Reviving an ancient-modern quarrel : a critique of Derrida's reading of Plato and Platoism by Irwin, Jones
University of Warwick institutional repository: http://go.warwick.ac.uk/wrap
A Thesis Submitted for the Degree of PhD at the University of Warwick
http://go.warwick.ac.uk/wrap/4203
This thesis is made available online and is protected by original copyright.
Please scroll down to view the document itself.
Please refer to the repository record for this item for information to help you to
cite it. Our policy information is available from the repository home page.
Reviving An Ancient-Modern Quarrel: A Critique of 
Derrida's Reading of Plato and Platonism 
A Thesis Presented For the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy 
by 
Jones A. Irwin 
December 1997 
University of Warwick 
Supervisors: Mr. Martin Warner 
Dr. Cyril Barrett 
ABSTRACT 
This thesis begins from an analysis of Derrida's specific readings of Plato and 
Platonism, identifying there a modernist bias, which interprets these metaphysical 
systems as if they were coextensive with Cartesian rationalism. Against Derrida, I 
argue for a repositioning of Plato and Platonism in the context of an ancient-modern 
quarrel. In replacing Descartes's "clarity and distinctness" with a pre-modern 
emphasis on "faith" (pistis), I am seeking to challenge Derrida's diagnosis of a 
perplexity or impasse (aporia) which cannot be overcome by philosophy. With 
specific reference to the Meno and the Phaedrus, one can locate a three-tiered 
Platonic dialectic beginning with an assertion of knowledge, followed by a necesary 
deconstruction of this knowledge with, thirdly, a tentative reconstruction of 
philosophy based on faith rather than knowing. In later chapters, I examine this 
dialectic as it is developed in the Neo- and Christian- Platonist traditions, particularly 
through the work of Plotinus, Boethius and Augustine. 
On my interpretation, deconstruction remains at the second level of the Platonic 
dialectic, that of impasse and perplexity (one of Derrida's most recent texts is in fact 
entitled Aporias). Again with reference to an ancient-modern quarrel, it is my 
contention that Derrida's unstinting stress on the "aporetic" is due to an overemphasis 
of the Cartesian paradigm. Derrida identifies the exhaustion of what Deeley calls "the 
classical modern paradigm" with the exhaustion of philosophy per se. But this 
identification of philosophy with Cartesianism can be seriously challenged through a 
renewed foregrounding of the premodern philosophical resources which Descartes 
(and now Derrida) have sought to obscure. 
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REVIVING AN ANCIENT-MODERN QUARREL: A CRITIQUE OF 
DERRIDA'S READING OF PLATO AND PLATONISM 
Introduction 
Those who would like to consider "deconstruction" a symptom of modern or 
postmodern nihilism could indeed, if they wished, recognise in it the last 
testimony - not to say the martyrdom of faith in the present fin de siecle. This 
reading will always be possible. Who could prohibit it? In the name of what? 
But what has happened, so that what is thus permitted is never necessary as 
such? 
Derrida, "Denials" (p. 77) 
Unhappy Aristotle! Who invented for these men dialectics, the art of building 
up and pulling down, an art so far-fetched in its conjectures, so harsh in its 
arguments, so productive of contentions - embarassing even to itself, retracting 
everything, and really treating of nothing! 
Tertullian, "On Prescription Against 
Heretics" 
My aim in this thesis is in a sense quite simple: to repose the question "What is 
Philosophy? ". John Deeley in his New Beginnings: Early Modern Philosophy and 
Postmodern Thought [1] makes the claim that the "premoderns" interrogated the 
presuppositions of modernity more powerfully than any of the "postmoderns" have so 
far achieved [p. xii, Santella-Brago Preface to Deeley]. My own claim in this thesis 
is more moderate to the extent that it focuses on specific strands of the premodern and 
postmodern epochs in thought - that of Platonism on the one side and deconstruction 
on the other. But given this more restricted scope, my claim is perhaps more radical; 
that in the case of Derrida's thinking, deconstruction is not only less questioning of 
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modernity than Platonism, but is in fact a reinforcing of the modern paradigm. 
Derrida, on my interpretation, is a neo-modern rather than a post-modern; 
deconstruction is in effect a more developed form of Cartesianism. 
This is not a claim which is standardly made against Derrida - ironically, 
deconstruction is usually subjected to the accusation that it is anti-Cartesian, anti- 
truth, irrational etc. (most notably by analytic philosophers e. g. Searle "Reply to 
Derrida" [2]). Defenders of deconstruction, however, have been known to refer to 
an Enlightenment element in Derrida's thinking. Christopher Norris [3] for example 
speaks of Derrida as continuing the work of Kant. More significantly, Simon 
Critchley, in an essay on Derrida's enigmatic text Glas [4] has referred to specific 
Kantian / Husserlian aspects of Derrida's thought - 
it is worth noting that when Derrida locates the thought of differance in 
Husserl's use of the "Idea in the Kantian sense", he adds, "La critique de 
Kant par Hegel vaudrait sans doute aussi contre Husserl". My claim is that 
this remark read against the grain and in the knowledge of Glas, is a good deal 
more Kantian or Husserlian than might at first appear [Speech and 
Phenomena, French edition p. 114] (Critchley, p. 20). 
This interpretation lends some support to the suggestion that Derrida is more a neo- 
modern than a post-modern. And this is precisely where one can locate the 
importance of "reviving an ancient-modern quarrel". Derrida's texts on "Plato" and 
"Platonism" (with which this thesis is primarily concerned) are readings of 
unequivocally "premodern" metaphysics. The epoch (or epochs) of "premodernity" 
have taken on a renewed importance in the philosophical world since the recognition 
of what Deeley calls "the exhaustion of the classical modern paradigm": 
we are at a turning point in the history of philosophy, a turning point forced 
upon us by the exhaustion of the classical modern paradigm [p. 6, Deeley]. 
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However, a difficulty arises if Derrida's work can properly be said to be neo-modenz 
rather than post-modern. For if deconstruction constitutes a development rather than a 
critique of modernity, to what extent is Derrida's thought also determined by the 
"exhaustion of the classical modern paradigm"? If modernity is exhausted, what 
validity can possibly attach to neo-modernity? This question can be said to apply 
most especially to Derrida's readings of "Plato" and "Platonism". As paradigmatic 
examples of "premodern" metaphysics, the philosophy of Plato and its development 
through neo-Platonism (Plotinus) and Christian Platonism (Boethius, Augustine, De 
Cusa) become crucial alternative visions or models to that of Descartes / modernity. 
Faced with the exhaustion of the classical modern paradigm and thus with the possible 
exhaustion of philosophy as such, "Plato" and "Platonism" can be reintroduced as 
ancient but nonetheless valid wellsprings for the reinvigoration of thinking. 
It is here that the crux of Derrida's readings of "Plato" and "Platonism" takes on 
significance. Rather than interpreting the latter metaphysical systems as being 
possible new well-springs of philosophy, Derrida (in essays such as "Plato's 
Pharmacy" and "Khora") seems rather to see such "premodern" thought as 
anticipating the modern exhaustion of philosophy. In other words, rather than 
positing "Plato" and "Platonism" as antidotes to the modern crisis in philosophy, 
Derrida seems rather to interpret them as reinforcing the inevitable exhaustion of 
thought. "Platonism" (on Derrida's reading), like deconstruction, would involve a 
"doubling" of philosophy, where the old binary oppositions of either / or become 
replaced by neither / nor or both / and. Certainly, this interpretation is not without 
textual support. To take the most evocative example, one could cite the Christian 
Platonism of Nicholas De Cusa. De Cusa had a strong distrust of Aristotelian 
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dialectic and explicitly rejected the principle of noncontradiction, embracing instead 
the equivocation of the coincidentia oppositorum. But rather than (as with Derrida) 
seeing the exhaustion of the principle of noncontradiction as the exhaustion of 
philosophy as such, De Cusa's work has rather been described as an attempt to 
"transcend the usual conceptual confines" [Luscombe p. 177] (5). 
He adhered to the crucial distinction characterised by Gerson as that between 
speculative theology and mystical theology, the former being the work of the 
intellectual power of the rational soul and the latter being the task of its affective 
power [Luscombe, p. 177]. In other words, "rationalism" was not the only 
alternative. From a theological perspective at least, one also had the alternative of a 
certain "mysticism". Since Descartes, of course, this "mysticism" has been seen as 
the terrain of theology and thus as excluded from philosophy proper. It was the very 
tendency towards the mystic or nonrational which Descartes saw as a primary 
weakness of ancient and medieval thought and which motivated his own rationalism 
as a counter-philosophy - 
in my college days, I discovered that nothing can be imagined which is too 
strange or incredible to have been said by some philosopher....... it is also true 
that I have completely lost the intent to refute this philosophy; for I see that it 
is so absolutely and so clearly destroyed by means of the establishment of my 
philosophy alone, that no other refutation is needed .... [Ariew: "Descartes and 
Scholasticism" Cambridge Companion to Descartes; quoted pp. 58/76] (6). 
It is conventional to locate the transition from ancient / medieval to modern 
philosophy with Rene Descartes ["modernity began with the Cartesian rationalism and 
Lockean empiricism, finding together their most accomplished synthesis in Kant"; 
Braga, Preface to Deeley; p. xii]. There are many aspects to this transition but my 
particular focus will be on the way in which for Descartes philosophy became 
coextensive with epistemology, the "search for clear and distinct ideas" of the 
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Meditations [7]. This epistemologism excluded as philosophically invalid such genres 
as De Cusa's "mystical theology", which was now seen as being based on a complete 
irrationalism. In effect, not simply De Cusa but a whole tradition of ancient and 
medieval thought became excluded as nonphilosophical. 
At the beginning of this Introduction, I elaborated the issue of re - posing a 
fundamental philosophical question: "What is Philosophy? ". With reference to the 
origin of modernity and the problem of the so-called "ancient-modern quarrel" [cf. for 
example, Stanley Rosen's The Question of Being](8), one can delineate two quite 
clearly opposed philosophical camps. The moderns, most notably Descartes (a legacy 
to be developed by Locke, Kant and Hegel amongst others), considered philosophy 
to be an exclusively epistemological enterprise, grounded in the question "what can I 
know? "[9]. And the ancient / medieval philosophers, most notably for us Plato and 
the tradition of Platonism, were concerned with defining philosophy more broadly as 
"philo-sophid', "love of wisdom", where the values of love and wisdom were 
distinguished from, and often opposed to, the value of knowledge, going back at 
least as far as Socrates' repeated pronouncement of "ignorance", most especially in 
the Meno where he undergoes the states of perplexity [aporia] and benumbment 
[narkosa] (cf. Chapter 3). 
It is this quarrel which sets the philosophical context of my exploration of the 
Derridean readings of "Plato" and "Platonism". The problems which are integral to 
this exploration will be outlined and interrogated through the successive analyses of 
this thesis. Before concluding this Introduction however, it is necessary to clarify the 
concept of eo-, nodernism which I have applied to Derrida's work. In considering the 
nature of the "ancient-modern quarrel" I have foregrounded the conflict between 
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epistemological and nonepistemological models (e. g. those based on "wisdom" and 
"love") of thought, the former being generally identifiable as "modern" models and 
the latter as "premodern". But where does this leave Derrida's "neo-modernism" and 
how might this be related to the much vaunted epoch of post-modernity? Here one 
can return to Simon Critchley's claim that Derrida may be more "Kantian" or 
"Husserlian" than originally thought. Critchley locates the evidence for this important 
suggestion in a statement Derrida makes in his early text on Husserl, Speech and 
Phenomena [10] - 
La critique de Kant par Hegel vaudrait sans doute aussi contre Husserl [French 
edition, p. 114]. 
The critique of Kant by Hegel would also undoubtedly apply against Husserl 
[my translation]. 
Given Descartes's original modernist intention of transforming philosophy into a 
rigorous epistemology, it is clear that the Kantian philosophy represents a 
development (albeit a critical development) of Cartesianism, rather than a complete 
refutation of the latter. What links Descartes and Kant is an emphasis on rational 
epistemology (rather than for example revelation) as the paradigmatic criterion of 
philosophical analysis[11]. This is also the case, despite their pronounced 
differences, with the respective cases of Hegel and Husserl. Indeed, one can trace a 
direct lineage from Descartes to Husserl in a specific text, the later Husserl's 
Cartesian Meditations[12]. While certainly not positing a homogeneous development 
therefore, one can trace a continuity between Descartes and Husserl which could be 
called a modern continuity, a consistent modernist rationalism. 
In interpreting Derrida as a "neo-modern", my intention is to place him solidly within 
this tradition of thought. The "neo" refers more to the fact that Derrida is still a 
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modernist within a supposedly post-modernist age than to any specific difference 
between deconstruction and the philosophy underlying modernity. It is true of course 
that Derrida has been critical of many modern thinkers, most notably Hegel. In 
Glas[13] for example, his stated intention (with especial reference to the Hegelian 
discourse) is to - 
enervate, then, dilapidate enormous discourses [Glas, p. 3/4] 
As Critchley observes - 
If Derrida can be said to read Hegel systematically, then this is not done in 
order to maintain the system, but rather to find a moment of "rupture" within 
the system's development [Critchley, p. 8]. 
But this finding of a "rupture" within Hegelian rationalism still seems completely 
accepting of the standard of philosophy as rational epistemology - it remains an intra- 
epistemological critique of epistemology. As Derrida observes in the essay "Cogito 
and the History of Madness"[14]; "Hegel again, always"[Cogito, p. 43]. And this 
essay is itself an attempt to defend Cartesian epistemology against Foucault's anti- 
epistemological stance, precisely under the conviction that "Reason" is inescapable. 
But if Derrida is a rationalist critic of Reason, how are we to situate his discourse 
within the problematic of the ancient-modern quarrel, and what implications might 
this have for issues concerning the nature of philosophy per se? 
Here perhaps the most revealing text is Glas, concerned as it is with, amongst other 
issues, Hegelianism and Kantianism. From the perspective of "premodern" thought, 
Glas is also significant as it involves an extended discussion of Christianity. 
Moreover, these three perspectives intersect in the discussion concerning the 
Hegelian philosophy of religion and how the latter relates to both the Kantian 
philosophy of religion and to religion per se - 
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Hegelian philosophy, through and through a philosophy of religion, could be 
read as an effect of Christianity as well as an implacable atheism. Religion 
accomplishes itself and dies in the philosophy that is its truth, as the truth of 
past religion, of the essence of thought past of the Christian religion [Glas, p. 
32]. 
In describing Hegelian philosophy as "through and through a philosophy of religion", 
Derrida locates one key moment of the ancient-modern split. For Plato, as for 
Platonism, the distinction between philosophy and religion, if it exists at all, is very 
blurred. This blurring of the distinction is what allows Platonism to develop into 
Christian Platonism. Although the dogmatics of the Christian faith (Incarnation, 
Crucifixion, Resurrection) are absent from Platonism, what remains continuous is 
the emphasis on nonrational criteria of interpretation - for example the "eroticism" of 
the Phaedrus [15] or Plotinus' concepts of "rapture" and "enthusiasm" (cf. Chapters 
4 and 6 below respectively). Platonism therefore is not so much a philosophy of 
religion as a philosophical religion / religious philosophy [the ordering of terms 
matters little]. In Chapter 2,1 trace this Platonic sense of a religion / philosophy from 
its roots in Presocratism, with particular reference to the work of Eric Voegelin [16]. 
In contrast to this Platonic intersection of philosophy and religion, what makes 
Hegelianism primarily a "philosophy of religion" (Derrida's emphasis) is precisely its 
attempt to subordinate religion to reason. Although for Hegel Christianity represents 
the highest form of religion ("the Absolute religion" - in contrast to Judaism), it still 
expresses the truth of existence only inadequately, as a representation or 
"Vorstellung" of Absolute Knowledge or Savoir Absolu, which Derrida shortens to 
the siglum Sa - 
But just as Christianity represents and anticipates itself only in its Vorstellung, 
in Judaism, so the absolute religion Christianity is, remains the Vorstellung 
of Sa as philosophy. Vorstellung's structure opens the scene of the holy family 
onto Sa [Glas, p. 32]. 
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Hegel posits his philosophy of religion in opposition to that of Kant who had claimed 
that "we can know nothing of God" (quoted Critchley 1988, p. 19). What links the 
two thinkers is their modern sense of a philosophy of religion. Although Hegel 
believes we can know God while Kant believes we cannot, both agree that from a 
philosophical point of view, religion must he interpreted according to the criteria of 
epistemology - "is it possible to know God'? ". Critchley makes the point that in 
opposing Hegel in Glas, Derrida may be himself moving towards a variation of 
Kantianism - 
If Hegelianism is, as Derrida claims, a philosophy of presence, where 
philosophy is the truth of religion and where self-consciousness is presented 
with the Absolute as an object of cognition, then one might ask, does 
Kantianism bear a more complex relation to the philosophy of presence? ...... Is 
Glas implicitly postulating a post-Hegelian Kantianism? [p. 20, Critchley 
1988]. 
For the purposes of this thesis, the important point here would not be the conflict 
between Hegelian and Kantian philosophies of religion, but rather the fundamental 
affinity between the latter and their mutual opposition to a premodern symbiosis 
between philosophy and religion. For Hegel - 
God is God only in so far as he knows himself; his self-knowledge is, further, 
a self-consciousness in man and man's knowledge of God, which proceeds to 
man's self-knowledge in God [Encyclopedia, quoted Critchley 1988 p. 19]. 
For Kant in contrast, "one can know nothing of God". But both share an emphasis on 
epistemology (whether gnosis or agnosia). From this point of view, Derrida's 
thought seems to follow Kant's (epistemological) emphasis on agnosis (this also of 
course has interesting parallels with Derrida's own Judaic background). As Derrida 
stated in his 1980 Doctoral Thesis defence Punctuations: "I have never known where 
I was going"[17]. For Derrida (as for Kant), this agnosticism is not simply applicable 
to theological matters but rather to every phenomenon coming under the rubric of 
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philosophical enquiry. As such, Derrida is not so much a theological agnostic as a 
philosophical agnostic. 
Socrates too, it might be noted, was a kind of philosophical agnostic: "all I know is 
that I know nothing". But as we shall see in the various analyses of this thesis, 
philosophical agnosticism represents only a stage of the Platonic "system" (as the term 
is applied to both Plato and the wider movement of "Platonism"). In Chapter 3, for 
example, I will analyse Plato's agnosticism from the point of view of Meno's 
paradox; the crucial point being that agnosia or ignorance remains conditional in 
Plato. In the Meno [18], it is overcome through a recourse to pistis or "belief' and a 
reference to the "divinely inspired poets", most notably Pindar. Significantly, 
Socrates states that to remain at the level of mere agnosia is to risk becoming argos 
(lazy) and rnalakos (indolent, evil). Plato's distance from Derrida's kind of 
agnosticism is clear. Similarly, Augustine is clear in stating that one can never 
properly know God. In the Confessions [19], he even goes so far (in Book 7) as to 
criticise "the Platonists" for a residual gnosticism. However, unlike Kant / Derrida, 
Augustine's agnosia is not definitive. It is rather superseded by a stress on love and 
intellect, which takes us beyond the circular argumentation of ratio. 
The tradition of Platonism therefore (as an exemplar of the "premodern" paradigm of 
philosophy) can be interpreted as leading beyond what Derrida sees as the debate 
between gnosis and agnosia. To return to the initial problematic of "What is 
philosophy? ", my concern is through an analysis of Derrida's reading of "Plato" and 
"Platonism" to redefine philosophy contra Derrida. In place of epistemologism, I 
will argue that philosophy needs to return to its original self-conception as "philo- 
Sophia", love of wisdom. Ironically, this may not require too much of a leap back to 
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the historical past. This thesis is not set up as a refutation of contemporary "post- 
modern" thought; rather it is interested in the ways in which "postmodernism" might 
be extricated from "neo-modernism" and become a genuine move beyond what 
Deeley has called "the exhaustion of the classical modern paradigm". On my 
interpretation, Derrida has failed to take up the most important and transformative 
potentialities of this exhaustion, preferring one might say to dwell on the "end" rather 
than to make a new beginning. Jean-Francois Lyotard's conception of post-modernity 
however, as not so much a historical periodization as an "alien temporality", is very 
suggestive - 
the postmodern is thus an alien temporality that in a sense precedes and 
constitutes modernismn, always inscribing the possibility of a radical revision 
of modernism against itself, specifically in the thinking of the event (Bill 
Readings - Lyotard: Art and Politics) [20] 
As understood by Lyotard, the "post-modern" leads one out of the problem of simply 
positing a return to some pristine "origin" of thought. Premodern metaphysics 
understood on Lyotard's model would also be post-modern. Contrary to popular 
opinion Plato, and not Derrida, would be the exemplary post-modernist, the radical 
reviser of modernism. To this extent, there would open up powerful possibilities for 
philosophy beyond the limits of neo-Cartesianism. And there would also open up the 
possibility of marking important affinities (as well as disaffinities) between such 
unlikely counterparts as Plato and Lyotard, Plotinus and Heidegger, Augustine and 
Bataille...... [21]. 
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CHAPTER 1- DERRIDA ON THE "MODERNS" AND THE 
"ANCIENTS" 
Section 1.1 - Prefatory Remarks 
There is no chance that within the thematic of metaphysics anything might 
have budged, as concerns the concept of time, from Aristotle to Hegel. The 
founding concepts of substance and cause, along with their entire system of 
connected concepts, suffice by themselves - whatever their differences and 
internal problematics - ensure (us of) the transmission and uninterrupted 
continuity - however highly differentiated - of all the moments of Metaphysics, 
Physics and Logic, passing through Ethics [Derrida, "Ousia and Gramme" p. 
39] (1) 
The above quotation locates a fundamental continuity in what Derrida refers to as the 
"thematic of metaphysics", here extending from Aristotle to Hegel. This Derridean 
interpretation cuts across what I referred to in the Introduction as the ancient-modern 
quarrel. "Ousia and Gramme" makes the claim that (at least in one fundamental 
respect) there "is no chance" of a real quarrel between the ancients and the moderns - 
there is rather an "uninterrupted continuity", nothing "budges". I have outlined above 
how a philosophical link might be made between the "premoderns" and the 
"postmoderns", - as both epochs are questioning of epistemological rationalism as a 
value. Given what Deeley calls "the exhaustion of the classical modern paradigm" 
[Deeley, p. 6] (2), premodern thought becomes a crucial ally and resource of thought 
for postmodern philosophy. This resource, however, can only be accessed if one 
accepts the reality of an ancient-modern quarrel. For if, with Derrida, one sees an 
"uninterrupted continuity" between the ancients and the moderns, then premodern 
thinking also becomes subject to the "exhaustion" of the "classical modern paradigm". 
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I will argue that Derrida's account of such continuity between the ancients and the 
moderns is grounded in a generalisation of Cartesianism to the history of philosophy 
"as such" [cf. PP., tr. pp. 86 / 194, tr. p. 76 / 167] (3). From a reading of Descartes, 
Derrida applies the Cartesian logic back to the very origin of philosophy with Plato. 
The "exhaustion" of Cartesianism (of what Derrida refers to in "Cogito and the 
History of Madness" as the "pathetic" essence of philosophy) becomes the 
"exhaustion" of philosophy per se. In this chapter, I will trace the development of 
this Derridean interpretation through an analysis of two crucial essays, "Cogito and 
the History of Madness" [1963] (4) and "Plato's Pharmacy" [1972], beginning with 
the former. 
Section 1.2 - Derrida and Descartes 
there is no Trojan horse unconquerable by Reason (in general)..... 
Derrida, "Cogito... " 
The essay "Cogito and the History of Madness" is one of Derrida's earliest texts 
(1963) and, significantly, it is written at a time when Derrida is also working on 
Husserl. The very title of Husserl's late text "Cartesian Meditations" [5] makes 
explicit the links with the Cartesian legacy which Derrida takes up; Derrida's texts on 
Husserl, Introduction to Husserl's "Origin of Geometry"[6], Speech and 
Phenomena[7] and the 1959 essay "Genesis and Structure"[8] can be seen to bear on 
his 1963 interpretation of Descartes. Derrida's first published book (from 1962) is his 
Edmund Husserl's "Origin of Geometry": An Introduction. There Derrida focuses on 
what he terms "the Idea in the Kantian sense". He is critical of Husserl's attempt to 
dialecticize this "idea" into a phenomenological "intuition" and stresses how Husserl 
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fails adequately to recognise the distinction between these two terms which Kant saw 
as crucial. 
In other words, for Derrida Husserlian phenomenology is at its most convincing when 
it maintains a Kantian scepticism towards metaphysical dialectics, emphasising 
instead of the essential "thing in itself', the "idea" divorced from dialectical 
objectivism. In the Introduction I noted Simon Critchley's contention that Derrida's 
later text Glas [1974] (9) adopts a similarly "Kantian" approach to dialectics. 
Significantly, Derrida's text "Cogito and the History of Madness" (which I will focus 
on in this section) also foregrounds the paradigm of an "idea" abstracted from 
metaphysical dialectics. This is a crucial emphasis with regard to the ancient-modern 
quarrel. In privileging an "idea" divorced from metaphysical objectivism, Derrida is 
placing himself firmly in a modernist tradition of thinking. Descartes is the pivotal 
founder of this modernist tendency in philosophical thought and "Cogito and the 
History of Madness" can be interpreted as Derrida's neo-modernist development of 
the Cartesian legacy. Greek and medieval "realism" (e. g. Platonism), with its 
contrasting stress on the "object" independent of the idea can be seen as an exact 
opponent of the Cartesian / Derridean school of thought. It is these two paradigms of 
thinking which I will bring into direct confrontation in this thesis but before doing so 
it will be necessary to examine Derrida's "neo-Cartesianism" in more detail. 
Derrida's "Cogito" essay is primarily a critique of Foucault's reading of Descartes in 
Madness and Civilisation [10]. In this text, Foucault puts forward a critique of 
Descartes which interprets the latter as excluding the possibility of the individual 
subject being mad. He instances the following passage from Descartes' Meditations 
as conclusive evidence - 
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And how could I deny these hands and this body are mine, were it not perhaps 
that I compare myself to certain persons, devoid of sense, whose cerebrella 
are so troubled and clouded by the violent vapours of black bile, that they 
constantly assure us that they are kings when they are really quite poor, or that 
they are clothed in purple when they are really without covering, or who 
imagine that they have an earthenware head or are nothing but pumpkins or are 
made of glass...... But they are mad (sed anientes stint isti), and I should not be 
any the less insane (demens) were Ito follow examples so extravagant [quoted 
in "Cogito" essay; p. 45 / 46]. 
What interests Foucault is how this exclusion is meant to be consistent with 
Descartes' project of radical doubt. Has not this doubt remained complacent and thus 
unsuccessful in the measure to which it has assumed that it could not possibly be 
mad? Foucault concludes the following - 
In the economy of doubt, there is a fundamental imbalance between madness, 
on the one hand, and error, on the other....... Descartes does not avoid the peril 
of madness in the same way he circumvents the eventuality of dream and error 
["Cogito", p. 46]. 
In other words, Foucault is claiming that the "absolute foundation" of the Cartesian 
Cogito, grounded indubitably after the supposed furthest extremes of questioning, 
remains precarious in the measure to which these furthest extremes have not been 
reached: the "peril of madness" has not been avoided One can say that, according to 
Foucault, Descartes has only maintained a stable metaphysical structure (the Cogito) 
through a repression or exclusion of excess. It is this precise interpretation which 
Derrida wishes to counter in "Cogito and the History of Madness", and he does so 
from two points of view. According to Derrida - 
a) the Cogito, not only does not exclude madness, but is related to the very 
experience of madness itself. Indeed, madness (as an instance of excess) is 
shown to depend upon the Cogito as its basic presupposition. 
and 
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b) this internal relationship between thought and madness is characteristic of 
what Derrida sees as the highest possibilities of philosophy. It is only the 
"hyperbole" ["Cogito", p. 57] (or excess) of metaphysics which can escape the 
"determined historical totality" ["Cogito", p. 57]. 
In the first case, Derrida stresses a very specific misreading of the Meditations by 
Foucault. The Cartesian passage previously quoted, far from determining an 
exclusion of madness, is shown by Derrida to be simply a pedagogical device of 
Descartes to avoid alienating his readers. Foremost in Descartes' mind is the effort to 
exemplify the fact that crisis is not confined to the realm of the idiosyncratic. If 
madness were to be the paradigm of this crisis, it would give the impression that the 
crisis was not generalized, was thus not altogether serious. Consequently, Descartes 
looks to dreams as a "more common, and more universal experience than that of 
madness" ["Cogito", p. 81]. Significantly, however, this in no way reduces the 
extremity of doubt. Rather, dreams are simply a different medium for the same 
message. Because, as Derrida demonstrates, Descartes, under this new hypothesis 
of dreams, reintroduces the very same kind of doubt he had previously judged 
inadmissable under the hypothesis of insanity. The important point being that it is not 
the content or extremity of the doubting which has been exchanged, but rather the 
pedagogical case which is used to exemplify this doubt. And as madness seemed to 
imply a body made of glass so now dreams seem to suggest that even this residual 
material has been withdrawn - 
I shall consider that the heavens, the earth, colours, figures, sound, and all 
other external things are nought but the illusions and dreams of which an evil 
genius has availed himself in order to lay traps for my credulity; I shall 
consider myself as having no hands, no eyes, no flesh, no blood, nor any 
senses, yet falsely believing myself to have all these things ["Cogito", p. 53]. 
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This point of extreme doubt is of course only a transitional phase for Descartes. It 
will eventually lead to the more solid principle of Cogito, ergo sum [Descartes 
Discourse on Method) or "I think, therefore I am". But what is important for Derrida 
is that this movement from the radicality of dreams to the indubitability of the Cogito 
in no way represents an exclusion of hyperbolic questioning. Rather for Descartes, 
the point is precisely that the solidity of the Cogito remains consistent even with the 
extremity of doubt; even with madness as Derrida observes - 
it can no longer literally be said that the Cogito would escape madness because 
it keeps itself beyond the grasp of madness, or because as Foucault says, "I 
who think, I cannot be mad"; the Cogito escapes madness only because at its 
own moment, under its own authority, it is valid even if I mit mad, even if 
my thoughts are completely mad ["Cogito", p. 55]. 
This then would be Derrida's disagreement with Foucault. While the latter sees the 
Cogito as a metaphysical reduction of excess, Derrida sees rather Foucault's analysis 
of the Cogito as reductionistic. The principle of "I think, therefore I am" does not 
depend upon the repression of the possibility of madness. Rather, as Derrida notes - 
madness is only one case of thought (within thought) [Derrida's emphasis] 
["Cogito", p. 56]. 
This brings me to the second point mentioned above. That the radicality of a Cogito 
which no longer seeks to exclude madness is for Derrida characteristic of the highest 
possibilities of philosophy. It is best approached through his analysis of the concept 
of crisis ["Cogito", p. 62], given near the end of the "Cogito" essay. There, Derrida 
speaks of there being two kinds of philosophical crisis. In the first place, he refers to 
Husserl's sense of "crisis", in the guise of objectivism and the forgetting of origins. 
In the essay The Origin of Geometry, for example, Husserl puts forward a critique of 
the objectivism inherent in Galilean geometry. The latter is a "handed-down" [Origin 
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of Geometry, p. 157] (hereafter OG) science, which takes its fundamental axioms as 
an "inheritance" [OG, p. 170]. But for Husserl, such a science remains alienated 
from its origin and because this origin has received no philosophical validation, the 
theorems of Galileo remain without support. They are reduced to contingent and 
arbitrary principles. This kind of geometry, therefore, (and Galilean geometry would 
seem to be being employed as a paradigm case of geometry in general) is in crisis. 
What is required in response to this crisis is a Rückfrage [OG, p. 113], a return 
enquiry, which will seek to reactivate the repressed history of geometry, leading back 
to the originary source of this history in what Husserl calls the lebenstivelt (the life- 
world) [OG, p. 172]. 
Briefly, one can say that Derrida agrees with this Husserlian analysis in the measure 
to which it is a critique of objectivism, but disagrees with the proposed solution of a 
Rückfrage. Derrida makes this clear in his Introduction. One is therefore left with a 
discredited objectivism, which is shown to depend upon a historical, finite 
beginning, but from this finitude Derrida denies that one can reach what Husserl 
called a historical a priori [OG., p. 180]. And this would be the second sense of crisis 
which Derrida wishes to introduce. A crisis which is no longer simply a forgetting of 
origins, but rather a crisis of "origin" [ OG., p. 153] itself, a confusion as to whether 
there ever was an origin or a unified first principle which could act as a regulator and 
normative ideal for all succeeding history. 
This would seem to return Derrida to the kind of Dilthyean historicism (or historical 
relativism) to which phenomenology was a direct reaction. However, Derrida wishes 
to say more than this and "Cogito and the History of Madness" is once again 
instructive in this regard. In the following passage, for example, he distances 
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himself from the idea that the principle of finite world-views, characteristic of 
historicism, is sufficient in itself - 
In question is a way of accounting for the very historicity of philosophy. I 
believe that history in general would be impossible if we possessed only 
hyperbole, on the one hand, or, on the other, only determined historical 
structures, finite world-views ["Cogito", p. 60]. 
In this passage, Derrida would seem to be making a crucial distinction between 
"historicity" and "history". History, on the one hand, would simply be the relativity 
of world-views, what Derrida also refers to in this essay as the "human" ["Cogito", 
p. 56], the realm of "the natural man" [p. 56], "all that is real, factual, and existent" 
[p. 56], "anthropological factuality" [p. 56]. In contrast, historicity would involve 
the conflict between history and all that is "metaphysical and demonic", all that 
which involves a "reduction of the natural man" [p. 56], "the margin of the possible, 
the principled and the meaningful, which exceeds all that is real, factual and 
existent" [p. 56]. In the above passage, Derrida refers to the latter category as 
"hyperbole". It is the battle between metaphysical hyperbole and finite history which 
Derrida sees as constitutive of philosophy's historicity, and it is precisely this value 
of historicity which takes deconstruction beyond both Husserl's historical a priori and 
the relativity of historicism. Firstly, in the case of historicism, it can be said that the 
historicity of philosophy is more than a series of relative world-views as philosophy, 
for Derrida, involves "a thinking beyond the finite shelter" - 
if philosophy has taken place........ it is only in the extent to which it has 
formulated the aim of thinking beyond the finite shelter ["Cogito", p. 56]. 
Following this passage, Derrida formulates a possible historicist rejoinder. Is it not 
precisely this attempt to think beyond finitude which is symptomatic of philosophy's 
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effort to shelter itself from the necessity of finitude? (i. e. the necessity of the absence 
of infinity or God). Derrida answers in the negative - 
One cannot allege that the philosophical project of the "infinitivist" 
rationalisms served as an instrument or as an alibi for a finite historico- 
political-social violence (which is doubtless the case) without first having to 
acknowledge and respect the intentional meaning of this project itself. Now, 
within its own intentional meaning, this project presents itself as the 
conceptualisation of the infinite, that is, of that which cannot be exhausted by 
any finite totality, by any function, or by any instrumental, technical, or 
political determination. It will be said this presentation of the philosophical 
project by itself as such is its greatest lie, its violence and its mystification - 
or, further, its bad faith. And certainly, the structure which links this 
intention to exceed the world to the totality of history must be described 
rigorously, and its economy must be determined. But like all ruses, these 
economic ones are possible only for finite words and finite intentions, 
substituting one finitude for another ["Cogito", p. 310]. 
Historicism, therefore, for Derrida, would merely substitute one finitude for another. 
The important point being that the "intentional meaning" of the infinitivist project is 
here interpreted as significantly exceeding relativism. It is thus an intention, an idea, 
of infinity which is constitutive of philosophy's "historicity" and of its irreducibility to 
finite world-views - 
One cannot accuse those individuals or societies who use God as a recourse 
against madness of seeking to shelter themselves, to be sure of having 
protections against madness - the safe boundaries of asylums - except by 
construing this shelter as a finite one, within the world, by making God a 
third party or finite power, that is, except by deceiving oneself; by deceiving 
oneself not concerning the content and effective finality of this gesture in 
history, but concerning the philosophical specificity of the idea and name of 
God ["Cogito", p. 110] (Derrida's emphasis). 
It is thus the idea of God which is philosophically specific, which is specific to 
philosophy. Beyond the consequent critique of historicism, this diagnosis has 
important ramifications for Husserl's regulative ideal of an historical a priori. The 
problem, in brief, stems from the chasm between an idea or intention on the one 
hand, and the so-called thing-in-itself on the other. Husserl's phenomenology 
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grounds its critique of historicism in the conviction that the finite world-view can be 
superseded by infinity, as an idea and also, most importantly, as a thing-in-itself. 
Husserl is no idealist. But in the above passage, Derrida tells the reader that it is 
precisely and exclusively an idea of infinity which constitutes philosophy's exceeding 
of historicism and therefore its very specificity and power. The dream of Husserl has 
consequently been left behind, reduced in scope. But, more importantly, one has 
here Derrida's clear positing of what he sees as the highest possibility of philosophy. 
It is a thinking beyond the finite shelter, an idea of nonfinitude. 
Certainly, this would seem to mark Derrida's originality as a philosopher in the 
measure to which it is a hypothesis which a priori excludes the possibility of the idea 
of infinity being anything more than ideal. To employ a distinction used by Derrida 
earlier in the "Cogito" essay, infinity belongs within the margin of the possible, 
principled and meaningful rather than in the finite shelter of the "real, factual and 
existent". So, for example, so long as Descartes' idea of infinity remains just that, 
an idea, Derrida is happy to defend him against Foucault's objections. However, 
when later in the Meditations, Descartes begins to neglect the precariousness (or 
madness, as Derrida sees it) of this idea, and acts as if this idea were a truth in some 
objective sense, Derrida sides with Foucault - 
the act of the Cogito, at the hyperbolical moment when it pits itself against 
madness, or rather lets itself be pitted against madness, must be repeated and 
distinguished from the language or the deductive system in which Descartes 
must inscribe it as soon as he reflects the Cogito for the other, which means 
for oneself. It is through this relationship to the other as an other self that 
meaning reassures itself against madness and nonmeaning. And philosophy is 
perhaps the reassurance given against the anguish of being mad at the point of 
greatest proximity to madness. This silent and specific moment could be 
called pathetic ["Cogito", p. 59]. 
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Derrida has thus given us two kinds of philosophy, espoused by Descartes at different 
moments. On the one hand, the madness or excess of what one might call his 
philosophy of ideas, his hyperbolic notions of infinity. And, on the other hand, the 
misguided reassurance of his deductive system which inscribes his mad ideas of 
infinity as if they were objective truths. While philosophers of the first kind would, 
on Derrida's terms, escape Foucault's accusations of a repression of madness, 
philosophers of the second kind would not. To be clear, therefore, one can say that 
Derrida defends Descartes's Meditations only at their most hyperbolic moment. 
Additionally, he employs this aspect of Cartesian thought to set up a whole 
philosophy of philosophy, a meta-philosophy - 
philosophy is perhaps the reassurance given against the anguish of being mad 
at the point of greatest proximity to madeness. This silent and specific 
moment could be called pathetic ["Cogito", p. 59]. 
But Derrida now goes on to make a crucial qualification. The "reassurance" which he 
has described as being "pathetic" is integral to metaphysical dialectics which has as 
its effect a "finite historico-political-social violence". However, one cannot make 
philosophy as such synonymous with only this (reactive) dialectical movement. 
Crucially, one would "first" have to acknowledge the predialectical or "intentional 
meaning of this project itself' - 
One cannot accuse those individuals or societies who use God as a recourse 
against madness of seeking to shelter themselves........ except by deceiving 
oneself; by deceiving oneself not concerning the content and effective finality 
of this gesture in history, but concerning the philosophical specificity of the 
idea and name of God ["Cogito", p. 110]. 
It is this aspect of Cartesianism, its "intentional" or ideal aspect which Derrida 
wishes to maintain. This neo-modernist grounding of deconstruction becomes crucial 
in considering Derrida's readings of Platonism. As we will see in the next section, 
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for example, "Plato's Pharmacy" seeks to instigate an "unravelling" [denouement] of 
Platonic dialectics. In the "Cogito" essay, Derrida pinpoints an exhaustion of 
Cartesian dialectics and abstracts from this a neo-modernist stress on Cartesian 
ideality divorced from its "deductive system". In "Plato's Pharmacy" similarly, the 
metaphysical pretensions of Plato / Socrates are shown to be illusory. Socrates 
institutes no proper dialectic but is rather a "sorcerer" who (with particular reference 
to the Meno) is an instigator only of aporia and confusion. 
My contention (which I offer as merely a suggestion here - to be developed in further 
chapters) is that this "unravelling" of dialectics and the consequent embracing of a 
neo-modernist ideality excludes the possibility of a realist dialectics grounded outside 
Cartesianism. One fundamental aspect of the "Cogito" essay is Derrida's claim 
(contra Foucault) that the "history of Metaphysics" is a "continuous history". As 
Derrida notes in the essay "Plato's Pharmacy" - 
Platonism sets up the whole of Western metaphysics in its conceptuality[12]. 
The difficulty with this Derridean interpretation is that it misses the fundamental 
rupture which takes place between the ancients / medievals and Descartes. With the 
Cartesian system, a clear transition takes place from the paradigm of the realist object 
to the paradigm of the subjective idea. A residual realism remains in Cartesianism as 
the subjective idea seeks to correspond to an extra-subjective object, but the locus of 
emphasis has changed. The object is now dependent upon the subject, and not vice 
versa. Derrida's neo-modernism takes the break with realism one stage further. 
Because the Cartesian "deductive system" is a failure, because the idea fails to 
correspond to the object, one must abstract the idea from any obligation to 
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correspondence whatsoever. Deconstruction therefore, in valuing the ideal as ideal, 
seems to take Cartesianism to its logical conclusion. 
However, there is a danger here of identifying the logical development of 
Cartesianism with the development of philosophy as such. The failure of the 
Cartesian deductive system may inevitably lead (from a Cartesian perspective) to the 
valuation of an abstracted ideality. But this conclusion is not applicable to 
philosophies which do not begin from the Cartesian emphasis on the Cogito. 
Derrida's conclusions concerning the "unravelling" of philosophical dialectics in the 
"Cogito" essay (and below, in "Plato's Pharmacy") remain open to question from an 
other than Cartesian standpoint. It is this widening of the philosophical perspectives 
(with particular reference to the thought of Plato and Platonism) which I will develop 
in the succeeding chapters. Before doing so, however, it will be useful to analyse 
Derrida's deconstruction of Platonic dialectics in "Plato's Pharmacy". 
Section 1.3 -A Poison (Pharmakon) Deserved 
this strategy is a strategy without any finality; for this is what I hold and what 
in turn holds me in its grip, the aleatory strategy of someone who admits that 
he does not know where he is going (Punctuations, p. 50) [quoted in Critchley, 
The Ethics of Deconstruction p. 104) [13] 
In the "Cogito" essay Derrida declares "I philosophise only in terror", this "terror" 
being consequent upon the "aleatory strategy" described in the above epigram. This 
mode of anxious modernism (the anxiety of someone "who does not know") is 
continued in the essay "Plato's Pharmacy". The import of this later text is that 
Platonism, like Cartesianism, is unable to maintain its "deductive system", a system 
which Platonism is credited with having instituted in the first place. At several points 
"Platonism" (e. g. PP., p. 86, tr. p. 76), here understood as the work of Plato alone, is 
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cited as setting up the whole of philosophy in its conceptuality (e. g. pp. 86 / 194, tr. 
pp. 76 / 167). As with Descartes, Plato's attempt to maintain a correspondence 
between the Idea (or Form) of truth and the objective reality of truth runs aground, in 
this case because of the inability of Plato to extricate his philosophy from its sworn 
enemy, sophism. In other words, truth becomes falsity and falsity becomes truth, 
leaving the binary oppositions of Platonic "conceptuality" in crisis; a process Derrida 
refers to as "doubling" and which will give the title to the follow-on text in 
Dissemination on Mallarme, "The Double Session". It is helpful to note at this point 
a problem with the Derridean interpretation which I will develop in more detail below. 
The Platonic Idea is not identifiable with the Cartesian "idea" - to make this 
identification, as Derrida does, is to miss the whole import of this ancient-modern 
quarrel. The Cartesian idea is a subjective criterion - it is grounded in Descartes's 
revolutionary return to the self (Cogito, ergo sum). The Platonic Idea (Ideon) in 
contrast is perhaps less confusingly translated "Form" and refers to the 
unrepresentable (to the subject) "object" of philosophical striving. It is precisely this 
inaccessibility of the Platonic Idea / Form to subjectivity which will motivate 
Aristotle's vehement criticisms of Platonism in Book 1 (chapters 9 and 13) of his 
Metaphysics [14]. "Plato's Pharmacy" interprets the Platonic arguments for 
philosophical truth as if they had as their criterion the certainty of Cartesian "reason". 
But as we shall see in succeeding chapters, Platonic idealism often sets itself up in 
direct opposition to rationalism, the nonrational basis of its claims being exactly (as 
for example with De Cusa) the justification for an acceptance of those claims. These 
are issues to which I will return below. First, however, I will look at "Plato's 
Pharmacy" in more detail. 
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Derrida's analysis in this essay has as one of its primary loci the relationship between 
Plato and sophistics (PP, p. 120 -136, p. 105-119). Initially, Derrida makes the 
following blunt statement - 
men of writing appear before the eye of God not as wise men (sophoi) but in 
truth as fake or self-proclaimed wise men (doxosophoi). This is Plato's 
definition of the sophist. For it is above all against sophistics that this diatribe 
against writing is directed: it can be inscribed within the interminable trial 
instituted by Plato, under the name of philosophy, against the sophists [on peilt 
1'inscrire dans I'interminable proces entame par Platon, sur le nom de 
philosophie contre les sophistes] (PP. p. 120 /121, tr. p. 105 /106) 
Just two pages on, however, Derrida adopts a rather different tone - 
Contrary to what we have indicated earlier, there are also good reasons for 
thinking that the diatribe against writing is not aimed first and foremost at the 
sophists. On the contrary: sometimes it seems to proceed from them (il seinble 
parfois en proceder) [Derrida's emphasis] (PP. p. 123, tr. p. 108). 
The negative, rejoinding aspect of this second statement is clear - Derrida twice uses 
the term "contrary" alongside a single use of "not". But the more affirming, extending 
sense of this passage is easier to miss. It is encapsulated in the "also" - "there are also 
good reasons for thinking". Once again, Derrida is not so much arguing against 
himself as adding a second (apparently contradictory) proposition to a prior premise. 
Plato would be both against sophistics and for sophistics. This logic of both / and is 
developed by Derrida in the succeeding discussion. 
Socrates' and Plato's original criticism of the sophists is presented by Derrida (see 
above) as being linked to writing. The diatribe against writing is primarily a diatribe 
against sophistics (p. 120 /121, tr. p. 105 / 106). In the Sophist[15], Socrates gives a 
definition of the character of the title - the sophist is "the imitator of him who knows" 
('nirnetes tou sophou). This status of "imitation" is grounded in the privileging of 
speech over writing - writing can only imitate speech. But now Derrida points to a 
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discussion of writing in the Laws[16] where Plato seems to adopt a more affirmative 
attitude - 
In this instance, the immutable, petrified identity of writing is not simply 
added to the signified law or prescribed rule like a mute, stupid simulacrum: it 
assures the law's permanence and identity with the vigilance of a guardian 
[eile en assure la permanence et 1'identite avec la vigilance d'un gardien] 
(quoted PP. p. 128 jr. p. 113) 
Derrida quotes from two passages in the Laws, the first (891a) where the putting into 
writing (en grammasi tethenta) is interpreted as being both a challenge to posterity 
and a safeguard against people's tendency to miss the point at first hearing - "since 
even the dull student may return to them for reiterated scrutiny" (891a). The second 
passage concerns the need to procure books (grammata) as a condition for being a 
righteously equal judge. Such a judge "must keep these matters before his eyes", a 
possibility underivable from speech but intrinsic to the permanence of writing. The 
final sentence of the passage leaves one in no doubt that here at least Plato is 
privileging writing over speech - 
There is, in truth, no study whatsoever so potent as this of law, if the law be 
what it should be, to make a better man of its student. (957c). 
Already, Derrida states, there has been a "reversal" [renversement; also "overthrow"] 
(PP. p. 128, tr. p. 112) of Plato's original position of a distancing from writing and 
sophistics, understood as interdependent, to an endorsement of writing, as the most 
potent method of studying law and moreover, the best means to make a better man of 
its student. Writing is thus now tied, positively, to morality and civil ethics. But this 
is only the first of the apparent inversions which Derrida will describe. These 
inversions are not limited to the Platonic side of the "border" [frontiere] (PP. p. 123, 
tr. p. 108), but are equally engaged in by sophistics. Isocrates, sophist par excellence, 
is the next thinker foregrounded in "Plato's Pharmacy" - 
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Inversely, symmetrically, the rhetors had not waited around for Plato in order 
to translate writing into judgement. For Isocrates, for Alcidamas, logos was 
also a living thing (zoon) whose vigor, richness, agility and flexibility were 
limited and constrained by the cadaverous rigidity of the written sign. (PP. p. 
129, tr. p. 114). 
"Inversely, symmetrically" [Inversement, symetriquement] - before discussing the 
details of the Isocrates case, it is useful to once again move towards what might be 
called the meta-level, towards Derrida's motif of closure. On the one hand, there is 
inversion here ('inversely'). Plato inverts a privileging of speech over writing into a 
privileging of writing over speech. Isocrates inverts a (conventionally) sophistic 
privileging of writing over speech into a privileging of speech over writing. On the 
other hand, there is simultaneously an undeniable symmetry ('symmetrically') at 
work. If the opposition between Plato and sophistics is premised on their maintaining 
their stereotypical positions, the above inversions problematize such a fundamental 
opposition, such a fundamental assymmetry. They thus, by definition, point towards 
the possibility of symmetry. But, of course, one is not here (chez Derrida) dealing 
with a dialectic of thesis, antithesis, synthesis. Symmetry would not constitute the 
final term of a series. Rather it would now be added as a supplemental term to the 
previous binary opposition between Plato and sophistics. Thus - 
1) Plato and sophistics would be symmetrical. 
2) Plato and sophistics would be assymmetrical. 
This enigmatic series of simultaneous inversion, symmetry and assymmetry is 
eloquently described by Derrida in "Plato's Pharmacy" in the following, revealing 
passage - 
The front line that is violently inscribed between Platonism and its closest 
other, in the form of sophistics, is far from being unified, continuous [est loin 
d'etre unie, continue] as if stretched between two homogeneous areas. Its 
design is such that, through a systematic indecision, the parties and the party 
lines frequently exchange [echangent] their respective places, imitating the 
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forms and borrowing the paths of the opponent. These permutations are 
therefore possible, and if they are obliged to inscribe themselves within some 
common territory [stir uzt terrain conunun], the dissension no doubt remains 
internal and casts into absolute shadow some entirely-other [tout-autre] of 
both sophistics and Platonism, some resistance having no common 
denominator [sans commune inesure] with this whole commutation (PP. p. 
123, tr. p. 108). 
The references to a "common territory" and a "whole commutation" (tonte cette 
corona Cation) in this passage manifest the tendency in Derrida's work towards a 
certain absolutism. This is unsurprising when one considers that Derrida's concept of 
closure is premised on a description of the relations between the "inside" and the 
"outside". Whereas Plato, at the most repressive moments of his text, would seek to 
exclude the "outside", deconstruction would attempt to open up towards the "other". 
Inversely, (symmetrically), whereas thinkers of the "outside" such as Bataille, Artaud 
etc. would seek to exclude the "inside", deconstruction would attempt to reground a 
respect for the complexity of traditional metaphysics (and Derrida's reading of these 
thinkers particularly in Writing and Difference is a clear distancing of the work of 
deconstruction from the French avant-garde). Deconstruction would thus represent 
both the "inside" and the "outside" and as such would appear to have a greater claim 
to the status of absolutism than either metaphysics (privileging the "inside") or the 
avant-garde (privileging the "outside"). This issue of deconstruction and a certain 
absolutism is one I will return to below. Suffice to say here that the deconstructive 
concept of the supplement (graft, grapheme etc. ) is perhaps more appropriately 
described as an addition to the Absolute rather than the institution of a new dominant 
paradigm (the very possibility of addition to an absolute calling the latter concept into 
question). 
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Returning to the case of Isocrates, in "Plato's Pharmacy" Derrida is keen once again to 
exemplify the multiplication of inversions, apparent contradictions, bizarre 
complicities - 
If one holds, as does Robin, that the Phaedrus is, despite certain appearances, 
`an indictment against the rhetoric of Isocrates' and that the latter is more 
concerned, whatever he may say, with doxa than with episteme, one will not be 
surprised by the title of his discourse, "Against the Sophists". Neither will one 
be amazed to find, for example, this passage, whose formal resemblance with 
Socrates' argumentation is blinding (aveuglante)......... (PP. p. 129, tr. p. 114). 
Derrida goes on to quote from Isocrates' kata ton sophiston ("Against the 
Sophists"[ 17]), the relevant passage being itself an interesting admixture of sophistic 
and anti-sophistic elements (but by this point one is beginning to wonder with Derrida 
what exactly is constitutive of sophistics as such, or indeed anything as such e. g. 
philosophy as such, Platonism as such, deconstruction as such. The details of 
Isocrates' statement will be elaborated below. But at this point it is more helpful to 
unpack the complexities of the Derridean passage leading into the citation from 
Isocrates. At least nine points can be disentangled from Derrida's dense writing - 
1) the initial conditional. "If one holds... " (Si Pon tient) to a certain interpretation of 
the Phaedrus (here the interpretation of Robin [18]). Insofar as the Phaedrus is 
Derrida's primary concern in "Plato's Pharmacy", such a conditional foregrounds an 
important issue - how is one to interpret the Phaedrus and by implication, the work of 
Plato as a whole. 
2) Robin's interpretation claims that the Phaedrus, despite certain appearances 
(malgre certaines apparences) [p. 129 / tr. p. 114), is of a certain sort. But what of 
these "appearances" - is Derrida referring to certain inversions and contradictions 
within the Phaedrus itself? If so, what? 
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3) Despite certain appearances, the Phaedrus is, according to Robin, an indictment 
(requisitoire) against the rhetoric of Isocrates. A univocal interpretation of the 
Phaedrus (and perhaps of Plato) is being foregrounded by Derrida. 
4) Isocrates is concerned, whatever he may say [quoi qu'il dise] (p. 129 / tr. p. 114), 
with a specific thinking. Again, a certain movement of inversion, of complication, an 
intra-Isocratean differance is being highlighted. Isocrates, according to Robin, would 
not be what he claims to be. 
5) Despite his inverse claims, Isocrates is more concerned (according to Robin) with 
doxa than with episteme. 
6) If one agrees with Robin, one will not be surprised [on ne se laissera phis etonner] 
by the title of Isocrates' discourse ie Robin's logic anticipates the logic of the title and 
thus apparently explicates all the prior inversion and complication. 
7) The title of this discourse is "Against the Sophists". Isocrates, a sophist, would be 
contra-sophistry. The Phaedrus, as contra-Isocrates, would thus be pro-sophistry. 
8) Neither will one be amazed (Derrida here reiterates the confidence of Robin's 
anticipation) by the Isocratean passage to be quoted, a passage which manifests a 
formal resemblance [la ressemblance formelle] with Socrates' argumentation. 
Socrates resembles a sophist thinker writing against sophistry. But is this not 
something to cause amazement? 
9) This resemblance is blinding [aveziglante]. The Platonic Sun is blinding but so 
also is sense knowledge (Derrida plays on the ambiguity between the the positive 
blindness of the Republic [19] and the negative blindness of the Phaedo[20]) - can 
one philosophically differentiate the Sun (the Good etc) from the supplement (writing, 
sense knowledge etc. )? This is a question which will recur in Derrida's discussion of 
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Platonic "paternity", both in the sense of the Father of Logos (the Phaedrus - positive 
paternity) and in the sense of an economic Parent sum (the Republic - negative 
paternity). See next section. 
I will take each of these points, but not in the above order. 
3) The Pliaedrus is an indictment against the rhetoric of Isocrates. This is the essence 
of Robin's interpretation (Introduction to the Phaedrrrs, Bude edition). In chapter 3,1 
will deal with the Phaedrus in more detail, with particular reference to Ferrari's text 
Listening to the Cicadas. But here Derrida wants to focus on Robin's concept of a 
Platonic critique of Isocrates, a privileging of speech. Robin's interpretation is 
radical as traditionally the Phaedrus has been seen as a critique of writing, manifested 
most strongly in the myth of Theuth. Theuth was the god of invention - "Among his 
inventions were number and calculation and geometry and astronomy, not to speak of 
various kinds of draughts and dice, and above all, writing" (Phaedrus, 274c-d) 
[hereafter P. ]. Theuth exhibited his inventions before the King, Thamus, who 
"inquired into the use of each of them, and as Theuth went through them expressed 
approval or disapproval, according as he judged Theuth's claims to be well or ill- 
founded"(P, 274e). When it came to writing, Theuth claimed that he had invented 
something which would improve the memory and wisdom of his countrymen. 
Thamus however was not convinced and his reply is worth quotation in extenso as it 
has come down as the essence of the Phaedrus, as a Platonic / Socratic critique of 
writing - 
Theuth, my paragon of inventors, the discoverer of an art is not the best judge 
of the good or harm which will accrue to those who practise it. So it is in this 
case; you, who are the father of writing, have out of fondness for your 
offspring attributed to it quite the opposite of its real function. Those who 
acquire it will cease to exercise their memory and become forgetful; they will 
rely on writing to bring things to their remembrance by external signs instead 
of on their own internal resources. What you have discovered is a receipt for 
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recollection, not for memory. And as for wisdom, your pupils will have the 
reputation for it without the reality: they will receive a quantity of information 
without proper instruction, and in consequence be thought very knowledgeable 
when they are for the most part quite ignorant. And because they are filled 
with the conceit of wisdom instead of real wisdom they will be a burden to 
society. (P., 275a-c) 
The myth of Theuth has traditionally been seen as a critique of writing by Plato to the 
extent that the written word gives merely the "reputation" (or appearance) of truth / 
wisdom without the "reality". Socrates will go on to contrast this writing with "words 
spoken by way of instruction" (my emphasis, P. 277c-d) i. e. speech. This is where 
"lucidity and finality and serious importance are to be found" (P, 278a). But if 
Derrida is correct and for Isocrates speech must be privileged over writing (PP. p. 128 
/29, tr. p. 113 / 114), then what is one to make of Robin's interpretation that the 
Phaedriis is an indictment against the rhetoric of Isocrates. On the one hand, the 
Phaedrus would be a critique of writing (via the myth of Theuth). But on the other 
hand, it would be a critique of speech (contra the sophistry of Isocrates). Again 
Derrida is foregrounding a both land logic. His point appears not to be that either one 
or the other must be correct but that both interpretations of the Phaedrus are 
simultaneously valid. This issue refers back to issue 2 mentioned above - 
2) "Despite [malgrej certain appearances" the Pliaedrus, according to Robin, is an 
indictment against the rhetoric of Isocrates. In many senses deconstruction is always 
about the "despite" [malgre] It seeks to generate the resources of the "despite" so that 
which is cursorily dismissed becomes precisely the unravelling [deuouer] (PP. p. 96, 
tr. p. 84) component. The `appearances' of the Phaedrus undo the interpretation of 
Robin. Significantly, Robin's interpretation is already very subtle. It seeks to go 
beyond the equation of sophistry with writing and to see Isocrates' ideal of speech as 
merely writing by another means ie bad, sophistic, nonSocratic speech. The 
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Phaedrus on Robin's terms is thus a critique of sophistry in general, written and 
spoken. 
While Robin's hypothesis itself involves a certain "crossing of the border" [le passage 
de la frottiere] (PP. p. 123, tr. p. 108) between the poles of writing and speech, it 
nonetheless tries to posit a specific essence of the Phaedrus i. e. the Phaedrus = X. 
Derrida's thematic of inversions is more irresolvable. It invokes the kind of logic 
espoused by Henry Moore's painting Tortured Roots (employed as a cover by 
Critchley in his The Ethics of Deconstruction). On Derrida's terms, the critique of 
sophistics requires a pure vantage point of non-sophistic, Platonic speech which is 
complicated not primarily by Isocrates' privileging of speech but rather by Plato / 
Socrates' continual recourse to sophistry - "the threads of these complicities are 
almost impossible to disentangle" [ les fils de ces complicites sont presque 
inextricables] (PP. p. 134 / tr. p. 117). This inability to disentangle thus emblematizes 
the irresolvability of a plurality of tortured roots, to invoke Henry Moore. 
This point leads to a foregrounding of another two of the issues raised by Derrida, 
points 1 and 6- 
1) the initial conditional: "if one holds..... to Robin's interpretation of the Phaedrus". 
and 
6) If one agrees with Robin, one will not be surprised by the title of Isocrates' 
discourse. 
From the foregoing analysis it is clear that Robin's interpretation has been at least 
problematized by Derrida. If it can be said to be correct in a certain way, it can also 
be said to be incorrect - both correct and incorrect. The initial conditional is therefore 
invoked as itself unconditional - conditionality, for Derrida, here as regards Robin's 
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interpretation of the Phaedrus, becomes unconditional. This leads on to point 6- it is 
at least possible that one will be surprised by the title of Isocrates' discourse. Derrida 
has often argued against what he calls "preformationism" (most notably in Force and 
Signification), the tendency of philosophy to have its end "preformed" in its 
beginning, outruling the possibility of chance or surprise. In the case of Robin, the 
implication from Derrida is that his discourse is just such a type of preformationism. 
The problem being that the end may not always be in the beginning (at least according 
to deconstruction). 
The points concerning Isocrates are best taken together - 
4) Isocrates is concerned, whatever he may say, with a thinking of a type X. 
5) Despite his inverse claims, Isocrates is more concerned (according to Robin) with 
doxa than with episteme. 
6) The title of this discourse is "Against the Sophists" (Kata ton Sophiston). 
Point 4 is primarily concerned with what could be termed the logic of the "despite" 
(malgre'). Despite what Isocrates says, despite the appearances (apparances) of his 
discourse, he is doing something completely opposite. Derrida is interested in the way 
this gesture continually repeats itself among commentators. Robin bases his 
interpretation on a reading contrary to Isocrates' stated intention. An inversion of 
sorts thus takes place and is employed to critique Isocrates for a supposed 
philosophical inversion in his very discourse, the subordination of episteme to doxa 
(point 5). The final inversion of the series is invoked by Derrida when he points to the 
title of Isocrates' discourse - "Against the Sophists" (Point 7). Robin thus inverts the 
stated intention of Isocrates' discourse in order to critique a supposed real inversion 
only, finally, to have Isocrates invert this interpretation again in the very title of his 
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discourse. What Derrida finds surprising here is that amidst all these "tortured roots", 
following Robin one would not be in the least surprised (Point 6). Again there is a 
rather ironic Derridean point being made - preformationism necessarily unravels. 
This brings one to points 8 and 9, the former beginning with a reiteration of the 
complacency of preformationism, a reiteration which is therefore doubly ironic (the 
motif of the double being continually emphasised by Derrida; cf., for example, "Two 
Words for Joyce"). 
8) Neither will one be amazed by the Isocratean passage to be quoted, a passage 
which manifests aforinal resemblance with Socrates' argumentation. 
9) This formal resemblance is blinding (aveuglante). 
I have already commented on Derrida's doubling, his re-iteration of the non-surprise, 
the non-amazement, the anticipation, the preformationism accruing to a certain 
reading of the relation between Plato and sophistics. Again, in points 8 and 9, a 
doubling takes place but this time of a different sort, not a re-iteration of a point, but 
an apparent contradiction - 
8) One will not be amazed at a formal resemblance 
9) This resemblance is blinding. 
Both Not-A (8) and A (9). 1 have already discussed this Derridean "logic". Suffice to 
re-mark it here again. Other issues are raised in this context with regard to the 
question of "formal resemblance". One more inversion is added to the increasingly 
tortured series. In claiming that Plato and sophistics are closely aligned, then that the 
Phaedrus is a critique of Isocrates, and then that Isocrates' work is against the 
sophists, one will not be surprised. But now Isocrates' work is said to exemplify a 
formal resemblance with Socrates' argument; therefore the anti-sophist (Isocrates) 
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resembles the sophist (Socrates). And this apparent contradiction is both unsurprising 
and blinding. When one considers that Derrida's reference to a "blinding" 
resemblance is itself double, that it refers to the (positive) blinding of the Sun 
(Republic) and the (negative) blinding of sense experience (Phaedo) [PP. p. 73 / 74, 
tr. p. 83/84], it becomes clear that one is not merely talking of ambiguity here, a 
double-meaning, but a doubling upon doubling ad infinitum. This is the `theme' of 
"The Double Session" ("La Double Seance" (which follows "Plato's Pharmacy") and 
of Dissemination (La Dissemination) as a `whole' - 
dissemination affirms the always already divided generation of meaning [la 
dissemination aff rive la gendration toujours dejä divisee du seas] (DS. p. 300 
/ tr. p. 268)........ "a book neither begins nor ends: at most it pretends [semblant] 
to" (DS, p. 303 / tr. p. 271).......... an effect that is therefore each time "new" 
(neuff), a game (jecu) of chance forever new, a play of fire (feu) forever young 
(jeune) - fire and games being always, as Heraclitus and Nietzsche have said, a 
play of luck with necessity [le jeu du hasard avec la necessitel, of contingency 
with law (DS, p. 309 / tr. p. 277). 
But Derrida is not finished yet in his attempt to exemplify all these doubling effects. 
While points 8 and 9 outline this logic with regard to the contradiction between 
Isocrates' title being non-surprising and blinding simultaneously, they also suggest yet 
another doubling effect. This concerns the "formal resemblance" (p. 129 / tr. p. 114) 
between Isocrates' discourse and that of Socrates. As outlined above, there are four 
propositions which lead to this confusing effect - 
A) Derrida `demonstrates' that Socrates / Plato cannot be distinguished from 
sophistics. 
B) Derrida outlines Robin's view that the Phaedrus is a critique of Isocrates. 
C) Insofar as the title of Isocrates' discourse is "Against the Sophists", it is suggested 
that Isocrates is an anti-sophist. 
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D) Isocrates' text is said to formally resemble that of Socrates ie a supposed anti- 
sophist (Isocrates) resembles a thinker indissociable from sophistry (Socrates). 
Derrida's suggestion appears to be that any clear demarcating line between philosophy 
on the one hand and sophistry on the other is an impossibility. Instead there is just the 
ever increasing process of blurring and complicity, of doubling. And this argument is 
intensified in the final pages of Part I of "Plato's Pharmacy" (PP, pp. 129 - 136 / tr. 
pp. 114-119). In the first case, Derrida outlines the content of Isocrates' critique of 
writing and his eulogy to speech. The rigidity of writing is a result of the fact that no 
matter how many republishings take place, the texts must obey the "preestablished 
pattern" (p. 130 / tr. p. 114) of what was written down originally - 
writing, in that it repeats itself and remains identical in the type, cannot flex 
itself [ne se ploie]in all senses, cannot bend [plie] with all the differences 
among presents, with all the variable, fluid, furtive necessities of psychagogy. 
He who speaks [Celui qui parle] , 
in contrast, is not controlled by any 
preestablished pattern [ne se soumet a aucun scheme preetabli] ; he is better 
able to conduct his signs; he is there to accentuate them, to inflect them, retain 
them, or set them loose [les lacher] according to the demands of the moment 
the nature of the desired effect, the hold [la prise] he has on the listener (PP. p. 
129, tr. p. 114). 
This is a crucial passage in terms of Derrida interpretation. Critics and defenders of 
deconstruction alike have focused on a much vaunted Derridean critique of 
phonocentrism (cf., for example, Norris' Derrida[21]), the privileging by metaphysics 
of the voice over the written word, to which deconstruction would then be an 
inversion, i. e. a privileging of writing over speech. But what I have tried to show 
through this analysis of "Plato's Pharmacy" is the constant interplay between 
opposing inversions in Derrida's work - an opposition is inverted only to be later re- 
inverted or de-inverted. 
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At the outset of "Plato's Pharmacy", Derrida had been keen to stress the Platonic 
privileging of speech over writing, and the Platonic critique of sophistry as a 
privileging of writing over speech (cf., for example, p. 120 / tr. p. 106; "it is above all 
against sophistics that this diatribe [requisitoire] against writing is directed"). 
However, he then pointed to a Platonic privileging of writing (in the Laws, 891a and 
957c) as beneficial to posterity and the most potent study of law (cf. PP. p. 128, tr. 
p. 113). No sooner had the Platonic position been inverted than Isocrates was 
introduced as a "rhetor" (ie a sophist) privileging speech, while at the very same time 
the Phaedrus was introduced as a text critiquing Isocrates, therefore critiquing a 
certain privileging of speech. 
The objection might be raised that Derrida is confusing matters here. The Phaedrus 
Robin, for example, might reply is a critique of rhetorical speech, not speech in 
general. There would thus be no doubling in this context but a hierarchical distinction 
between good and bad speech. Derrida's answer is two-fold. Firstly, the doubling 
effect does not simply relate to the Socrates-Isocrates resemblance but also for 
example to the dualistic Socratic privileging of speech (in the Phaedrus) and 
privileging of writing (in the Laws). In the Socrates- Isocrates instance, it is important 
that Derrida does in fact refer to a specific difference - 
Despite these similarities, the condemnation of writing is not engaged in the 
same way by the rhetors as it is in the Phaedrus. If the written word is scorned 
[est meprise], it is not as a pharmakon coming to corrupt [corrompre] memory 
and truth. It is because logos is a more effective pharnrakon [plus efficace] 
(PP, p. 115). 
It is thus not the truth of logos which the rhetors (Isocrates, Gorgias, Alcidamas - the 
Attic school) privilege, but its "spellbinding powers of enchantment, mesmerizing 
fascination, and alchemical transformation, which make it kin to witchcraft and 
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magic" [ "de son pouvoir d'envoittement, de fascination medusante, de 
transformation alchimique qui l'apparente a la sorcellerie et ä la magie] (PP. p. 131, 
tr. p. 115). Or at least the rhetors are initially ambiguous on this point ("as a 
pharmakon, logos is at once good and bad [est ä la fois bon et mauvais]; it is not at 
the outset governed exclusively by goodness [le bier] or truth" (PP. p. 131 / tr. 
p. 115). However, the rhetors (particularly Gorgias) soon repeat "the Platonic gesture" 
(PP. p. 131, tr. p. 115). In his Encomium of Helen, Gorgias describes the persuasive 
powers of speech, its seductions and ravishments. But - 
in showing that Helen gave in to the violence of speech (would she have 
yielded to a letter? ), in disculpating [innocentant] this victim, Gorgias indicts 
logos in its capacity to lie [en son pouvoir de mensongel (PP, p. 116). 
The counter-argument put forward against Derrida's motif of "reversal", to the effect 
that the rhetors privilege bad speech while the Phaedrus privileges good speech is 
now undermined. The Attic school simultaneously critique writing as being 
excessively rigid and speech (logos) as being, in its bad aspects, a tendency to lie or 
seduce. Once again a reversal of positions has taken place. Derrida, however, has one 
more surprise in store. Up to this point, Socrates and sophistics have indeed been 
made coextensive but aside from the privilege accorded to writing in the Laws, this 
has not proved too detrimental to the claims of Platonism. For has not Derrida just 
shown that even the rhetors maintain a certain normative hierarchy and that 
coextensivity with sophistics does not necessarily imply a valuation of evil. On this 
reading, the processes of doubling described by "Plato's Pharmacy" while calling for a 
reevaluation of sophistics do not necessarily call for a simultaneous reevaluation of 
Socrates / Plato. Does "Platonism" not remain intact in its eternal integrity? 
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The final section of Part I of "Plato's Pharmacy" (Section 5- The Phannakeus) 
answers in the negative - 
isn't Socrates, "he who does not write" [celui qui n'ecrit pas], also a master of 
the pharmakon? And in that way isn't he the spitting image [ne ressemble-t-il 
pas ä s'y meprendre] of a sophist? a pharmakecus? a magician? a sorcerer? 
even a poisoner? and even one of those impostors denounced by Gorgias? 
(PP. p. 134, tr. p. 117). 
Having elevated the rhetorical Attic school to the position of Socrates, to the position 
of critic of logos (speech) as a seduction and ravishment, Derrida now de-elevates 
Socrates to the status of a "sorcerer" [sorcier; p. 134] and "poisoner" [empoisonneur], 
a purveyor of the very sorcery and poison which the Attic school have been 
represented as criticising. The final inversion is thus in place. Derrida cites two 
characteristic Platonic passages, from the Sy nposium[22] where Socrates is described 
as a bewitcher of mankind (215c) with nothing but a few simple words (psilois logois) 
and from the Meno[23] where Socrates is compared to a stingray (harke - from which 
we derive the term `narcotic') which exercises "magic" and "witchcraft" on its 
interlocutors, nuanbing them in the process (80, a-b). It is however perhaps the final 
sentences quoted from the Meno passage which are the most telling, where Meno 
offers a prophetic warning to Socrates - 
In my opinion you are well advised not to leave Athens and live abroad. If you 
behaved like this as a foreigner in another country, you would most likely be 
arrested as a wizard (goes) [80, a-b]. 
Derrida derives the necessarily apocalyptic conclusion - "Socrates arrested as a wizard 
[sorcier] (goes or pharmakeus): that will have to wait [patientons]" (PP. p. 135, tr. 
p. 119). It seems less than far-fetched to see the Meno passage as an inscription within 
the text, by Plato, of Socrates' death-to-come. But what are we to make of this 
impending martyrdom? The fact that the Meno is written after Socrates' death 
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clarifies the fact that this martyrdom has already taken place. In hindsight, then, what 
is Plato seeking to tell the reader; about Socrates' death, about Socrates' life, about his 
relation to sophistry, about sophistry's relation to witchcraft and the pharmakon, about 
the pharmakon's relation to morality and the Good? Within this context, Derrida 
makes his own provocative point (these are the last words of Section I) - 
the structure of the pharinakon, the one and only name for that potion that 
must be awaited. And even, in Socrates' case, deserved (my emphasis)[la 
structure du pharinakon: none unique de cette potion qu'il faut attendre. Et 
qu'ilfaut meine, comme Socrate meriter] [PP, p. 136 / tr. p. 119). 
A poison which, in Socrates' case, would be deserved. The accusation against 
Socrates from Meletus, Anytus and Lycon had two aspects -a charge of heresy and a 
charge of corrupting the minds of the young (cf. The Last Days of Socrates, p. 43). 
This of course is the very accusation brought by Socrates against sophistry on 
numerous occasions (for example, the Protagoras, Gorgias). In the Phaedrus, 
Socrates turns against his very own original speech, declaring that he has committed a 
sin and must not go away until he has expiated it (P, p. 23). Socrates' original speech 
had been a reiteration of Lysias' sophistic speech. This is then deemed to be a heresy. 
In other words, one has an equation of heresy with sophistics. Derrida's concluding 
claim in "Plato's Pharmacy" is that the charge of heresy can equally be brought 
against Socrates. In other words, the work of Socrates / Plato is indissociable from 
that of the sophists. And as such, the penalty brought against Socrates by the 
Athenian authorities, that of a death sentence, is according to Derrida fully deserved. 
The final confirmation of this being the homonymy between the term for Socrates' 
kind of philosophical magic (pharmakou) and the hemlock (pharmakon) administered 
to bring his life to an end. This then would be Derrida's final conclusion from a 
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subtle analysis in "Plato's Pharmacy" concerning the apparent interdependencies 
between Socrates / Plato and sophistics. 
It is significant that having described this interdependency in "Plato's Pharmacy", the 
follow on essay in Dissemination ("The Double Session") is concerned primarily with 
the work of Stephane Mallarme. Mallarme is often seen as a kind of Platonist, but a 
Platonist simultaneously determined by the modernist revolution in thinking. For 
Mallarme the Idea is everything, but less in the sense of the objective Form / God of 
the medievals and more in the sense of the "Idea in the Kantian sense". In the poem 
Les Fenetres[24], Mallarme puts forward a vehement diatribe against what he calls 
"Id - bas" ("the here-below") in much the same way that in the "Cogito" text, 
Derrida disavows the objective or "finite shelter". There Derrida contrasts this 
misguided objectivism with the "idea of infinity", the intentional force of philosophy. 
Similarly, in Les Feiictres, Mallarme values the subjective ("0 moi") over the 
objective - 
Is there a way, 0 Self familiar with bitterness, of breaking through the crystal 
insulted by the monstrous and escaping with my two featherless wings - at the 
risk of falling for all eternity? [25] 
There is a certain interpretation of Plato and Platonism (put forward most notably by 
Heidegger) which in seeing a Platonic chasm between the sensible and the 
supersensible would favour the conception that Mallarme is a faithful Platonist. 
Certainly in placing "the Double Session" directly after "Plato's Pharmacy" in 
Dissemination there is the suggestion by Derrida that the only route Platonism can 
take after the deconstruction of its dialectics is towards a kind of Mallarmean 
subjective idealism. "Plato's Pharmacy" seems to lead Plato away from metaphysical 
dialectics and towards Mallarmean subjectivism in much the same way that the 
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"Cogito" essay led Descartes away from his previous "deductive system" and towards 
a valuation of the idea as idea. In succeeding chapters, I will put forward a critique 
of this attempt by Derrida to unravel Platonic dialectics by pointing to the 
fundamental differences between Platonic and Cartesian dialectics, with particular 
reference to an ancient-modern quarrel. I will attempt to show that Platonic dialectic 
is still workable once one extricates it from a neo-Cartesian framework and returns it 
to its more objectivist origins. 
Here the conception of the "Forms" will be crucial. The term which Plato often uses 
for the Forms ("Ideon") has itself been regularly translated as "Idea" and this 
translation has contributed to the blurring of the problematic of an ancient-modern 
quarrel. If translated as Idea, Ideon risks giving the sense that it is to be identified 
with what Derrida calls "the Idea in the Kantian sense" or Descartes's "idea of 
infinity". What distinguishes the former from the latter is its complete independence 
from the Cogito. For Plato, the Idea is that which limits subjectivity while, for 
Descartes and Kant, it is subjectivity which limits the ideal. This distinction is so 
strong that it will lead Platonists such as Simone Weil to call for an annihilation of 
subjectivity as an act of faithfulness to the Idea ("the sin in me says I"; Gravity and 
Grace p. 27) [26]. To avoid confusing these two completely distinct symbols 
therefore, it is perhaps more appropriate to translate "Ideon" as "Form". I will return 
to this notion of Form in Chapter 4 on the Phaedrus, in chapter 7 on De Cusa and 
also in the Conclusion through a discussion of Iris Murdoch's development of this 
conception. At this point it is only necessary to note how the conception of Form 
works in direct contrast to the criterion of the Cartesian idea. 
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In the next chapter, I will begin my analysis of the resistance of Platonic dialectic to 
Derridean deconstruction with an examination of the roots of Platonic thinking in 
Presocratism, most notably the thinking of Heraclitus and Parmenides. 
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CHAPTER 2- FROM THE PRESOCRATICS TO PLATO: A MEDITATION 
ON A COMPLEX METAPHYSICAL UNITY 
Section 2.1 - Prefatory Remarks 
The relation between Plato and Derrida bears a significant similarity to the conflict 
which took place in James Joyce's work between the writing of Ulysses [1] and 
Finnegan's Wake [2]. Ulysses was Joyce's great attempt at metaphysics; it can be 
seen as very much a poetic articulation of Platonism / Aristotelianism. But for Joyce, 
the metaphysics of Ulysses ultimately had to give way to the more deconstructive 
poetics of Finnegan's Wake. Applying this hypothesis to the relation of Plato to 
Ulysses and Derrida to the Wake, one's conclusion would be that Platonism must 
make way for deconstruction, that the metaphysics of Plato is subject to an inevitable 
and fatal deconstruction. 
Such a conclusion is not without its apparent justifications. From a Derridean 
perspective, while difference depends upon identity, identity depends upon difference. 
Thus the positing of a unity independent of difference becomes highly problematic, 
indeed impossible. Derrida's reading of Plato in `Plato's Pharmacy' points to this 
impossibility, through the irreducibility of doubling. Derrida locates points of stress 
within the Platonic text and there is the sense that this is not so much a deconstructive 
critique of Plato as a recognition that Plato is already engaged in self-deconstruction. 
This is no doubt the case and Dcrrida's reading is very subtle here. 
But "Plato's Pharmacy" also recognises a prevalent metaphysical movement in Plato's 
work. At one point, for example, Derrida refers to "Platonism" (PP., p. 76) as 
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"setting up the whole of Western metaphysics in its conceptuality" (PP., p. 76). A 
over-simple reading of Derrida might identify this statement as a critique of 
Platonism, and by implication of metaphysics as such. However, "Plato's Pharmacy" 
makes clear at several points that from a Derridean perspective there is no one Plato, 
no one interpretation of Platonism - 
we do not believe that there exists, in all rigor, a Platonic text, closed upon 
itself, complete with its inside and its outside (p. 130, PP. ). 
The metaphysical moment of Plato's text is thus interpreted as provisional, contextual 
and therefore subject to always possible re-contextualisation. Far from repressing 
Plato, a deconstructive reading thus opens up the Platonic text to an endless 
dissemination of possibilities. Plato would not merely be a metaphysician, but 
potentially a thinker of the anti-metaphysical, the transmetaphysical, the 
non metaphysical, the premetaphysical, the post metaphysical etc. etc. Indeed, strictly 
speaking, there would be no closed metaphysics to transgress. "Metaphysics" would 
"itself' be far more complex than has often been supposed. These developments of 
Derrida's logic are in no way meant as ironic. Rather they point to a relentless drive 
towards nonfinalisation at the heart of deconstruction, a wellspring of futural 
possibility. It therefore may appear rather bizarre that it is this futural Plato, this 
postmodern regeneration of Platonism which I wish to call into question. This may 
seem bizarre to the extent that one can one well ask: has Derrida not precisely shown 
the contemporary relevance of Platonism in all its flexibility and diffcrance? 
My answer to this question is twofold. First, I do not wish to oppose Derrida but 
rather his interpretation of Plato. From the perspective of a reading of deconstruction, 
this thesis is intent on articulating the importance of Derrida's work. The import of 
Derrida's philosophy requires careful consideration; this is not at issue. What is at 
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issue is the philosophical status of Plato and Platonism. The dialogues of Plato 
manifest extraordinary procedures of reversal, doubling, apparent contradiction, 
impasse etc. Nonetheless, I am in agreement with Eduard Zeller when he states that it 
is only in the form of a "system" that one can truly be faithful to Plato - 
Although Plato's philosophy is nowhere transmitted as a systematic whole and 
in the dialogues we can only observe from afar its gradual growth and 
development, it is only in the form of a system that any account of it can be 
given. The justification for this is the incontestable fact that in the dialogues 
we see circles spreading wider and wider until they finally embrace the whole 
universe (Zeller, p. 126) [3] 
This is an eloquent rendition by Zeller of the Platonic procedure. While Zeller speaks 
of "system" he does not mean, for example, the systematicity of logical positivism. 
Rather the description is almost absurd - "circles spreading wider and wider". Plato's 
would be an almost absurd systematicity, a quite fantastical unity. In the next two 
chapters I will attempt to make sense of this metaphysical epiphany, beginning in the 
next section with an analysis of Plato's precursors, Heraclitus and Parmenides, to 
whose own enigmatic philosophies of unity he owed such a great debt. 
Section 2.2 - Heraclitus and Parmenides 
In traditional histories of Greek philosophy, Heraclitus and Parmenides are 
represented as diametrically opposed thinkers. W. K. C. Guthrie, for example, in The 
Greek Philosophers: From Thales to Aristotle[4], groups their supposed mutual 
antagonism under the heading of the "problem of motion" (cf. pp. 43-50) - 
He (Parmenides) was the exact reverse of Heraclitus. For Heraclitus, 
movement and change were the only realities; for Parmenides movement was 
impossible, and the whole of reality consisted of a single, motionless and 
unchanging substance (GP., p. 47). 
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Guthrie sees both Heraclitus and Parmenides as "pioneers" (GP., p. 47) of philosophy, 
thinkers of both "power" and "limitation" (GP., p. 47). He quotes a question from the 
Classical Tripos at Cambridge to the effect that many problems in Greek philosophy 
resulted from a confused sense of the difference between grammar, logic and 
metaphysics (GP., p. 47). The implication is that one must wait until Plato and 
Aristotle for a proper approach to these issues. Heraclitus and Parmenides are of 
historical interest and indeed insightful within their limited context but, according to 
Guthrie, their work lacks a genuine systematicity. 
This section will attempt to rehabilitate (contra Guthrie) the philosophical status of 
Heraclitus and Parmenides. A fuller discussion of their respective relations to Plato 
will have to await the succeeding sections but here it is already necessary to 
emphasise their direct influence on the latter. The apparent self-deconstruction of 
dialogues such as the Lysis[5] and the Meno[6] (i. e. their failure to reach set 
conclusions) seems on first inspection to play into the hands of Derrida's theory of 
"doubling" ad infinitu, n. That is, they seems unable to support a metaphysics of unity, 
instead foregrounding an interminable process of deferral. However, the 
interpretation I will put forward of Heraclitus as primarily a thinker of unity, is useful 
as an analogy to the Platonic procedure in these dialogues. As Charles H. Kahn 
argues - 
We can best imagine the structure of Heraclitus' work on the analogy of the 
great choral odes, with their fluid but carefully articulated movement from 
image to aphorism, from myth to riddle to contemporary allusion. Yet, the 
intellectual unity of Heraclitus' composition was in a sense greater than that of 
any archaic poem, since its final intent was more explicitly didactic, and its 
central theme a direct affirmation of unity: hen pant einai; "all things are one" 
[Kahn p. 7] (7) 
58 
In line with the previously quoted interpretation of Zeller, my interpretation claims 
that Plato's work can only be understood as a "holistic" system, but nonetheless a 
system of a subtly enigmatic kind. In line with Kahn, I claim that a similar system 
precedes Plato in the work of Heraclitus, and that this Heraclitean "didacticism" can 
be linked to the Platonic method. 
Similarly, one can make a strong argument for the Parmenidean influence on Plato 
although in this case one has almost an inversion of the Heraclitean example. In 
linking Heraclitus to Plato, the possible critical rejoinder is always that Plato is a far 
more unified thinker than Heraclitus. Following Guthrie's reading of Heraclitus as a 
thinker of flux, an oppositional interpretation might see this flux as devoid of structure 
and thus wholly incompatible with the Platonic unity posited for example in the 
Republic. My reading of Heraclitus (following Kahn) as a didactic thinker avoids 
such difficulties. With Parmenides, it is rather the positing of didacticism which as it 
were causes the problem in the link with Plato. For if Parmenides is to be represented 
(following Guthrie) as a philosopher of unchanging substance, then the very 
temporality which gives Plato's dialogues much of their force and power would seem 
to have been lost. In other words, in linking Parmenides with Plato, does one not lose 
a recognition of and respect for difference (albeit within unity)? 
Again, I wish to portray a different figure from that represented by Guthrie. The 
Parmenides of "impossible movement" simply does not hold up to a reading of the 
Parmenidean fragments undertaken more recently by for example A. H. Coxon (The 
Fragments of Parmenides) [8] Coxon foregrounds several possible references by 
Parmenides to Heraclitus (Coxon, p. 221), none of which appear to be negative. I 
will discuss these points below. Here, it is useful to interpret the import of this 
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general reinterpretation of Parmenides and Heraclitus. According to Guthrie, 
Heraclitus is a thinker of flux (without unity) and Parmenides a thinker of unity 
(without flux). This binary opposition, I have claimed, is untenable. Instead, 
following Kahn and Coxon, it seems clear that both Heraclitus and Parmenides are 
thinkers of a differentiated unity, a complex One. In following sections I will link this 
metaphysical structure to that of Plato. At present, however, I will address the 
respective intricacies of the Heraclitean and Parmenidean systems in more depth. 
Heraclitus is said to have antedated Parmenides by several decades (cf. Guthrie 
p. 43/46) and it is his work that I will first address. Eric Voegelin in The World of the 
Polis (Order and History Volume 2) [9] places the system of Heraclitus at a crucial 
historical juncture between a prior "theomorphism" and a new enriched view of 
"human" character (p. 224). Voegelin cites Fragment B119 - 
Character - to man - demon. 
This emphasis on a particularly or specifically human character (ethos) in Heraclitus is 
paradoxical. It in no way signifies a rejection of divinity (daimon) but rather a 
recognition that divinity and humanity are not mutually exclusive. The previous 
theomorphism of such thinkers as Homer and Hesiod tended to interpret divinity as 
the exclusive attribute of the immortal i. e. the gods (cf. Voegelin, p. 224). With 
Heraclitus, however, one has, as it were, an incarnation of divinity in the mortal. 
Voegelin is right to foreground the extraordinariness of this tenet. For it can be seen 
as a profound anticipation of (and influence on) the Platonic doctrine of exemplarism / 
participation and of course the Christian Incarnation itself (see below). 
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Significantly, however, the redirection of divinity towards the human is not meant by 
Heraclitus to constitute what Augustine would call a "puffing up" (see Confessions, 
Book 7) of humanity. Rather in line with the tenet that "the wise is set apart from all 
things" (B 108), Heraclitus clearly sees divinity as divesting the human of its 
previously complacent knowledge and self-assurance. Paradoxically, the divinisation 
of the human is a simultaneous deconstruction of the latter's wisdom (sophia) and 
knowledge (polymathie - "much knowing") towards the more vulnerable status of 
"lover of wisdom" (philosophos). This is a movement that will be repeated in 
Parmenides and in effect it marks the beginning of philosophy proper. As Voegelin 
observes - 
Human wisdom is not a completed possession but a process. The participation 
in the divine wisdom that is apart from all things, cannot be achieved by a leap 
beyond all things; it is the result of the occupation with these very things, 
ascending from the manifold to the One that is to be found in them all...... The 
new term for the man of such higher knowledge should not be sophos - for that 
is a great name seemly "to God alone" - but the more humble and befitting 
philosophos (Voegelin, p. 226). 
Voegelin here goes on to make reference to an identical movement in the Phaedrus. 
Predating Plato, Heraclitus can therefore be seen to have begun to define a 
philosophical perspective which will become highly influential throughout the history 
of philosophy. Guthrie's interpretation of Heraclitus as simply a thinker of flux 
becomes in this context all the more surprising. But what of Kahn's conception of a 
didactic Heraclitus - is this given credence by the enigmatic relation between the 
divine and the human here described? Certainly there can be no sense in which one 
would simply invert Guthrie's hypothesis of flux and supplant it with a homogeneous 
Heraclitean unity. Nonetheless, the vulnerability of the philosophos is vulnerable 
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precisely only in relation to an all-embracing Unity. This is made clear from 
Heraclitus' very first fragment - 
Although this account (logos) holds forever, men ever fail to comprehend, 
both before hearing it and once they have heard. Although all things come to 
pass in accordance with this account (logos) men are like the untried when 
they try such words and works as I set forth, distinguishing each according to 
its nature and telling how it is. But other men are oblivious of what they do 
awake, just as they are forgetful of what they do asleep (Kahn, p. 29). 
The logos holds forever (aiei). Vulnerability thus resides at the level of the human 
and not the divine. Through obliviousness and forgetfulness men are like sleep- 
walkers. Taken in abstraction, this second level of reality almost directly corresponds 
to the Derridean position outlined in Chapter 1-"I have never known where I was 
going". Significantly, Derrida has at several points noted an affinity between 
deconstruction and Heraclitus. In "Plato's Pharmacy", for example, he makes 
reference to a cryptic phusis in Heraclitus, which he links to the fragment "Nature 
loves to hide". My analysis of the fragments however has been intended as a 
problernatisation of this view which is very akin to Guthrie's theory of irreducible 
flux. On my interpretation, following Kahn and Voegelin, `flux' for Heraclitus is 
always conditioned, qualified by an overarching unity. 
If such is the case however, one can well wonder at the reasons for Heraclitus' mode 
of utterance. Known for example as "the Riddler" and "the Obscure", his enigmatic 
style seems to suggest a sense of interminable difference and confusion. If he is so 
convinced of unity, one might ask, why does he write in such a differentiated mode? 
One response to this question is to point to the enigma already present in the very 
experience of transcendence itself, an experience which Voegelin posits as being the 
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basis of Heraclitus' project (p. 234). The challenge which divinity brings to the human 
is not imposed from without or extrinsic; rather it comes from within. Voegelin here 
quotes a passage from Plato's Timaeus which he sees as being directly influenced by 
Heraclitus - 
With regard to the kind of soul which is dominant in us, we should consider 
that God has given it to each of us as a daimon, dwelling as we said at the top 
of the body; and because of its affinity with Heaven it draws us away from 
Earth, for most truly we are a heavenly growth, not an earthly one (Voegelin 
p. 206 / Plato Timaeus 90 a-b). 
This "drawing away" from the Earth is not without its difficulties. As Heraclitus and 
Plato are all too well aware, the coming to terms with wisdom is a process fraught 
with tension and the possibility of failure. This particularly applies to those whom 
Heraclitus terms asynetoi or fools - 
Fools, even when they hear it, are like the deaf; of them it is said: "Present, 
they are absent" (B34). 
Two more fragments also bear on this precariousness of the daimon - 
Eyes and ears are bad witnesses for men whose souls are barbarous (B 107). 
There awaits men at death what they neither hope nor surmise (B 27). 
In the case of fragments B34 and B 107 the Heraclitean interpretation is unequivocally 
negative. He is criticising, ridiculing the foolish and the barbarous. This is important 
to bear in mind when one considers Heraclitus' emphasis on the xyizon or "common". 
While there is an underlying commonality there also seems (in the case of the foolish 
and the barbarous) to be an irretrievable loss. These are figures who remain incapable 
of directing their soul towards the divine sophia or wisdom. This is one side of the 
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vulnerability intrinsic to Heraclitus so often referred to as his thinking of flux. In this 
context, one is speaking of a negative vulnerability, a failure to fulfill the divine task 
which is the responsibility of the human ethos or character. 
However, there is also a positive aspect to this vulnerability. Here one can speak of 
Heraclitean unity maintaining a symbiotic relation with difference. The force of this 
positive Heraclitean difference is captured by fragment B27 - 
There awaits men at death what they neither hope nor surmise. 
This refers back to the original issue of Heraclitus' notion of the philosophos, the 
lover of wisdom. The philosopher is not in possession of sophia or wisdom, but is 
rather constituted in his / her very straining or yearning for this sophia. This 
"reaching out" (orexis) is to become a central theme in Empedocles' discourse (cf. 
Voegelin p. 223). In Heraclitus, the presence of such orexis raises the issue of the 
philosophical import of the experience of transcendence. In what is its apparently 
irreducible vulnerability to be differentiated from the vulnerability or blindness of the 
foolish and the barbarous? Is this theological experience not also a blindness, 
grounded only in an abyssal groundlessness? 
This is where one sees Heraclitus' crucial significance for the development of 
philosophy (and also for the theme of this thesis). Faced with a scenario analogous to 
that of a Derridean doubling or difference, Heraclitus in no way reduces or represses 
this difference, but at the same time neither does he see such difference as 
interminable, infinitely deferred etc. (like a proto-Derrida). This is where Heraclitus 
becomes central to the Platonism vs. Deconstruction debate. Three fragments are 
relevant in this regard - 
64 
The most beautiful kosmos is like a garbage-heap strewn at random (B 124) 
If you do not hope, you will not find the unhoped-for, since it is hard to be 
found and the way is all but impassable (B 18) 
Through lack of faith (apistis) the divine escapes being known (B 86). 
I will consider the first fragment independently, and the last two in tandem. The 
concept of the kosmos "being like" a garbage-heap has two aspects. In the first case, it 
can be linked to Parmenides' notion of the eoikota panta (B8,60), where the light- 
goddess promises to tell Parmenides the arrangement of the world "as all is likely" 
(eoikota panta). Here, as Voegelin observes, one has a specifically contingent truth, a 
"likely" account (p. 216). Applying this to Heraclitus, one can say that according to 
fragment B 124, it is possible that the kosinos is a garbage heap strewn at random. 
This in effect is for Heraclitus the possibility of failure, the world as seen by the fools 
and the barbarous. But this remains an irreducible possibility. 
The second sense of the fragment interprets "like" in the sense of a negative 
appearance. The most beautiful kosmos is like, might be seen by some as, a random 
garbage-heap, but ultimately it remains a beautiful kosmos. Understood in this sense 
the first part of the fragment is assertive -S is P (the cosmos is beautiful) while the 
second part refers to a mistake, a misreading by those whose souls are not directed 
towards the sophia, unhealthy souls, those suffering from a "disease of the soul" 
(nosos) [B 46]. However, one must be careful in describing the first part as 
"assertive". This would seem to be an example of the didacticism which Kahn speaks 
of ( and which I believe to be the driving force of Heraclitus' writings). Nonetheless, 
it is stated by Heraclitus who has already described the access to sophia as only a 
divine capacity. 
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As a philosophos on Heraclitus' terms (that is, a lover of wisdom rather than a wise 
man), to state that the kosinos is beautiful can only be a statement grounded in orexis 
(reaching out). Can one still maintain that it is therefore didactic? I believe the 
answer to be yes when one considers the crucial fragments B 18 and B 86 (see above). 
Heraclitus' didacticism is a didacticism based on "hope" and "faith", but it is no less a 
didacticism for all that. Faced with the inaccessability of sophon, there is always the 
danger that one will sink into oblivion. If truth (a - lethia - literally, the negation of 
oblivion), is only accessible to a divinity, does this not leave humanity in the abyss, in 
the realm of lethia? Fragments B 18 and B86 reject this pessimism through hope and 
faith. 
Some commentators might respond that this remains a nonphilosophical rejection. 
Hope and faith, if not illogical, are at least extra-logical, extrinsic to philosophy. At 
this point, one would have to foreground the perennial question, "What is 
philosophy? ". I have attempted to show how in Heraclitus the emphasis is placed on 
the philo - aspect, the aspect of the lover rather than that of the wise. To this extent, 
hope and faith are not only for Heraclitus not extrinsic to philosophy; they are the very 
movement of the philosophical spirit. With Parmenides, the situation is similar. 
Commentators such as Guthrie interpret the Parmenidean poem in a univocal sense, as 
a treatise on the unchangeability of Being and, by implication, the impossibility of 
motion. As Guthrie himself observes, such conclusions are "extraordinary" (GP., 
p. 47) having been reached by equally "extraordinary" means, but one can only put this 
down to the limitations of language and logic within which the Presocratics worked 
(GP., p. 47). Voegelin however interprets Parmenides rather as a thinker of 
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complexity whose conception of Being is inscribed within a process greater than 
itself. This is for Voegelin an "experiential" (p. 203) process which - 
by its inner logic, will articulate the soul to the point where its supernatural 
destiny achieves consciousness (Voegelin, p. 202). 
Parmenides describes this journey of the soul in a Prologue and two parts, one 
concerning Truth (alethia) and the other Opinion / Delusion (doxa). The part 
concerning alethia elaborates a philosophy of Being, Being as an eternal Now (nyn) 
[B8,5], as Justice (dike) [B8,13-15], as Necessity (ananke) and as bounded 
(tek'uteton) [B8,29-33]. These motifs are the basis for the supposed antagonism 
between Parmenides' Being and Heraclitus' Becoming. This polar opposition 
becomes problematised when one considers that it rests on a total neglect of the 
relation between the the first part and the second part of Parmenides' poem. For the 
realm of doxa is concerned with the realm of the mortal and as such it must be the 
very starting point for Parmenides' own reflections. 
Both parts of the poem are said to derive from the knowledge received from the 
nameless goddess of light, introduced in the Prologue. This goddess guides 
Parmenides in his search for reality - Parmenides is therefore in the traditional 
Pythagorean position of one who disclaims sophia (wisdom) which is allowed only to 
God, in favour of that of philosophos (lover of wisdom) [cf. Coxon, p. 12]. The very 
vulnerability of this status of philosopher gives the lie to those such as Guthrie who 
identify the thought of Parmenides with the first part of the poem i. e. the Way of 
Truth. If anything, it seems more consistent to identify Parmenides with the second 
part of the poem, the Way of Delusion, thus throwing the whole project and status of 
the poem into question. For if Parmenides is fundamentally deluded, how is one to 
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take anything of what he says seriously, whether titled the Way of Truth or the Way 
of Delusion'? All Parmenidean Ways become equally subject to vulnerability. 
This approach to Parmenides, while legitimate in some respects, risks a process of 
infinite regress. Almost in Derridean fashion, one finds oneself asserting that 
Parmenides would be neither true nor deluded, both true and deluded. It seems to me 
that a more fruitful line of inquiry is that taken up by Voegelin who compares 
Parmenides' thought to that of Plato, in a similar fashion to the affinities he draws 
between Heraclitus and Plato (and thus between Parmenides and Heraclitus). All 
three are interpreted as thinkers of a certain paradox, that is the participation 
(i netaschesis) of the divine in the human, the infinite in the finite. This of course 
foreshadows the Christian revelation, a foreshadowing and relationship I will discuss 
below. It is certainly possible to read back into Parmenides' poem many of the 
elements which will later be developed by, for example, Augustine and Boethius. 
The love (i)hilia) of the philosopher is linked as in Heraclitus to a orexis (reaching 
out) of the spirit. This is Parmenides' evidence of the heavenly growth (phyton 
ouranion) which Plato will describe so eloquently in the Timaeus (90a-b): "for most 
truly we are a heavenly growth". The relation between Parmenides and Plato will be 
developed more clearly in section 2.4 but here it suffices to conclude with a certain 
Platonic interpretation of the poem itself. In a sense, the poem can be seen as a 
dialogue between its various parts - the Prologue announcing the Goddess, the first 
section announcing Truth, the final section announcing Doxa. As Voegelin observes: 
What are the relations between the gods that appear in the revelation 
concerning Delusion and the goddess who reveals the gods as delusionary? 
Could it be that we, after all, do not emerge from the Doxa into the Truth of 
Being, but that the Truth of Being is embraced by the Doxa? Or are there 
nondelusionary gods beyond Being? Or is the revelation of the Truth, coming 
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from the goddess, perhaps itself a Delusion? The poem offers no answers to 
such questions; we have reached the limits and limitations of Parmenidean 
thinking. Nevertheless, these questions, while not answered by the poem, 
are raised by its very structure (p. 218, Voegelin). 
For Voegelin, one has to wait until Plato to obtain a genuine answer to these 
questions. However, this is perhaps to still underestimate Parmenides. Voegelin's 
interpretation also applies to Heraclitus - the problems raised by Heraclitus are only 
resolved by Plato. In the next two sections I will address this problematic directly. 
Section 2.3 will be concerned with Heraclitus and Plato, Section 2.4 with Parmenides 
and Plato. In both cases I will point to a resolution which already takes place in the 
Presocratics - what Voegelin would term an assertion of "order" (the theme which 
guides his magnum opus Order and History). 
Section 2.3 - Heraclitus and Plato 
Of all those whose accounts I have heard, none has gone as far as this: to 
recognise what is wise, set apart from all (XXVII, Kahn, p. 41). 
In his analysis of this fragment, Charles Kahn speaks of a certain "duality" (p. 115), 
which lie posits as being fundamental to Heraclitus' thought. In "Plato's Pharmacy", 
Derrida refers to a Heraclitean cryptic phusis which he aligns with the doubling effect 
of deconstruction. Here, however, I will seeks to draw a strict distinction between 
Heraclitean duality and Derridean doubling. In "Plato's Pharmacy", Derrida also 
refers to Platos' early dialogue the Lysis as being another example of deconstructive 
doubling. While outlining an undeniable duality in the Lysis, this section will attempt 
to link this Platonic ambiguity with Heraclitus rather than Derrida. In so doing it is 
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hoped to foreground both the Heraclitean influence on Plato and the Heraclitean / 
Platonic philosophical resources which can be employed to resist the ateleology of 
deconstruction. 
To begin, it is possible to locate two different examples of duality or ambiguity in the 
Heraclitean fragment quoted. The term logoi, translated by Kahn as "accounts", has 
both a subjective and a cosmological meaning. It can refer to the treatises of 
philosophers, for example Heraclitean treatise or here the treatises of his 
philosophical opponents, or it can refer to something universal, to which all things 
agree. Fragment 1 makes this second meaning clear - 
Although this account (logos) holds forever (aiei) [Kahn, p. 29]. 
In fragment XXVII, however, logoi has primarily a negative connotation, as the 
subjective work of thinkers distanced from true wisdom. But it also stands as a kind 
of barometer of true wisdom - these logoi would not be true logoi. Heraclitus repeats 
this ambiguity at the very end of the fragment in the pronoun panton ("all"). What is 
wise (sophon) is set apart from "all". But Heraclitus does not specify here if he means 
"all men" or "all things". As Kahn observes - 
The difference is considerable: is the wise separate "from all men" or "from 
all things"? The first reading suggests wisdom as ordinarily conceived, a 
property men wish to possess, though in fact they fail to attain it. The second 
seems to posit the "wise" as a cosmic divine principle, separate or 
transcendent like the Intelligence (Woos) of Anaxagoras which is "not mixed 
with anything else" (Kahn, p. 115). 
Just as the term logos has a respective subjective and cosmological meaning, a dual 
structure, so too the term panton. Kahn goes on to clarify this simultaneous 
ambiguity - 
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his (Heraclitus') characterisation is strictly ambivalent between a human 
property that is rare and difficult and a cosmic power which is unique and 
remote from all others. For it is precisely this ambiguity or duality between 
the life of man and the life of the cosmos that structures Heraclitus' entire 
discourse, as in the duality already noted between logos as the utterance of a 
man and logos as the pattern of cosmic process (p. 115, Kahn). 
As this passage implies, it is not simply ambiguity which the terms logos and panton 
share. They also share an emphasis on an enigmatic unity. Panton, if taken to mean 
"all men", refers to a human property that is rare and difficult. In other words, the 
ambiguity of panton is tempered by an unambiguous hierarchy pertaining to the 
human. Similarly, if taken to mean "all things", panton can be understood as "a 
cosmic power which is unique and remote from all others". There can be no 
ambiguity as regards the uniqueness or remoteness of this cosmic principle. Rather, 
the ambiguity can only refer to the nature of the remoteness itself. I emphasise this 
subtle point because it differentiates Heraclitus' "duality" from Derridean doubling 
which would come to subvert the remoteness itself, thus disallowing the concept of 
hierarchy or even genuine wisdom (sophia). 
This difference from Derrida is also made clear by Heraclitus' employment of the verb 
"to recognise" (ginoskein) in this same fragment XXVII - "to recognise what is wise". 
This concept of recognition is continuously used by Heraclitus. Kahn refers to it as 
follows - 
Heraclitus has taken over this verb, with its cognate nouns gnome and gnosis, 
as his own term for "cognition" in a privileged sense, for the insight which 
men lack and which his own discourse attempts to communicate (Kahn, 
p. 104). 
The duality which thus governs Heraclitus' reference to logos and panton is far from 
being a duality of infinite regress. Rather it is very much a purposeful duality: it is 
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part of a hierarchical Heraclitean system which seeks to redress the lack of wisdom 
which often parades as the essence of wisdom. In this sense, Heraclitus is 
particularly scathing towards his predecessors in Greek literature and philosophy. 
Note, for example, the following fragments - 
XVIII - Much learning (polymathie) does not teach understanding (lions). For it 
would have taught Hesiod and Pythagoras, and also Xenophanes and Hecataeus. 
XIX - The teacher of most is Hesiod. It is him they know (epistantai) as knowing 
(eidenai) most, who did not recognise (ginoskein) day and night: they are one. 
XXII - Men are deceived (hexepatentai) in the recognition (gnosin) of what is 
obvious, like Homer who was wisest of all the Greeks. For he was deceived by boys 
killing lice who said: what we see and catch we leave behind: what we neither see 
nor catch we carry away. 
I want to stress two particular points deriving from these fragments: 1) that 
Heraclitus is making a clear distinction, a hierarchical distinction, between genuine 
recognition or understanding (XVIII - noos, XIX - ginoskein, XXII - gnosin) and 
mere learning or inferior knowledge (XVHI - polymathie, XIX - epistantai / eidenai, 
XXII - hexepatentai) and 2) that this understanding (noos) remains of an enigmatic 
sort. This is borne out by what Homer is supposed to have misunderstood according 
to fragment XXII i. e. the "obvious" (phaneron). However, the riddle of the boys 
killing the lice seems far from obvious. This is a crucial fragment for understanding 
the wider implications of Heraclitus' thought and I will use it as a helpful preface to 
the discussion of the Heraclitean influence on Plato (with particular reference to the 
Lysis) - 
Kahn emphasises what he calls the "double paradox" (Kahn, p. 112) in fragment 
XXII. Usually one assumes that what one sees and catches one carries away and what 
one neither sees nor catches one leaves behind. Fragment XXII however denies the 
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expected consequence of seeing and catching ("what we see and catch we leave 
behind") while affirming this consequence of not seeing and catching ("what we 
neither see nor catch we carry away"). This is the riddle of the lice which is said to 
have caused Homer's death through the grief attendant on not being able to guess the 
answer (cf. Kahn, p. 1 12). Heraclitus' fragment can be seen as a projected answer to 
this riddle. 
His most fundamental point would appear to refer back to our previous definition of 
the philosophos as undertaking a journey towards truth rather than having arrived. 
Etymologically, this is what distinguishes the term "philosopher" (lover of wisdom) 
from the term "sophist" (possessor of wisdom). Applied to the lice riddle, one can 
see Heraclitus as pointing to the irreducibility of a certain ignorance. The philosopher 
remains blind to the lice which are yet to be caught. These lice constitute the task 
which lies ahead for the philosopher - the problems yet to be solved. The fact that 
Homer fails to understand this open project is not so much due to his ignorance as to 
his polymathie, his false wisdom which blinds him to the enigmatic truth which is 
stated as being accessible to the "boys" i. e. to children. This point links fragment 
XXII to fragments XVIII and XIX. It also links Heraclitus to a prominent aspect of 
Platonic thinking. 
One clear example of such Heracliteanism at work in Plato is the Lysis. Heraclitus' 
thinking concerning the need for opposition ("conflict is justice") is introduced by 
Socrates as a hypothesis in relation to the essence of true friendship. Perhaps, 
Socrates says, friendship is not so much a matter of like being attracted to like, as like 
to unlike. For surely the like are merely receiving what they already have when they 
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become friends with their like. With the "unlike", however, they have something of 
genuine originality to receive. Socrates nonetheless dismisses this hypothesis as being 
too close to that of the antilogoi who privilege opposition to merely confuse the 
argument. Initially, this would seem to outrule the concept of a Heraclitean influence 
on Plato. Has Socrates not here explicitly rejected a central Heraclitean tenet i. e. that 
conflict is justice? 
Two points can be made here. Firstly, as already discussed in this section, Heraclitus 
should not be simply seen as a thinker of opposition. To requote Kahn - 
the intellectual unity of Heraclitus' composition was in a sense greater than 
that of any archaic poem, since its final intent was more explicitly didactic, 
and its central theme a direct affirmation of unity: hen pantai einai, "all 
things are one"[Kahn, p. 7] 
The "Heracliteanism" which Socrates rejects in the Lysis is thus somewhat of a 
caricature and probably more directly attributable to the work of the Heraclitean 
contemporary of Socrates, Cratylus. Secondly, there is the question of the enigmatic 
structure of the Lysis itself. While the conflict of opposites is rejected as a hypothesis 
concerning friendship so too is the doctrine of like and like. A. E. Taylor makes the 
point that the dialogue seems to end in a circle as in its final phase it appears to 
unquestionably reintroduce a variant of the like and like doctrine as the key to 
friendship (the doctrine having been refuted earlier in the dialogue). 
However Taylor makes an important qualification. The final phase of the dialogue 
privileges a friendship based on what is most near and intimate to us (to oikcion), this 
being the good (to agathon) - 
The way in which the thought that what is most near and intimate to us (to 
oikeion) is the good is kept back to the very end of the conversation suggests 
that this - that man as such has such a "natural good" and that it is the one 
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thing worth caring for in life - is the thought he means the discussion to leave 
in our minds. [p. 73 - Taylor Plato the Man and his Work] (10) 
Taylor derives the following significant conclusion - 
If we go back to the various proposed explanations of the secret of friendship 
with this thought in our minds, it may occur to us that they do not after all 
formally contradict one another. [Taylor, p. 73] 
This reevaluation of the different refutations outlined in the Lysis has the effect in one 
case of reintroducing the importance of a certain Heracliteanism - the doctrine of 
opposites in its relation to friendship. I have already described this doctrine as a 
caricature of Heraclitus' thought. This criticism is true from the point of view of 
Heraclitus' fundamental emphasis on unity -a unity which must underlie all 
opposition. However, opposition is nonetheless a significant component of 
Heraclitus' thinking taken in a less general sense. For example, many of the 
fragments foreground a conception of unity precisely through a thinking of the unity 
of opposites (e. g. "the mortal is the immortal" etc). This emphasis on the unity of 
opposition is however very different from the privileging of opposition over unity 
which is practised by the antilogoi. And in this sense Socrates can be said to have 
been unfair to Heraclitus in the Lysis. 
However, I have already pointed to the fact that this refutation remains provisional. 
This provisionality is tied to Plato's strategy in the Lysis. Edith Hamilton for example 
has described the Lysis as illustrating in an exemplary way the "method" of Plato 
[Hamilton, p. 145] (11). Schematically, one can say that in the Lysis this method 
stages an inconclusive dialogue between apparently conflicting philosophies (thus 
emphasising plurality) while concluding by introducing the Good as an unproven 
assumption, this Good being seen as a reconciling principle between all the 
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competing philosophies. This method is repeated throughout the Platonic corpus, 
most notably in the Maio, in the famous "Meno's paradox" where Socrates is asked 
how he can possibly find the Good (or Truth) if he does not know what he is searching 
for. This ignorance or perplexity concerning the Good is exemplified in the Meno by 
the fact that this principle must remain an unproven assumption - it is introduced at 
the end, after an inconclusive discussion. I will discuss this Platonic method in more 
detail in Chapters 3 and 4. Here it is useful to see it in its striking affinity to 
Heraclitus' concept of the One which far from repressing difference seems rather to 
depend upon this difference as its very condition of possibility. In the next section, I 
will outline an analogous affinity between the Platonic method and the structure of 
Parmenides' poem. 
Section 2.4 - Parmenides and Plato 
As discussed in Section 2.2, Parmenides' concept of being (as One, changeless, 
timeless etc - fragment 8: "that Being is ungenerated and imperishable, entire, 
unique, unmoved and perfect: hos ageneton eon kai anolethron estin, houlon kai 
atremes »nounogenes to hed ateleston) is often seen as outruling the possibility of 
difference. This leads Guthrie for example to speak of the historically specific 
"limitations" of Parmenides' project. In other words, the concept of Being as 
unmoved, timeless etc is interpreted by Guthrie as ultimately inadmissible and a 
merely interesting stop-off point in the history of philosophy (albeit a rather farcical 
stop - off point, in hindsight). 
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In this section, however, in linking Parmenides with Plato I will argue for a different 
interpretation of Parmenidean Being (to eon). As Coxon has noted - 
Parmenides' poem is dominated by his conviction that human beings can 
attain knowledge of reality or understanding (noos) [ Coxon, p. 19]. 
However, if one is to adhere to the traditionalist interpretation of Parmenides (as 
exemplified by Guthrie) such a reading is inadmissable. If Being is "unmoved and 
perfect" (fragment 8) then one is disallowed from speaking of elements such as 
"conviction", "human beings" etc as these would all be differentiations of the One. 
Indeed strictly speaking, the One would exclude any possibility of a philosopher 
called Parmenides. On my reading this extremism represents a distortion of 
Parmenides' work to the extent that - 
a) it judges Part 1 of the poem, "the Way of Truth", as if it were the poem as such, 
taking its tenets (Being is One etc) as the essence of Parmenides' poem. This neglects 
the fact that the Prologue and Part 2 maintain an enigmatic and unclear relation to Part 
1. 
b) Part 1 of the poem is addressed to Parmenides by a "goddess". Its truth-status is 
therefore at least ambiguous, if not precarious. For example, one would have to take 
account of the mythic component of the goddess' speech. 
Both of these points are linked to Parmenides' relation to Plato. In the following two 
chapters, I will concentrate on Plato's dialogues, the Meno and the Phaedrus. Here, 
however, it seems most appropriate to concentrate on the Parmenides which has been 
described, for example by Miller [12], as having "surely proven itself the most 
enigmatic of all of Plato's dialogues" (Miller, p. 3). One of the reasons for this 
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enigma is Plato's placing of Parmenides in the position of questioner and Socrates in 
the position of interlocutor undergoing the trial of the elenchus. Moreover, it is not 
just any Socratic / Platonic position which is in question here, but precisely the 
Theory of Forms, perhaps the Platonic doctrine. Even more surprisingly, Socrates 
seems unable to offer a defence of the Theory of Forms, and Parmenides' criticisms 
appear to be destructive of their very basis. 
This apparent undermining by Plato of a central Platonic doctrine has led Platonic 
commentators to seek security by passing the Parmenides off as a "highly enjoyable 
philosophical jest" (Taylor, p. 370). On Taylor's interpretation, the Parmenides is 
Plato's employment of the Eleatic method to exemplify the inherent confusions of the 
latter - 
It is enough for his [Plato's] purpose to perplex the "eristics" by availing 
himself of fallacies of the kind which they habitually commit in their own 
argumentation. His parody of their elenchus is also an exposure of it. The one 
important point to keep in mind is that the conclusions to which he is led by 
his application of the Eleatic methods to the Eleatic "hypothesis" are not 
meant to be asserted as his own. They are simply what happens to the 
"hypothesis" if you make the Eleatic criticize himself by his own methods 
[Taylor, p. 366]. 
This interpretation at best only holds for the second part of the Pannenides (most 
commentators split the Parmenides into "Parmenides I" and "Parmenides H"). In the 
first part of the dialogue, the confusion regarding the Theory of Forms is not the 
result of Eleatic fallacy but of Socrates' very own inability to answer incisive 
questions from Parmenides. To this extent, Taylor's attempt to pass the Parmenides 
off as merely a "philosophical jest" seems to err more than a little on the side of 
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wishful thinking. Nonetheless, Taylor's interpretation does have the merit of 
foregrounding the Parmenides / Plato relation. 
As is clear from the above quotation, Taylor views the relation as one of a Platonic 
critique of Parmenides. It seems however that if Taylor were to see this (as appears to 
be the case) as a general interpretation of the Parmenides / Plato relation that this view 
would only hold on a very unsympathetic reading of Parmenides. That is, if Taylor is 
claiming that not simply the Parmenides but Plato's work in general is a critique of 
Parmenides, this interpretation seems only admissible if one returns to a view of 
Parmenides ä la Guthrie i. e. Parmenides posits a univocal, timeless, changeless One. 
It is clear that this version of Parmenideanism is rejected by Plato tout court. 
However, there is a more sympathetic reading of Parmenides which in turn forces one 
to reconsider the Parmenides / Plato relation. As Voegelin notes - 
the effectiveness of Parmenides....... would be unintelligible without the initial 
meaning of his work. This meaning was recovered, and magnificently 
enriched, in the work of Plato. The Republic is animated by the Parmenidean 
light-vision, giving the philosopher his grasp on the Truth of Being, and of 
the incarnation of the paradigmatic order in the work of the philosopher, that 
is, in the order of his Politeia. Philosophy in the strict sense, as the tree of 
speculation that grows from the heavenly root, is the creation of Parmenides 
and Plato [Voegelin, p. 214]. 
Voegelin therefore grounds this reinvigoration of the Parmenides / Plato relation in 
what he refers to as the initial meaning of Parmenides' thought. The central question 
relates to the debate between those who would stress such a Parmenidean original 
meaning and those who would rather stress the rigidity of the Parmenidean One. 
From the point of view of the latter, the Parmenides / Plato relation can only be very 
tenuous. While it is true that there is a linkage between the Parmenidean One (even 
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understood rigidly) and Plato's Theory of Forms, the former remains incompatible 
with for example the Platonic philosophy of dialogue which emphasises difference, 
albeit a difference which can possibly be overcome. 
Understood outside a rigid notion of the One, however, Parmenides' philosophy can 
be linked in several important ways to the development in Plato's own thinking. The 
structure of Parmenides' poem is important in this respect. It is divided into a 
Prologue and two parts which report the knowledge received from the goddess 
concerning Truth (alethcia) and Delusion (doxa). In the Prologue, the goddess 
addresses Parmenides as follows - 
Welcome, 0 youth, arriving at our dwelling as consort of immortal 
charioteers and mares which carry you; no ill fate sent you forth to travel on 
this way, which is far removed indeed from the step of men, but right and 
justice (Fragment 1,23-26). 
Crucially the Prologue thus foregrounds Parmenides having been "carried" by mares 
to the goddess, his having travelled "on this way" (hodon). At once this 
problernatizes the rigid conception of a Parmenidean One. If the One requires a 
"way" or "path", it must in consequence allow for change, time etc, all the attributes 
denied of the rigid Parmenidean One. This admission of an irreducible time or 
plurality is reinforced by the advice which the goddess adds - 
You must be informed of everything (panta), both (hemen) of the unmoved 
heart of persuasive reality (aleitheics eupeitheos atremes) and of the beliefs of 
mortals (hede broton doxas), which comprise no genuine conviction; 
nevertheless you shall learn these also, how it was necessary that the things 
that are believed to be should have their being in general acceptance, ranging 
through all things from end to end (pantos panta peronta) [fragment 1,29-32] 
[Coxon, p. 50]. 
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The continued reference here to the "all" (panta) or "everything" and that which 
extends through "all things from end to end" is more reminiscent of Heraclitus than of 
the traditional interpretation of Parmenides. This is perhaps because the Prologue is 
always neglected in favour of a reading of Part 1 of the poem which elaborates the 
timelessness of Being. My contention is that when read in the context of the 
Prologue, Part 1 of the poem becomes a utopian construct or speculation rather than a 
metaphysical refutation of change. As later with Plato, Parmenides is attempting to 
put forward a critique of the beliefs of mortals (pede broton doxas). However, in his 
very recognition that these beliefs are to be found in "everything" Upanta), 
Parmenides has rejected (prior to its inauguration) posterity's interpretation of the 
Eleatic as a thinker of timeless Being. 
Coxon describes the situation well when he calls for a clear distinction between the 
journey necessary to reach the goddess (hodon poluphemon daimonos) and the 
philosophical contemplation of Being which she advocates Upeithous keleuthos) 
[Coxon, p. 12]. Coxon accuses a "Stoic writer" of having initially confused these 
two distinct paths - 
The correctness of this identification of the journey along the hodon 
poluphenion daimonos with the peithous keleuthos described by the goddess 
has commonly been taken for granted; nevertheless it flagrantly violates the 
form of the poem [p. 12] 
By "the form of the poem" Coxon is alluding to the relation between the Prologue 
and Part 1, and also to how this relation is already clarified within the Prologue itself; 
By his careful use of tenses in the prologue, Parmenides distinguishes clearly 
between 1) being set on the road to the goddess by the mares; 2) being drawn 
along this road and through the gates, to which it leads, by the mares under 
the guidance of the Heliades; 3) hearing from the goddess about the possible 
hodoi dixesios and about the landmarks on the "real way" or "journey of 
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persuasion" which lies before him. Since dixesis is philosophical enquiry, the 
journey to the gateway must necessarily be in some sense preliminary to the 
enquiry she describes... [Coxon, p. 12]. 
In other words, the journey, the path (hodon), in effect the opening to temporality 
and flux, must precede the arrival at timeless Being. This more open view of 
Parmenides, as a thinker of a projected Unity within difference, links the Eleatic to 
Plato's work. Coxon makes the point that the Parmenides, Theaetetus, Sophist and 
Statesman constitute an "Eleatic tetralogy" [p. 261 from Plato's perspective. For 
Coxon, the Platonic theory of Forms is "a pluralist development of Parmenides' 
monism" [p. 26] - 
It is consequently not surprising that, although there is no allusion to 
Parmenides either in the formulation of the theory in the Phaedo or in its 
elaboration in the middle books of the Republic, the latter is sometimes 
expressed in language which derives unmistakably from him [Coxon, p. 27]. 
So too with the later dialogues which on first inspection would seem to represent a 
refutation of Eleaticism. The Sophist for example (succeeding the Parmenides) puts 
forward a critique of Parmenides' monism. However, it also outlines a critique of 
Plato's own theory of Forms (cf. 248a). Additionally, this critique in both cases is 
vocalised by a dissident Eleatic, the Stranger. Coxon derives the following 
conclusion - 
The visitor from Elea is represented as the embodiment of the genuine 
philosopher and so as one who is "dedicated always through arguments to the 
Form of Being" (le tou ontos aei dia logisinon proskehnenos idea - 254a). In 
making this the ultimate concern of dialectic, Plato shows himself still, as 
earlier in the Phaedo and Republic, a direct if unorthodox successor to 
Parmenides [p. 29]. 
This Parmenidean influence on Plato distances him from Derrida in the measure to 
which the Form of Being remains an almost undeconstructible assumption in 
Platonism. This becomes particularly clear in the Meno where Socrates is challenged 
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by Meno precisely because he is employing such an ideal paradigm without any 
substantive content. "How", asks Meno, "can one find the truth if one doesn't even 
know what one is looking for? ". Plato's work can be interpreted as an attempt to 
anwer this most fundamental of philosophical questions. The next two chapters 
examine the details of this metaphysical project, what in the Seventh Letter Plato calls 
"the almost miraculous effort" [cf. Voegelin, p. 4]. 
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CHAPTER 3- PLATO CONTRA DERRIDA I: THE CASE OF THE MENO 
Section 3.1 - Prefatory Remarks 
W. K. C. Guthrie, in the Introduction to his translations of the Protagoras and Meno 
outlines some of the difficulties which any interpreter of Plato must face - 
When a philosopher expounds his thoughts in the more usual form of a 
systematic treatise, it may be profound and difficult, but at least the reader's 
task is limited to finding out what it means on the assumption that the writer 
was doing his best to communicate his own views in as clear and orderly a 
manner as possible. But in dealing with something that so far from being a 
treatise, is a unique amalgam of philosophical discussion with dramatic art, 
humorous irony, and poetic myth, a number of prior questions must arise [p. 
8] (1) 
Guthrie goes on to outline some such questions, particularly in relation to the 
Protagoras which he cites as being especially prone to misunderstanding. For 
example, Socrates' exposition of the poem of Simonides (342A -347A) appears to 
outdo even the sophists in terms of its distortions of the poem and its "long, 
continuous exhibition of virtuosity" [Guthrie, p. 19]. Similarly, there is Socrates' 
defence of the Spartans as the most philosophical of the Greeks, his claim that their 
apparent disdain for metaphysics is simply an elaborate ruse, their expulsions of 
foreigners the means to indulge in a clandestine bout of philosophical discussion 
[Guthrie, p. 19]. This is undoubtedly Socrates at his most mischievous, but the 
ramifications of this behaviour have serious import. For it is precisely this kind of 
Socratic sophistry which Derrida cites in "Plato's Pharmacy" as disallowing a simple 
dichotomy between Platonism and sophism. There is, says Derrida, rather a 
doubling effect, a confusing of positions. 
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Dialogues such as the Protagoras can easily lend themselves to such an interpretation. 
Besides the above mischievousness there is additionally the rather startling fact that 
Socrates seems to admit to a kind of Protagorean hedonism at the conclusion of the 
discussion. As Guthrie observes - 
An endless controversy has been aroused by the fact that in this dialogue, he 
[Plato] apparently makes Socrates enunciate and defend a doctrine regarded by 
many as the direct antithesis of what Socrates is likely to have taught in real 
life [p. 9; Guthrie]. 
Guthrie however goes on to make two important qualifications to this point - 
1) Protagorean hedonism, to which Socrates appears to adhere in the Protagoras, is 
far from, for example, the vulgar hedonism espoused by Callicles in the Gorgias (a 
dialogue in which Socrates takes a much stronger tone with sophistry). Protagoras is 
rather the "best of the sophists" (p. 23, Guthrie), a man of whom Plato had a high 
opinion, both as a thinker and as a moral influence. 
2) Although "stopping short" [p. 23] of the "full teaching" [p. 23] of Socrates in the 
Protagoras, Plato's other dialogues (for example, the Meno) can be employed to put 
this as it were strategic representation of Socrates in context. 
It is this second point which most interests me in the context of this thesis as it 
foregrounds the hypothesis of an at least relatively unified philosophy of Plato. In 
other words, no dialogue should be taken in isolation but must be read in the context 
of all the other dialogues, although Guthrie is sensible enough to admit that all 
dialogues are "open to a number of different interpretations" [p. 25]. Given this 
admission, I think that Guthrie's approach is a fair and fruitful one which gives the 
reader a framework within which to identify the consistency present in Plato's work. 
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In the next two chapters I will address the Meno (an early / middle period dialogue) 
and the Phaedrus (a middle / late period work). While the Socratic philosophizing in 
each dialogue can be said to differ qualitatively, fundamentally it is always the drive 
for truth, for the Good (i. e. the life of the philosophos) which remains paramount. 
As in the Lysis which was discussed earlier, this ideal or Form of the Good often 
remains little more than an assumption (or a daemonic dream) without substantive 
content. But what differentiates Plato from Derrida is that whereas the latter sees such 
insubstantiveness as a justification for making the Good conditional, deconstructible, 
for Plato (even in its very insubstantive state) it must remain unconditional, 
unconditioned, as an ideal which must guide the search for truth, and thus life itself. 
My first analysis of this problem will concentrate on the Meno. Guthrie describes the 
Meno as "one of the most interesting of Plato's dialogues, and the best of all to serve 
as an introduction to the study of his thought" [p. 24]. The dialogue is significant in 
one sense because it has been cited as the crucial transition point between the 
dialogues as a representation of Socrates' philosophy and as a representation of 
Plato's philosophy. The assertion of the transcendent Forms, the theory of learning as 
recollection and the doctrine of the immortality of the soul distinguish the Meno from, 
for example, the more Socratic influenced Gorgias and Protagoras - 
in the Meno one can see the transition taking place. It shows the mind of Plato 
assimilating what Socrates had to give and then, under other, particularly 
Pythagorean influences, as well as the individual bent of his own 
temperament, reaching out beyond it to regions of which Socrates scarcely 
dreamed [p. 24, Guthrie]. 
The more complex metaphysics of the Meno however should not blind one to the 
continuing Socratic influence. Plato's work from the Meno onwards is in no way a 
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refutation of Socrates' thought but a "natural extension" (Guthrie, p. 25) of the latter's 
moral and political thinking into the more explicitly cosmological sphere. And this 
cosmological thinking requires more than ever a Socratic foundation. In the early 
dialogues, the discussion often concerns concepts which appear readily accessible to 
the average reader - moral virtue, political justice etc. Socrates' subsequent point is 
of course that these concepts are employed without understanding by people and are 
therefore more inaccessible than one might at first admit. Nonetheless, most of his 
interlocutors in the early dialogues either reject Socrates' argument (thus returning to 
the "complacent" [tharralcon] state of, for example, a Callicles) or else accept it but 
see the solution as within reach, given consideration (e. g. Hippothales in the Lysis. 
Although the Lysis seems to have a circular argument, it nonetheless finishes with the 
supposition that "friendship" is our "very own" [phusei oikeion], that is, within 
reach). 
To the extent, however, that the Meno is addressing more cosmological issues, 
Socrates leaves himself open to the charge that he has no control over his subject- 
matter. This leads Meno to propound a dilemma or what he sees as a paradox of the 
Socratic position. If one is as ignorant as Socrates claims then one cannot know what 
one is searching for. But if one does not know what one is searching for, one cannot 
hope to find it. Meno has thus introduced a problem which could be fatal to the 
Socratic / Platonic project as a whole. Initially Socrates seeks to avoid this paradox by 
outlining the thesis of knowledge as "remembrance" or anamnesis. This seems to be 
a specifically Platonic rather than Socratic solution. However Socrates later disclaims 
any certainty as regards this thesis. Rather his only philosophical means for avoiding 
the paradox is his declaration that it is always better to seek knowledge than to weakly 
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give up the quest (Guthrie, p. 104). Even in the Meno therefore, where one can trace 
the Platonic introduction of cosmological themes, these themes still remain very much 
dependent upon a Socratic method of enquiry. I will discuss how these issues are 
developed in the Meno in more detail in the following section. 
Here it is more appropriate to make a more general point. The Socratic response to 
Meno's paradox is something I believe to be central to the Platonic project as a whole, 
early to late. I am thus following Guthrie's thesis that no dialogue can be interpreted 
in isolation. Running throughout the dialogues is the assumption of the Form of the 
Good, to which all vision must be directed. But as Socrates makes clear, even in the 
rather intellectualist Republic, the Good is "beyond knowledge". Meno interprets this 
"beyond" negatively in constituting his paradox and I would argue that Derrida repeats 
this negativity. In contrast, Plato affirms this "exteriority" as the very object of 
philosophical striving. 
Section 3.2 - The Meno 
In Chapter 2,1 discussed the Presocratic affinity, particularly that of Heraclitus and 
Parmenides, with Plato. There, the subtle difference between the Presocratic / 
Platonic emphasis on "Unity" and Derrida's stress on "doubling" was outlined. The 
Meno is again a clear case in point. It combines a fundamental faith in the One with a 
continuous reiteration of the difficulties involved in proving (endeixasthai, 82a) such 
an ideal. The tone is set abruptly at the very beginning of the dialogue with Meno 
immediately asking "Can you tell me, Socrates, whether virtue can be taught, or is 
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acquired by practice, not teaching? " (70a; ekheis moi eipein, ho Socrates, ara 
didakton he arete; he ou didakton all asketon; ). Plato avoids the articulation of 
dramatic context he so ably elaborated in the prior Protagoras. This enables him (via 
Socrates) to focus on the philosophical issues more clearly and the introduction of the 
topic of virtue (arete) provokes Socrates into a question concerning the nature of 
virtue itself. Far from being able to offer an answer to whether virtue is acquired by 
teaching (didakton) or practice (asketon) Socrates cannot even elaborate what virtue is 
in the first place - 
a drought of wisdom has come on (aukhrnos tis tes Sophias gegonenz)..... so far 
am I from knowing (eidenai) whether it can be taught or not (eite didakton cite 
ine didakton) that I actually do not even know (host oude auto eidos) what the 
thing itself, virtue (arete) is at all [71a]. 
This lack of knowing reminds one of Heraclitus' critique of polyntathie and 
Parmenides' Way of Delusion (Doxa). In both the latter cases, this lack was not 
understood negatively but rather as the impetus to the striving (orexis) which was 
constitutive of the philosophical spirit. Here in the Meno one sees Plato repeating this 
Presocratic gesture. At the beginning of the dialogue, there is an initial 
deconstruction of the polyinathie which Socrates cites as being representative of the 
Thessalians and linked to the influence of the sophist Gorgias on that city (70a / b). 
Socrates contrasts this with the drought of wisdom (aukhmos tis tes sophias) which 
has "come on" [71a] Athens. Meno wishes Socrates to answer the question 
concerning virtue in a Thessalian manner and appears indignant when Socrates admits 
his ignorance - 
Meno: But is it true, Socrates, that you do not even know what virtue is 
(alethos oud ho ti arete estin oistha)? Are we to return home with this report 
of you? 
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Socrates: Not only this, my friend, but also that I never yet came across 
anybody who did know, in my opinion (alla kai hoti oud allo po enetuckhon 
eidoti, hos einoi doko). [71c] 
Socrates changes the emphasis from his own ignorance to a more general 
philosophical problem. His words are an implicit challenge to the poly nathie of the 
Thessalians, and to Meno's own expectations. As the dialogue develops and Meno 
responds to Socrates' questioning, the fundamental philosophical issue is 
foregrounded. Having made the transition from the question "is virtue teachable? " to 
"what is virtue? " (ti plies areten einai), Meno cites a number of examples of virtues 
(in the plural; 72a-b). Socrates refers pejoratively to these examples as being a 
"swarm" (72b - smenos) of virtues rather than the one virtue he was seeking (ei miau 
zeton areten) [72a]. This is once again a referring back to Presocratic terminology, in 
this case the debate concerning the One and the Many. Socrates is searching for the 
One (mia) amongst the swarm (s»nenos). 
We thus have here a rather enigmatic combination of Socratic ignorance and an 
assumption or striving for unity. From a Derridean perspective, one might say that 
this is an instance of doubling, where Plato juxtaposes truth and confusion so as to 
create an impasse. My hypothesis however is that the dual nature of the Socratic / 
Platonic enterprise is fundamentally opposed to Derridean doubling. Unity and 
philosophical ignorance (e. g. concerning virtue) are not interchangeable. Rather for 
Plato, ignorance or perplexity is part of a dialectical process. In a crucial passage in 
the Meno [75d] Socrates makes this clear - 
Socrates: If my questioner were a professor of the eristic (eristikon) and 
contentious sort, I should say to him: I have made my statement; if it is wrong, 
your business is to examine and refute it. But if, like you and me on this 
occasion, we were friends and chose to have a discussion (dialegosthai) 
together, I should have to reply in some milder tone more suited to dialectic 
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(dialektikoteron). The more dialectical way (isos to dialektikoteron), I 
suppose, is not merely to answer what is true, but also to make use of those 
points which the questioned person (erotoinenos) acknowledges he knows 
(eidenai). And this is the way in which I shall now try to argue with you. 
Socrates' distinction in this passage between "eristic" (eristikon) and the "dialectical 
way" (isos to dialektikoteron) can be referred back to the opening section of the Mezzo 
discussed above. There, Socrates sought to deconstruct the polymathie of the 
Thessalians which had influenced the questioning style of Meno. In effect, Meno's 
questioning style, which expects immediate answers to fundamental questions ("is 
virtue acquired through teaching or practice? ") is representative of the eristic mode of 
discourse. At section 84a of the Meno (in the slave boy discussion) Socrates outlines 
perhaps the foremost attribute of this kind of discourse - to tharraleon, understood in 
a negative sense as that of the "overconfident" or "presumptuous" participant. In 
contrast, dialectic (dialektikoteron) opens up a realization of what Socrates initially 
refers to as a drought of wisdom (aukhmos tis tes sophias). Under the experience of 
Socrates' dialectical questioning, Meno's state is transformed from that of the eristic 
tharraleon (or tharros) to what he himself will refer to as aporia (utter perplexity). 
This transformation and Meno's ensuing indignation reaches a climax at the famous 
passage where Meno accuses Socrates of being akin to a torpedo-fish - 
I consider that both in your appearance and in other respects you are extremely 
like the flat torpedo sea-fish; for it benumbs (nark-on) anyone who approaches 
and touches it, and something of the sort is what I find you have done to me 
now. For in truth I feel my soul (ten psukhen) and my tongue quite benumbed 
(narko), and I am at a loss what answer to give you. And yet on countless 
occasions I have made abundant speeches on virtue (aretes painpollous 
logous) to various people - and very good speeches they were, so I thought - 
but now I cannot say one word as to what it is (nun de oud ho ti esti to 
parapan ekho eipein) [80b]. 
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This is then the result of the way of dialectic. While eristic leads to the making of 
abundant speeches on virtue (aretes pampollous logous) dialectic leads rather to a 
drought of wisdom, a state of being benumbed (narko). This situation is repeated in 
the example of the slave-boy (84a) where Socrates tries to prove a mathematical truth 
to the slave of Meno. Initially, the boy is confident but he is shown by Socrates to be 
over-confident (tharraleos) and he is reduced to a state of perplexity (aporia). 
However, this perplexity is interpreted by Socrates positively as it leads the slave-boy 
to "push on in the search gladly, lacking knowledge" (nun men gar kai zeteseien an 
hedoes ouk eidos) [84b]. Perplexity (aporia), lack of knowledge (ouk eidos) is the 
spur to a desire (hedoes - literally "pleasure") for truth. This reminds one of 
Heraclitus' concept of orexis or striving; reaching out for truth. 
Orexis is etymologically linked to oreios which means "living on the mountains". 
This is perhaps unsurprising when one considers that Heraclitus rejected societal life 
in favour of the wandering life of the hermit. It also foregrounds a possible relation to 
Derrida's "I have never known where I was going" [Punctuations]. However, one 
can say that there is a fundamental difference between the Derridean wandering and 
the Heraclitean / Platonic enquiry. The perplexity (aporia) and lack of knowledge 
(ouk eidos) which is characteristic of both deconstruction and Plato's texts is 
nonetheless set within a dialectical context in the case of Plato. This becomes clear 
from Socrates' response to Meno's paradox. Faced with the confusion attendant upon 
Socrates' questioning, Meno raises his infamous question - 
Why, on what lines (tropon) will you look (zeteseis), Socrates, for a thing of 
whose nature you know nothing at all (me oistha)? Pray, what sort of thing, 
amongst those that you know not will you treat us to as the object 
(prothemenos) of your search (zeteseis)? Or even supposing, at the best, that 
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you hit upon it, how will you know (eise) it is the thing you did not know (ho 
ou ouk hedestha)? [80d] 
Meno seems to have turned the tables fatally on Socrates. Socrates had first reduced 
Meno from a state of confidence (to tharraleon) to a state of utter perplexity (aporia). 
At the heart of this transformation was the Socratic / Platonic conviction that 
polyinathie is a false knowledge. In other words, genuine philosophizing only begins, 
according to Plato, with lack of knowledge (out; eidos). However, Meno here 
challenges the practicality of such an ideal. In professing complete ignorance and 
loss, how is one to progress philosophically? His critique asks two fundamental 
questions - 1) Without an object (prothemenos) of enquiry, one has no direction 
(tropon) for one's search (zeteseis). 
2) Without knowledge of one's "object" one may paradoxically find it without 
knowing (ouk hedestha). In other words, despite having the truth in one's possession, 
one would remain unaware of this fact. 
Socrates' answer to these questions is nothing short of extraordinary. Instead, as one 
might expect, of carefully arguing his case, lie proceeds to call on the words of the 
mystical poets concerning the immortality of the soul (ten psukhen tou anthropou 
einai athanaton) [81b] and the doctrine of knowledge as remembrance (anainnesis) 
[81d]. If taken in isolation, this can seem either a Platonic tour-de-force (from a 
mystic's perspective) or a deplorable lack of rigour (from a more conventionally 
philosophical perspective). However, Plato's recourse to a kind of poetizing (Pindar 
is explicitly mentioned at 81a) is best understood in the context of a later passage 
[86b]. 
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There Socrates outlines a rationale which casts clearer light on the mysticism of the 
previous section. Firstly, he disclaims any "confident assertion" (diiskhurisaimen) of 
his anamnesis argument or the argument concerning the immortality of the soul 
(athanton). Instead it is suggested that it is a solution to Meno's paradox which is 
crucial. In other words, the high-flown poetizing is only a means to launch one out of 
Meno's paradox where one cannot search for or find what one does not know. At 80e, 
Socrates describes the paradox as a "captious argument" (eristikon logon) again 
reiterating the fundamental Socratic distinction between eristic and dialectic. At 86b, 
one gets a firm espousal of the dialectical mode of philosophizing as an antidote to the 
"captious" eristic representative of Meno - 
Most of the points I have made in support of my argument are not such as I 
can confidently assert (diiskluurisaimen); but that the belief (oioinenoi) in the 
duty (dein) of inquiring after (zetein) what we do not know (ha inc tis oide) 
will make us better (beltious) and braver (andrikoteroi) and less helpless 
(hetton argoi) than the notion that there is not even a possibility (inede 
dunaton) of discovering (eurein) what we do not know (a inc epistainetha), 
nor any duty of inquiring after it (Wiede dein zetein) - this is a point for which I 
am determined to do battle (diamakhoimen)...... both in word and deed (kai 
logo kai ergo) [86b-c]. 
There are four points I would like to address in relation to this important passage 
which bear on our problematic as a whole. 
1) the undermining of confident assertion (diiskhurisaiien) 
2) the belief (oionnenoi) in the duty (dein) of inquiring after (zetein) what we do not 
know (ha me tis oide) 
3) the conviction that this inquiry will make us better (beltious) and braver 
(andrikoteroi) and less helpless (hetton argoi) 
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4) the claim (stemming from Meno's paradox) that there is not even a possibility 
(mede dunaton) of discovering (eurem) what we do not know (a me epistametha), nor 
any duty of enquiring after it (mede dein zetein) 
1) The undermining of confident assertion (diisklzurisaimen) - This has already 
been referred to in relation to the opening passages of the Meno where Socrates puts 
forward an implicit critique of the Thessalian tharraleoi with their over-confidence in 
assertion. It is also a crucial point in relation to the thesis as a whole. My primary 
reason for foregrounding a confrontation between Platonism and deconstruction is that 
I believe Derrida to be asking several important questions of philosophy, to which I 
think Platonism offers several significant answers. This problem centres on the issue 
of whether philosophical judgement is possible. In "Plato's Pharmacy", Derrida 
suggests that any Platonic assertion is doubled i. e. it is reversible. In other words, 
all philosophical judgement is conditional and relative. 
On one level, section 86b-c of the Meno vindicates this Derridean deconstruction. 
Having just outlined his theory of ananznesis and the immortality of the soul and 
applied this philosophy to the slave-boy, Socrates then seems to retract his confidence 
in these assertions - "most of the points I have made in support of my argument are 
not such as I can confidently assert". When one considers that it is precisely these 
arguments which have been traditionally seen as constitutive of the Meno's 
importance, it is clear that Derrida has a point. There is undoubtedly self- 
deconstruction at work in Plato. 
However, what differentiates Plato from Derrida is the ideal of dialectic. The eristic 
arguments of the Thessalians and Meno are deconstructed so as to pave the way for 
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the dialectical process. Whereas in Derrida philosophical judgement is conditional, 
in Plato it is perplexity and confusion (aporia) which are conditional. The 
benumbment (nark-an) which Meno describes as being consequent upon the Socratic 
questioning method represents only an initial stage. Indeed, it is a positive stage to 
the extent that it is what induces the desire for truth. Socrates describes this link 
between perplexity (aporia) and a craving (epothese) for knowledge in the context of 
the slave-boy, who has been led to an analogous state of benumbment as that of 
Meno, and now desires to learn - 
Now do you imagine he [the slave-boy] would have attempted to inquire or 
learn (epikheiresai zetein) what he thought he knew (ho oeto eidenai) when he 
did not know it (ouk eidos), until he had been reduced to the perplexity 
(aporian) of realising that he did not know (me eidenai), and had felt a 
craving (epothese) to know (to eidenai)? 
The undermining of confident assertion (diiskhurisaimen) is therefore a condition of 
the craving (epothcse) for wisdom which is the origin of philosophy. One question 
which remains however is how the confident assertion of eristic differs from the 
assertion which will now be consequent upon philosophical enquiry. Eristic assertion 
clearly differs from the perplexity (aporia) of the initial stage of dialectic. But if this 
perplexity is to be overcome, how is one to avoid returning to a state of eristic 
assertion? This is one of Derrida's fundamental points in "Plato's Pharmacy" when 
he states that there is a "crossing of the border" between Platonic dialectic and the 
eristic of the sophists. 
Plato faces two difficulties in this context. On the one side lies the over-confident 
(tharraleon) assertion of the Thessalians / Meno / sophistry in general, which his 
questioning method is meant to undermine. However, once perplexity has 
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undermined one's over-confidence, any progress from this perplexity to a state of 
knowledge runs the risk of repeating the very form of the opposed eristic. The second 
difficulty lies with a possible affinity between Platonic dialectic and deconstruction. 
This is the kernel of Meno's accusation. Although obviously not referring to Derrida, 
Meno's paradox states that the Platonic method seems unavoidably destined to a 
philosophical impasse. In the effort to avoid over-confident assertion, Platonic 
dialectic is brought very close to deconstruction ad infinituna. In the next section, I 
will look at how the Platonic dialectic can be distinguished from this second threat of 
endless deconstruction. 
2) The belief (oiomenoi) in the duty (dein) of inquiring after (zetein) what we do 
not know (ha inc Eis oide) 
In its efforts to avoid the over-confident (tharraleon) [84a] assertion exemplified in 
the Meno by for example the Thessalians, Meno and the slave-boy (initially), how is 
the Platonic dialectic to avoid an infinite regress? Derrida's emphasis on the 
"unravelling" of dialectic in "Plato's Pharmacy" centred around the inevitability of 
doubling, the primary case being the simultaneous sense of pharmakon as "poison" 
and "cure". In this coincidence of opposite meanings, Derrida's point was that 
Plato's attempt to distinguish between the positive and negative senses of this term 
failed radically. In the case of writing, Plato's distinction between good and bad 
writing (in the Phaedrus) was inadmissible. Good writing doubled as bad writing and 
Vice versa. 
The Meno throws up a significantly analogous situation centring on the term to 
tharraleon / tharros. I have already described how this term is used negatively by 
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Plato to signify the "presumption" endemic to the eristic method [86a]. However, 
this term is also used positively by Plato in the Meno. At 86b, Socrates employs the 
term "tharrounta" ["confidently"] in a positive sense - 
You must confidently [tharrounta] try to search for and to recollect what you 
don't happen to know now. 
In this context, lie is speaking of the courage or confidence [tharros] which must 
drive the philosophical method or endeavour (zetein). Here is an instance of what one 
might call the Platonic double - tharros is used twice in the Meno in diametrically 
opposed senses. How are we to interpret this ambiguity? 
I would suggest that one read the double sense of tharros / to tharraleon as a pivotal 
Platonic response to the question already posed - how is Platonic dialectic to avoid the 
twin perils of over-confident eristic and deconstructive under-confidence? In the 
previous section, I addressed Plato's relation to the former. By foregrounding the 
"drought of wisdom" (auk-limos tis tes sophias) underlying the self-assertion of 
Meno's argument, Plato distances his own dialectic from the presumptive sense of 
tharros. He thus uses tharros negatively in order to deconstruct false knowledge. 
This leaves him, as it were, in the same position as Derrida. But Plato's "dialectical 
way" (isos to dialektikoteron) [75d] progresses from the deconstructive stage to a 
reconstructive phase via a positive employment of tharros by Socrates. This renewed 
sense of confidence or courage can faithfully be linked to the Heraclitean tenet of 
orexis. While the negative sense of tharros remains too complacent to translate 
orexis, the positive sense of tharros returns to the Heraclitean sense of striving or 
yearning for truth. 
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As with orexis, the positive sense of tharros fails to translate into Derrida's 
differance. This failure is perhaps best explained by an invoking of Heraclitus' 
fragment B86 - 
Through lack of faith (apistis) the divine escapes being known. 
Pistis (faith) is what instils the positive sense of confidence in the philosophical quest 
for Heraclitus and Plato. Such faith is not negated in Derrida but rather doubled. In 
other words, Derrida refuses to maintain faith as an unquestioned condition of his 
philosophizing. For deconstruction, lack of faith (apistis) must be simultaneously 
maintained. I will return to this issue of Derrida and faith in the second part of the 
thesis concerning Derrida's interpretation of Platonism, and particularly Christian 
Platonism. Here I will develop Plato's sense of pistis and its philosophical 
ramifications in more detail. 
I had extracted a quotation from Meno 86b to begin this section - "the belief 
(oiomenos) in the duty (dein) of inquiring after (zetein) what we do not know (ha me 
tis oide)". Plato's concept of belief (oiontenos) is of course directly linked to the 
concept of faith (pistis) which he uses at 81e in the context of refuting Meno's 
paradox which he refers to as that "captious argument" (to eristiko logo). In contrast 
to this "eristic" (eristiko) argument, Socrates puts his trust or faith (pisteuon) in the 
truth (aletliei) of virtue (arete), a trust which then makes him ready to inquire (zetein) 
into the nature of virtue. There are then three steps to the Platonic dialectical method; 
A) A rejection of the two kinds of eristic argument (to eristiko logo) where 
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1) Through over-confident (tharraleon) assertion one thinks one knows what one does 
not know, but one's complacency prevents any further questioning e. g. Thessalians, 
Gorgias at 70b. 
2) Through lack of faith (apistis), one thinks there is no hope of finding any truth 
e. g. Mono at 96d. 
B) A placing of one's trust or faith (pistis) in truth 
C) Through such pistic or belief (oiomenos), one undertakes to enquire (zetein) 
into the nature of truth. Plato terms this method the way of dialectic ("isos to 
dialeklikoteron) [75d] 
This leads on to the third issue deriving from section 86b-c. 
3) The conviction that this inquiry will make us better (beltious) and braver 
(andrikoteroi) and less helpless (hetto,, argoi); 
This returns one to the problem of tharros. Plato's critique of eristic over-confidence 
led to the apparent impasse of Meno's paradox. Here at 86c, Plato describes the 
benefits of a different kind of thnrros - the dialectical method is not going to leave us 
stranded and helpless (argoi). Instead we will become better (beltious) and braver 
(andrikotaroi). The passage 86b-c finds an analogue at 81d. There, Socrates asks 
that we have courage (andreios) and that we faint not (me apokamne) in the search 
(zeton). Again the danger is that one might be seduced by the "captious argument" 
(eristiko logo). To do so would be to become idle (argos) and indolent (malakos). In 
contrast, the dialectical way makes us energetic (ergastikos) and inquiring (zetetikos). 
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Of course it is faith pistis) which again grounds this declaration and one can well ask, 
from a Derridean perspective, whether this faith is justified. Throughout the Meno, 
this faith leads Socrates to search for the one amongst the many, the unity underlying 
plurality. At 72c for example, he seeks the one common character (eidos tautop 
apasai ekhousi) by which all virtues are virtues. At 72e he seeks the one form (auto 
eidei) which makes a man a man, and a woman a woman. Again at 73e he looks for 
the homogeneous good (auto agathoi) by which all mankind (pantes ar anthropoi) are 
virtuous in the same way. It is this common good (agathon) which is worth searching 
for and which according to 86c will make us better (beltious) and braver 
(andrikoteroi) and less helpless (argoi). 
Without pistil however all the negative qualities excluded by Plato begin to loom 
large - helplessness, idleness, indolence. The fundamental question therefore is 
whether Plato can give a philosophical grounding to the concept of "faith" and 
whether this may allow Platonism to transcend the crisis of metaphysics which 
Derrida has spoken of for example in "The Double Session". In the last section of this 
chapter, I will address this issue from the perspective of the final point to be extracted 
from 86b-c. 
Section 3.3 - Philosophy's Doing Battle (diainkhoimen) 
The final point to be developed from Meno 86b-c is the claim (stemming from Meno's 
paradox) that - 
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A) there is not even a possibility (mede dzinaton) of discovering (eurem) what we do 
not know (a me epistametha), nor any duty of inquiring after it (mede dein zetein). 
To what extent is Derrida's philosophy convergent with the claims of Meno's 
paradox? If understood as a sophistic pronouncement of truth, point A differs from 
Derrida's claims fundamentally. For example, if Meno was to state that "truth is 
impossible" or "truth does not exist", he would himself be making a philosophical 
claim of sorts. In contrast, Derrida's doubling strategy does not disavow truth but 
rather claims that tnith is indistinguishable from the absence of truth. This is of 
course a paradoxical claim rather than a univocal predicative thesis such as "truth 
does not exist". However claim A is derived from Meno's own original paradox. 
When Socrates at 86b-c attacks the claim that "there is not even a possibility of 
discovering that we do not know nor any duty of inquiring after it", the content of 
what lie is opposing can only be understood as rooted in paradox. 
The difficulties originally stem from the opening passage of the Meno [70a] where 
Meno immediately addresses Socrates in an eristic style, expecting "fearless, 
magnificent answers" (aphobos to kai inegaloprepos) [70b] to his question "whether 
virtue can be taught? " (ara didakton he arete; ). This is just another form of the over- 
confidence which Socrates later disdains in the slave-boy. However, in attempting to 
lead Meno out of this negative tharros, Socrates' questioning is of a sufficiently 
radical sort to incur the accusatory reactions of Meno at 80a where, as already 
discussed, he claims to have been benumbed [narko] by Socrates. This accusation 
hinges on Meno's suspicion that Socrates divests his interlocutors of tharros while 
retaining his own sense of philosophical confidence. But Socrates tries to scotch this 
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claim by allowing Meno's analogy with the torpedo-fish [Meno compares Socrates to 
a torpedo-fish with the power of benumbing others with his sting] to hold only if the 
torpedo-fish is itself numb - 
As for me, if the torpedo - fish is torpid itself (ei men he Harke aute narkosa) 
while causing others to be torpid, I am like it (eoika aute), but not otherwise. 
For it is not from any sureness in myself (ou gar euporon autos) that I cause 
others to doubt (aporein): it is from being in more doubt (mallon autos 
aporon) than anyone else that I cause doubt in others [80c]. 
Socrates therefore is in more doubt (mallon autos aporon) than even Meno. 
Nonetheless, lie immediately expresses a willingness (ethelo) to join Meno in 
searching (suzetesai) for the nature of virtue [80d]. It is precisely this willingness 
(ethelo) which also signifies capacity or power, in the face of the aforementioned 
radical doubt and apparent incapacity that stuns Meno. It provokes him into 
articulating his paradox - 
Why, on what lines will you look (tina tropon zeteseis), Socrates, for a thing 
of whose nature you know nothing at all (ho me oistha)? Pray, what sort of 
thing, amongst those that you know not (hon ouk oistha), will you treat us to 
as the object (prothemenos) of your search? Or even supposing, at the best, 
that you hit upon it, how will you know it is the thing you did not know? (ho 
su ouk hedestha) [80d]. 
This is the paradox upon which claim A was based - "that there is not even a 
possibility of discovering what we do not know nor any duty of inquiring after it". At 
86b-c, Socrates has translated the paradox into a predicative utterance which he 
wishes to oppose. Here at 80d, it remains in the more open form of a question. I 
have returned to this passage because I believe it to be a direct precursor of Derrida's 
thinking. In effect, Meno's paradox represents the doubling strategy of 
deconstruction in its implication that Socratic knowledge can only be nonknowledge, 
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Socratic objectivity only the lack of an object. Derrida makes an exactly similar point 
in a rather more enigmatic fashion, in his essay "The Double Session" [2] - 
one cannot get out of Mallarme's antre as one can get out of Plato's cave. A 
mine full of nothing [mine de rien]. (translation modified) [DS, p. 216] 
Derrida has carefully woven many different issues into this condensed declaration. 
Firstly, antre is the French word for "cave". Throughout "The Double Session", 
Derrida plays on the fact that "antre" and "entre" are homonyms. The latter means 
"between" or "through". Mallarme's "cave" [antre] is a cave which one cannot get 
through, it is in effect a "between" [entre], a kind of limbo state. Derrida is here 
turning "entre" into a noun, while "antre" becomes a preposition. Significantly, 
there is an English phrase which can capture this ambiguity. The word "passage" 
could possibly translate "antre" or "entre". "Passage" is also advantageous because it 
allows one to refer back to Plato's "passage" or "cave". For Derrida, Plato's cave is a 
passage without passage - it is the preposition which becomes a noun. There is no 
exit from Plato's cave to an outside of light and truthfulness. Plato's philosophy is 
always a travers - in passage. This, on my interpretation, is also the implication of 
Meno's paradox. Meno exemplifies the in-betweenness of Socrates' questioning, the 
fact that it is in-between knowledge and nonknowledge, objectivity and 
nonobjectivity. 
The final phrase of "The Double Session" quotation puts this hypothesis more 
provocatively - 
a mine full of nothing [mine de rieh] (DS, p. 216). 
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This is not (as might appear) a negative statement from Derrida. It is both positive 
and negative -a positive full mine, of negative nothing. Again, there is the sense of 
being in-between positivity and negativity. The claim is being made that Plato's antre 
(cave) is a precursor of Mallarme's entre (between / passage). 
If one follows the hypothesis of an analogy between this Derridean claim and Meno's 
paradox, it is possible to find Socrates / Plato's own answer to this challenge from 
deconstruction. Having expressed his willingness, his capacity (ethelo) to search 
(suzetesai) for truth, despite his stated perplexity (aporein), Socrates finds his own 
perplexity radicalized by Meno in the paradox. Socrates' response is immediate. 
Describing the paradox as a "captious argument (eristikon logon) [80e], he introduces 
a truth, "something true, as I thought, and beautiful" (alethe, emoige dokein, kai 
kalon) [81a]. This truth and beauty has been imparted to Socrates from enigmatic 
sources - 
I have heard from wise men and women (andron to tai gunaikon sophon) who 
told of things divine (theia praginata) that - ......... 
The sentence in the text ends in mid-sentence and this is the only point in the Meno 
where there is a deliberate impasse or breakage. One is reminded of the previous 
discussion concerning antre and entre. Plato seems to be here employing a method 
analogous to that of Mallarme. The ellipsis (" - ") introduces a confusion as regards 
the philosophical status of what is now going to be said. This vulnerability is 
increased by the phrase "emoige dokein" ("as I thought") in the sentence which claims 
to set the argument on a surer footing; "something true, as I thought, and beautiful". 
The universality of Truth and Beauty becomes conditioned by a subjective 
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intentionality. To this point, it is clear again that there is a strong affinity between 
deconstruction and Platonic dialectic. 
However, as before, what differentiates the latter from the former is the 
reintroduction by Plato of philosophical tharros (confidence) after an initial period of 
perplexity. At 81 a-b, the reasoned account (logon oiois) of priest and priestesses (ton 
iereon to kai iercion) is invoked alongside Pindar and "many another poet of 
heavenly gifts" (polloi ton poieton, osoi theioi eisin). The alethe which these 
visionaries have imparted concerns the immortality of the soul (ton psukhen tou 
anthropou einai athanaton) [81b], living one's life in the utmost holiness (osiotata) 
and the doctrine of knowledge as recollection (anamnesis) [81c]. These concepts or 
ideals, in particular the last paradigm concerning anainnesis, are what have been 
traditionally abstracted by commentators as the essence of the Meno (cf. for example 
Taylor). The Meno would be Plato's exemplification of the doctrine of knowledge as 
remembrance. 
The difficulty with such interpretation is that it loses the contextual nature of such 
ideas in Plato and here specifically in the Meno. At öle for example, Socrates states 
that the arguments of immortality and anamnesis are worth only one's trust (pisteuon) 
or faith. The tharros or confidence behind these arguments is therefore fundamentally 
heterogeneous to the kind of tharros / to tharraleon which Socrates originally 
criticised in the Thessalians and Meno. There, being tharraleos had the effect of 
thwarting the desire for knowledge. Similarly, it is excessive tharros which must be 
exorcised from the slave-boy [84c] if he is to undertake philosophical enquiry 
(zeteseien). To this point, Plato and Derrida appear to be in agreement. 
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What Plato wishes to avoid however is a philosophy which would remain at the 
negative stage of a deconstruction of false tharros / to tharraleon. This is the kernel 
of Meno's paradox. For Plato, it remains a "captious argument", an "eristikon 
logon" [80e]. One imagines that Plato would respond similarly to Derrida's 
deconstructive strategy. The difficulty for Plato is how to avoid the impasse of 
Meno's paradox and Derrida's doubling while at the same time avoiding the stifling 
tharros of the Thessalians and Meno. 
Crucial to this debate is Socrates' discussion of the difference between understanding 
( hroizesls) and right opinion (orthe doxa) which is first introduced at 97b. Socrates 
had previously been making the assumption that it is only through the guidance of 
knowledge (epistelne) that human conduct is right and good [96e]. But this 
assumption leads Meno to such an impasse that he is unsure whether there are any 
good men at all - 
And that makes me wonder, I must say, Socrates, whether perhaps there are 
no good men at all (oud eisin agathoi andres), or by what possible sort of 
process (tropos) good people can come to exist (tes geneseos ton agathon 
gignomenon) [96d] 
Realising the absurdity (katagelastos) [96e] of this position, Socrates changes the 
assumption from knowledge being the only guide to good human conduct to there 
also being true opinion (orthe doxa) [97b] as such a guide. At 97d, Socrates 
differentiates between knowledge and right opinion on the grounds of the latter being 
like Daedalus' statues. Daedalus was reputed to be the first sculptor who contrived an 
ingenious mechanism in his statues by which they could move. Right opinion is 
analogous to these statues because unlike knowledge, it is not fastened (dedemena - 
97d) whereas knowledge is fastened by its trammels (desino - 98a). 
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This hypothesis of right opinion is crucial for Socrates if he is to avoid Meno's 
paradox. If he were to hold out for the ideal of understanding (phronesis), he admits 
himself that lie would be destined to absurdity (katagelastos) [96e]. In contrast, the 
paradigm of right opinion allows Socrates to admit a continual level of perplexity 
(aporia) while nonetheless accounting for the good men (agathoi andres) whom 
Meno felt may be unintelligible at 96d. It would however be wrong to suggest that 
Socrates has replaced the regulative value of knowledge with the regulative value of 
right opinion. At 98b, Socrates is unequivocal on this point - 
Socrates: And indeed I too speak as one who does not know (ouk eidos) but 
only conjectures (all eikazon): yet that there is a difference between right 
opinion and knowledge (orthe doxa kai epistenne) is not at all a conjecture with 
me but something I would particularly assert that I knew (phaien an eidenai): 
there are not many things of which I would say that, but this one, at any rate, 
I will include among those that I know (an on oida). [98b] 
On first inspection, this can appear to contradict Socrates' transition from the 
paradigm of understanding / knowledge (phronesis / epistenze) to that of right opinion 
(orthe doxa). Was it not precisely the assumption of the ideal of knowledge which led 
to absurdity (katagelastos)? As with so many Platonic dialogues, there appears to be 
a danger here of absolute confusion. How is one to reconcile, for example, the 
simultaneous privileging of right opinion and knowledge when each ideal appears to 
exclude the other? I have already referred to the fact that a privileging of knowledge 
runs the risk of returning to Socrates' admitted absurdity (katagelastos) at 96e. By the 
same token, a reading of the Meno as a dialogue emphasising right opinion at the 
expense of knowledge causes a chasm betwen the Meno and later crucial dialogues 
such as the Republic. Amidst these problems, is there a possibility of reconciling the 
various strands in Plato? 
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On this issue I am in fundamental agreement with the thesis of Eduard Zeller (cf. 
Chapter 2) whose interpretation is worth reiterating - 
Although Plato's philosophy is nowhere transmitted as a systematic whole and 
in the dialogues we can only observe from afar its gradual growth and 
development, it is only in the form of a system that any account of it can be 
given. The justification for this is the incontestable fact that in the dialogues 
we see circles spreading wider and wider until they finally embrace the whole 
universe [Zeller, p. 126) (3) 
"It is only in the form of a system that any account of it can be given" - but what kind 
of system is one to attribute to Plato? At Meno 75d, in contradistinction to the 
"eristic and contentious" method, Socrates introduces the "milder tone more suited to 
dialectic" (praoteron pos kai dialektikeron apokrinesthai). This "dialectical way" 
(isos to dialektikoteron), Socrates continues, does not merely involve the speaking of 
truth but also the "making use of those points which the questioned person 
(erote, nenos) acknowledges he knows (eidenai)". At 84c, Socrates reiterates this 
fundamental point when he states that he merely asks Meno questions and does not 
teach him (erotontos emou kai on didaskontos). This is thus Plato's dialectical way or 
method (isos to dialektikoteron). But does it enable us to make sense of the 
aforementioned contradictions and paradoxes? 
In the measure to which Socrates shuns the didacticism or teaching (didaskontos) and 
embraces questioning (erotontos), the Socratic dialectical method is bound to 
encounter difficulty. As Socrates says at 82a, "it is no easy matter" (all esti men ou 
radion). It is this erotontos which leads to a deconstruction of the negative tharros of 
the Thessalians and Meno. But the crucial transition point between the ensuing 
contradiction, confusion and perplexity so ably encapsulated in Meno's paradox and 
the dialectical method takes place at the reintroduction of a positive tharros. 
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Lexically, this marks the transition from 84a to 86b (from the slave-boy's stifling 
tharros /to tharraleoiz to Socrates' positive use of tharrounta ["confidently"]). But in 
fact it is a transition which occurs again and again in the Meno, for example when at 
84b the slave-boy rediscovers a craving (epothese) for knowledge, at 86b-c where 
Socrates tells us we will be better (beltious) and braver (andriketeroi) and less 
helpless (hetton argoi) if we follow philosophical enquiry (zetein) and most notably at 
98b where Socrates asserts that the difference between right opinion and knowledge is 
something "I would particularly assert I know" (phaien an eidenai). 
The analysis of the Meno in this chapter has intended to exemplify the simultaneous 
proximity and distance between Plato's dialectical method and Derrida's doubling, 
deconstructive strategy. In the next chapter, I will analyse this relationship from the 
perspective of the Phaedrus. 
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CHAPTER 4- PLATO CONTRA DERRIDA II: THE CASE OF THE 
PHAEDR US 
Section 4.1 - Forms in the Phaedrus 
In Chapter 1,1 outlined how Derrida diagnoses the failure of the Cartesian project as 
its inability to set up a "deductive system" between the idea and the "thing-in-itself'. 
For Descartes, the ultimate responsibility for this failure lies with the subject in so far 
as it is the mind of the individual which represents the locus of philosophy. This 
problematic of a correspondence between the subjective and the objective is also 
present in Plato's work. Here, however, the terms are differently defined. Whereas 
for Descartes the subject is the locus, for Plato it is rather the objective Forms which 
guide philosophy. In many ways, the Platonic Forms can be seen as a development of 
Heraclitus' notion of the Logos. This is particularly true of the fragment "listen not to 
me, but to the logos". 
Nonetheless, both Heraclitus and Plato also stress the need for a relationship between 
subjectivity and the objective Form. When, for example, Heraclitus states "I enquired 
into myself' or Socrates endorses "Know thyself', they are not speaking of Cartesian 
introspection but rather of the ability to locate the divine element within oneself; as it 
were, to locate the objective in the subjective. In Plato's work, this project has a 
rather tortured history. The early and middle dialogues clearly outline a metaphysics 
of separation - in the Republic, for example, the Good is "beyond Being". But by the 
time Plato came to write the Timaeus [1] he had realised the difficulty of surmounting 
this philosophical chasm - how was the individual subject to access the Forms? 
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Kenneth M. Sayre in Plato's Late Ontology[2] makes the point that the brevity of the 
Critias might be seen as the last gasp of Plato's "two-world" ontology - 
Plato's abrupt termination of Socrates' conversation with Timaeus and his 
companions only a few pages into the Critias, in fact, might possibly signal his 
ultimate disaffection with the "two world" ontology upon which these 
dialogues are explicitly based (Sayre, p. 14). 
Depending upon how one dates the Phaedrus, it is either a late middle (or 
"intermediate") dialogue or a very late work. Rowe, for example, sees only the Laws 
and the Philebus as later. Whatever view one takes, the Phaedrus is placed right at 
the nexus of the difficulties concerning Plato's interpretation of the Forms. On 
Sayre's view, the later Plato begins to develop a more dialectical view of the relation 
between subjectivity and the Forms. The Parnienides is the crucial deconstructive 
text in this regard. Pannenides II in particular (cf. Sayre, p. 16) represents a "massive 
and formally conclusive refutation" of the two-world ontology. It is the Philebus 
which then builds on this deconstruction a new sense of the ontology of the Forms - 
The ontology of the Philebus is entirely different...... in the Philebus the Forms 
are ontologically derivative....... whereas sensible objects are composed of 
Forms and the Unlimited, Forms themselves are composed from the same 
Unlimited in combination with the principle of Limit (Sayre, p. 14). 
Previously (for example, in the Republic), the Forms were said to be ontologically 
separated from the sensible world. This separateness of course is the basis of 
Aristotle's famous accusation against the Platonic Forms in the Metaphysics - how 
can philosophy continue if it has no connection to Truth? The later Plato appears to 
take this accusation on board and the Phaedrus and Philebus [3] in particular can be 
seen as attempts to bridge the chasm between the sensible and the intelligible. 
However before this constructive project is undertaken, Plato unequivocally undoes 
the logic of his prior two-world ontology. This deconstruction is already implicit in 
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the Timaeus but it is undertaken to a most extreme degree in the Parmenides. 
Understood in isolation, the Parmenides can only be seen as a descent into nihilism 
and several commentators note this specificity of the dialogue as an unclear work. For 
example, Mitchell H. Miller describes it as "the most enigmatic of all of Plato's 
dialogues. In spite of a sustained and extensive history of discussion, there is no 
positive consensus about the basic issues central to its interpretation" (p. 3, Miller). 
Similarly, Constance C. Meinwald comments: "Plato's Parmenides today finds itself 
in a strange position: it is clearly an important work, but its import remains 
remarkably unclear" (p. 3, Meinwald)[4]. 
An in-depth analysis of the Pannenides would take me too far beyond the stated 
intention of the thesis. It is significant with regard to the Phaedrus in so far as it is 
emblematic of a crisis in Plato's concept of the Forms. In effect the Parmenides is a 
complete deconstruction of the "two world ontology" of the early Plato. Following 
Rowe's [5] interpretation, I will regard the Phaedrus as having been written after 
Parme, iides 11 and as thus an attempt to reground philosophy outside the prior dualism 
between the Forms and the world. G. R. F. Ferrari [6] for example contrasts the 
Phaedrus on precisely this level with the Symposium [71 - 
the place of Beauty in the two dialogues is different. Diotima's initiate comes 
to see Beauty just in itself; he comes to see, I suggested, that there is such a 
thing as Beauty, independent of what we find beautiful. The experience of the 
inspired lover in the Phaedrus, by contrast, is to shuttle in memory between 
the bodily beauty of the boy and the Beautiful itself. It is to be awoken by an 
exemplar of Beauty to the conviction that there is such a thing as Beauty (The 
boy, too, comes to have this experience, seeing the lover's face transformed by 
love, made beautiful by the sight of beauty; 255b7 - d3) ['Platonic Love', p. 
268] (8). 
It would however be misguided to portray the later Plato as resolving all the questions 
concerning the Forms in a clear and distinct manner. The Phaedrus manifests such 
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ambiguity and reversal of argument (e. g. Socrates gives one speech which he then 
completely recants in a succeeding speech) that it has been interpreted throughout 
history as either a work of an immature (Diogenes Laertius) or senile (e. g. H. Raeder) 
Plato. As Derrida himself observes in "Plato's Pharmacy" there has been a prominent 
reading of the Phaedrus as a "badly composed" dialogue. While not denying the 
enigmatic organisation of the Phaedrtts, I will rather interpret this asymmetry as 
Purposeful on Plato's part. 
From a Cartesian perspective such asymmetry by definition exemplifies a lack of 
clarity and distinctness i. e. a failure of philosophy. But given that Plato's model of 
philosophy is more accurately comparable to Heraclitus' concept of orexis or striving, 
one can see how asymmetry becomes precisely a condition of possibility for genuine 
philosophising. Before analysing the details of the Phaedrus, I will first outline some 
of the ontological tenets of the roughly contemporary (or slightly later) Philebus as 
this dialogue seems to make explicit much of the metaphysics which remains implicit 
in the structure of the Phaedrus. 
The Philebus is Plato's most explicit attempt to offer an alternative view of the Forms 
to the two-world ontology. The difficulty of trying to link subjectivity or the sensible 
world with the Forms, given the latter's ontological "separation", is overcome 
through the interpretation of the Forms and the sensible world as "ontologically 
homogeneous" (p. 15, Sayre). The Forms are no longer described as ultimate but 
rather as "ontologically derivative" (p. 14) to the extent that they (like the sensible 
world) partake of the principle of the Unlimited. While the Philebus offers no clear 
account of how the sensible world or its individual subjects relate to the Forms, it 
nonetheless has now provided the philosophical framework within which such 
114 
communication is at least possible. The irony (from a Cartesian / Derridean 
perspective) is that this increased possibility has not been effected by making the 
subject more knowledgeable but rather by conceiving of the Forms as more participant 
in the sensible world. In other words, the resolution lies in an increased emphasis on 
the object rather than on the subject. Hackforth [8] refers to this objective emphasis 
as being particularly a feature of the Phaedrus: "a susceptibility to the influence of 
external Nature felt as a power lifting him (Socrates) out of his normal rational self 
into a state of "possession" (enthousiasmos)" (Hackforth, p. 14). As with Ferrari's 
contrast with the Symposium, the Phaedrus is again here interpreted as a paradigmatic 
text with regard to the intertwining of the sensible / Forms and subjective / objective. 
This paradigmatic aspect of the Phaedrus makes it a good text to foreground here in 
our analysis of Platonic dialectic. The importance of the Phaedrus to our purposes is 
also underlined by Derrida's own foregrounding of the latter in "Plato's Pharmacy". 
It is therefore to the details of this complex dialogue to which I now turn. 
Two crucial philosophical problems are foregrounded at the opening of the dialogue. 
In the first case there is the very issue of external Nature which Hackforth speaks of 
(p. 14). The significance of place or of situation is introduced by Plato in the very 
first words of the text - 
Socrates: Where do you come from, Phaedrus my friend, and where are you 
going? 
Phaedrus: I've been with Lysias, Socrates, the son of Cephalus, and I'm off 
for a walk outside the wall, after the long morning's sitting there. On the 
instructions of our common friend Acumenus I take my walks on the open 
roads; he tells me that is more invigorating than walking in the colonnades. 
Socrates: Yes, he's right in saying so. [Phaedrus, 227a-b]. 
The importance of this reference to place lies in its relation to the problem of the 
Forms which was discussed above. Ferrari refers to the difference in kind between the 
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Symposium and the Phacdrus in so far as the former posits the Forms as separated 
while the latter sees the Forms as more embodied in the sensible world. It is therefore 
significant that Plato should begin the dialogue with an explicit question concerning 
situation and place - "where do you come from and where are you going? ". The 
Phaedrus is the only dialogue where Socrates actually leaves the city and a little later 
in the text he will begin his second speech with an invocation to the local divinities to 
give him some inspiration. The suggestion is that the philosophical content of the 
Phaedrus is intrinsically linked to its contextualization "outside the city" - 
Phaedrus: you, my excellent friend, strike me as the oddest of men. Anyone 
would take you, as you say, for a stranger being shown the country by a guide 
instead of a native: never leaving the the town to cross the frontier nor even, I 
believe, so much as setting foot outside the walls (Phaedrus, 230 c-d). 
This declaration by Phaedrus follows an extended paen to the surroundings from 
Socrates. Phaedrus is mocking Socrates for his expression of awe concerning an area 
which should be all too familiar to a local. The wider point however concerns 
Socrates' overstated enthusiasm for the empirical context; for a philosopher who 
never leaves the city because the countryside can teach him nothing (230d) Socrates 
shows a remarkable love for the banks of the Ilissus - 
Socrates: Upon my word, a delightful resting-place, with this tall, spreading 
plane, and a lovely shade from the high branches of the agnus: now that it's in 
full flower, it will make the place ever so fragrant. And what a lovely stream 
under the plane-tree, and how cool to the feet! Judging by the statuettes and 
images I should say its consecrated to Achelous and some of the Nymphs. 
And then too, isn't the freshness of the air most welcome and pleasant: and the 
shrill summery music of the cicada choir! And as crowning delight the grass, 
thick enough on a gentle slope to rest your head on most comfortably. In fact, 
my dear Phaedrus, you have been the stranger's perfect guide (230b-c). 
This eulogy is too pronounced to be insignificant. At 230d Socrates has stated that he 
never leaves the city because the countryside can teach him nothing. However, this 
time Socrates has left the city and the implication would seem to be that he is 
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beginning to learn from his surroundings. This thesis is reinforced by Sayre's claim 
that there is a move away from the two world ontology in the later Plato. Dating the 
Phaedrus as a significantly late work, Socrates' eulogy to his surroundings can be 
interpreted as a revaluation of the sensible world contra his prior supposition that the 
sensible world can teach him nothing. Socrates' invocation of the llissus would thus 
look forward to the conception of the Forms as "ontologically homogeneous" with 
the empirical world in the Philebus. 
This is precisely Ferrari's point in the essay "Platonic Love". There Ferrari describes 
Plato as building a "bridge" (PL., p. 248) in the Phaedrus "between love and 
philosophy" (PL., p. 248). If Love is still a Form for Plato it is now at least an 
incarnate Form, a Form which manifests itself in the sensible world. This sense of 
incarnate Form looks forward not simply to Aristotle's conception of immanent form 
but more closely to the development of Christology in Christian Platonism (cf. 
Chapters 6 and 7). Christ would be the incarnate Form par excellence. In the 
Phaedrus this incarnation is exemplified by the beauty of the Ilissus (which is an 
exemplar of Beauty as such). There is also a sense in which Phaedrus himself 
represents an empirical incarnation of Beauty, leading Socrates outside the city with 
his seductive power. Socrates claims that it is Phaedrus' possession of the arguments 
of Lysias which leads him out of the city - 
a hungry animal can be driven out of the city by dangling a carrot or a bit of 
green stuff in front of it: similarly if you proffer me volumes of speeches I 
don't doubt you can cart me all round Attica, and anywhere else you please 
[230d-e]. 
However, the overall context of the dialogue would seem to suggest otherwise. In the 
first case, Socrates will reject the basis of Lysias' very arguments concerning the 
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preferability of a non-lover over a lover (230e-234c), or strictly speaking the 
superiority of rationalism over love. Socrates' initial speech agrees with Lysias' 
fundamental point while disagreeing with his method, but the second Socratic speech 
is a complete refutation of the principle that "the rational must always be 
praiseworthy and the irrational always deserve censure" (235e and Hackforth p. 36). 
In the next section, I will analyse this Socratic eulogy to love in more detail and 
discuss its implications for the Platonic concept of "wisdom" as opposed to 
"knowledge". Here my primary concern is to foreground the objective aspect of Eros 
in the Phaedrus, how Socrates' concern for love is also a concern for the Form of 
Love. Ferrari's distinction between the Symposium and the Phaedrus (see above) is 
crucial here. In the latter dialogue the conception of the Forms as "separated" 
becomes developed into a sense of the Forms (particularly the Form of Love) as 
"shuttling" between the sensible and intelligible worlds. This is manifested for 
example in Socrates' eulogy to the banks of the Ilissus, in the erotic play between 
Socrates and Phaedrus which is a continuing feature of the dialogue and in the final 
section on writing / speech which exemplifies the importance of what might be termed 
the objective pedagogical context in which philosophy can flourish. The last case is 
particularly important with regard to Derrida's interpretation to the extent that Derrida 
reads Socrates' privileging of speech as an example of "phonocentrism", the attempt 
to exclude the alienating effects of writing. The argument of "Plato's Pharmacy" (cf. 
Chapter 1) is that this project of repression fails and that the Platonic system is thus 
destined to an endless "unravelling". 
Derrida himself makes no reference to possible changes in Platonic methodology in 
"Plato's Pharmacy" or to how the Phaedrus might be seen as a refutation of Plato's 
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earlier two-world ontology. However, a thematisation of this issue may be helpful in 
clarifying a Platonic response to Derrida. On my reading Derrida's interpretation of 
Platonic phonocentrism is an epistemological one. In other words, it is analogous to 
his argument against Descartes' deductive system in "Cogito and the History of 
Madness". Plato and Descartes try but fail to exclude a "madness" at the heart of 
reality. In the Phaedrirs, this project of repression becomes most prominent 
according to Derrida in the last section concerning "writing" and "speech". Plato 
wishes to maintain the face-to-face presence of the teacher to pupil relation while 
excluding the "orphan" status of writing i. e. writing, unlike speech, does not require 
its generator to be present for its transmission. Writing (ecriture) therefore is 
constituted in and by absence or difference / deferral (differance) and it is this 
radicality which Socrates wishes to exclude in favour of presence. Nonetheless 
despite this repressive moment, Derrida locates in Plato's text (as with that of 
Descartes) a simultaneous moment of differance. For example, Plato on the one hand 
(through the mouth of Socrates) seems to exclude writing but there is of course the 
fact that this refutation takes place in the overarching context of a written dialogue. 
Derrida's conclusion is that Platonism is perhaps its own self-deconstruction; Plato 
would seem to have already recognised the interminable movement of differance. 
The Phaedrus may nonetheless be read differently. The difficulty with Derrida's 
interpretation is that it sees Platonism as being double in nature, as being first a 
positing of a theory (for example that of phonocentrism) and in turn a deconstruction 
of this theory. These two aspects of Platonism, as it were its schizophrenia, are 
irreconcilable according to Derrida. This irreconcilability is not specific to Plato's 
work but is generalised by Derrida to be the very nature of philosophy itself. 
119 
Certainly this sense of a "doubling" in Plato is not without foundation. I have already 
referred to the two-world ontology in the early Plato. Our analysis of the Meno in the 
last chapter was based around Socrates' anamnesis of the Forms, this remembrance 
being the very basis of the philosophical project. This anamnesis however was only 
partial (it remained very fragile), this being precisely the difference between sophistic 
tharros and Socratic tharros. In other words, the access to the Forms is extremely 
tenuous. To this extent it is fair to speak of a duality in the work of Plato between the 
Forms and the sensible world and although this dualism is revised in later works such 
as the Phaedrus and the Philebus, there is a sense in which "doubling" always 
remains a feature of Platonism. The Forms may become "ontologically 
homogeneous" in the Philebus but they still remain the Forms and Plato also 
introduces the "principle of Limit" as an element heteregeneous to the sensible world. 
To this extent, a dualism remains. 
It is however the fundamental difference between Plato's dualism and Derrida's 
"doubling" which is at issue here. Whereas Derrida's doubling leads to an 
"unravelling" of philosophy, Plato's dualism is precisely the very condition for 
philosophy to take place. The model of "phonocentrism" is paradigmatic here in so 
far as it is interpreted in fundamentally opposed ways by Derrida and Plato. For 
Derrida, Socrates/Plato's privileging of speech over writing is an example of a 
metaphysical gesture par excellence, and signifies an attempt to close off the "other" 
of philosophy. 
In contrast, in the Phaedrus the phonocentric model is linked to the very nature of 
"dialogue" as a structure of philosophising. This is particularly true of the final 
passages where the teacher-pupil relationship is described. For Plato, the paradigm of 
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speech far from representing a repression of the "other" is precisely an opening up to 
the other, whether that be the teacher's opening up to the pupil or vice versa or even 
the philosopher's opening up to the anti-philosophical sophist (as for example, in the 
case of Socrates' discussion of Lysias' speech). Hackforth makes the point that 
Socrates' first speech is a radical example of this kind of submission to the other. 
Phaedrus misinterprets Socrates' undertaking as involving a commitment to defend 
Lysias' thesis (albeit with greater care and precision than Lysias himself was capable 
of). To this extent, Hackforth states that Socrates' first speech is "forced" (p. 37) on 
him by Phaedrus' misinterpretation. Beyond the mere particulars of the issue lies the 
general nature of dialogue as in this case Socrates' submission of his subjective 
philosophy to the opposed sophistic system of Phaedrus. Phonocentrism here far from 
involving a repression of otherness constitutes an exacerbation of otherness. 
Additionally, there is the fact that the Socrates' own philosophy is transformed and 
altered within this very dialogue. His second speech involves a complete refutation of 
the thesis underlying the first speech. 
Of course in one sense this is Derrida's exact point. Although the model of 
phonocentrism is presented as being a repression of otherness, in reality it is built on 
nothing but diffdrance, the difference and deferral of what Derrida calls "writing", 
the other of speech. Socrates' opening up to Phaedrus and his consequent 
"submission" and "recantation" are therefore for Derrida evidence of a deconstruction 
ad infinitian. That is, for Derrida, these effects of phonocentrism are destructive of 
the very basis of the paradigm of speech and more generally of the very basis of 
philosophy itself. The irony is that for Plato these movements seem to be the very 
vindication of philosophy as an enterprise. This conflict in interpretation stems from a 
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fundamentally opposed conception of the nature of philosophy. As outlined in 
previous chapters Derrida seems to be working with a neo-Cartesian model of 
philosophy where one either achieves knowledge or is destined to interminable 
difference. In the last chapter, employing in particular the example of the Meno, I 
put forward a skeletal outline of a three-tiered dialectic where one could locate 
Derrida's thinking at the second stage of a negative deconstruction of knowledge. 
Platonic dialectic was rather to be found at the third stage of a reconstructive 
philosophy based on faith (pistis) and striving (orexaito). In the next section, I will 
apply this Platonic dialectic to the question of "wisdom" (or "love" contra 
knowledge) in the Phaedrus. 
In concluding this section, however, I will focus on the question of the Forms in the 
Phaedrus. In effect the issue of phonocentrism is a subsection of the Forms question. 
The model of Socrates in dialogue with the other (here Phaedrus, but also Lysias and 
by implication Sophism in general) is an analogue of the otherness of the Forms and 
in the Phaedrus one is given the further analogy of the otherness of the Ilissus (or as 
Hackforth describes it, the otherness of External Nature). In the Meno, while the 
paralysis of Meno's paradox was circumvented, this philosophical progress was 
extremely fragile, being based on a vulnerable "faith". Already at this early stage of 
his development Plato had moved away from the epistemologism of the sophists (in 
this case Gorgias/Meno), replacing the value of knowledge with that of love of 
wisdom. But Plato's adherence to a two-world ontology in the early dialogues creates 
the difficulty of accessing the Forms. It is this residual difficulty which the Phaedrus 
attempts to address - the latter dialogue is in this sense a development of the skeletal 
122 
Platonic philosophy outlined in dialogues such as the Meno. In contrast with the 
Cartesian paradigm of a clear and distinct subjective idea, the Phaedrus very much 
exemplifies the paradigm of the Object or Form in Platonism. For example at 277d-e, 
Socrates describes the philosophical object as being a study of the "just, the fine and 
the good" and crucially outlines how any subjective interpretation of this Object 
cannot be final. Even those who succeed in speaking accurately of such Forms cannot 
be ascribed the title of "being wise" - 
Socrates: To call him wise seems to me to be too much, and to be fitting only 
in the case of a god; to call him either a lover of wisdom -a philosopher - or 
something like that would both fit him more and be in better taste [p. 131, 
278d]. 
This Platonic philosophy looks back to Parmenides' sense of metaphysics as a 
"heavenly growth" (cf. Chapter 2: Voegelin); one grows towards the Forms. In the 
Phaedrus the Forms also begin to manifest themselves within the sensible world. The 
crucial point here in terms of philosophical methodology is that "spiritual 
development" (psukhes paideusin, 241c) consists in ones' becoming more like the 
philosophical object rather than in the case of Husserlianism where the subject 
"creates" in addition to discovering truth. While Derrida sees lack of knowledge as 
constituting the "unravelling" of philosophy, for Plato metaphysics begins in the 
dimunition of subjective knowledge and the opening towards the object. The 
Phaedrus perhaps better than any other Platonic dialogue exemplifies this importance 
of the extra-subjective. One can say that the dialogical context per se is already a 
paradigm case of extra-subjectivity in so far as it involves the philosopher in 
discussions outside his / her individual cogito. The Phaedrus adds extra emphasis to 
this perspective in its continual reference to context e. g. the descriptions of the Ilissus 
and this being Socrates' first visit outside the city. In Derrida's emphasis on a 
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deconstruction of epistemology, he fails to take notice of Plato's reconstructive 
efforts outside epistemology. In this section I have concentrated on these efforts in 
relation to the Forms, particularly in the Phaedrus. In the following section, I will 
focus rather on the question of "wisdom" in the Phaedrus. 
Section 4.2 - "Wisdom" in the Phaedrus 
The last two chapters have been concerned to develop an alternative philosophical 
model to that of Derrida, primarily through interpreting deconstruction as a neo- 
Cartesianism and contrasting this latter with a model of philosophy as "love of 
wisdom" (philosophia). In Chapter 2,1 outlined how the sense of philosophy as 
grounded in love began with the Presocratics, most notably with Parmenides and 
Heraclitus. In Chapter 3,1 focused on Plato's early dialogue the Meno as an example 
of the Platonic dialectic at work. This dialogue was particularly revealing insofar as it 
opposed a philosophical dialectic based on "faith" to a sophistic dialectic based on an 
over-confident (tharraleon) "knowledge". The sophistic dialectic was in many senses 
a forerunner of the Cartesian revolution in philosophy and I employed the three stages 
of the Meno's argument as an analogue of Derrida's relation to both Cartesianism and 
Platonism. I concluded that whereas deconstruction remained paralysed at the second 
stage of an infinite regress Platonism rather offered the opportunity to move beyond 
this second stage to a third stage of constructive philosophy. The Phaedrus develops 
this inherent logic of the Meno into a more sophisticated form. Along with perhaps 
the Protagoras, the Phaedrus is Plato's most successful realisation of the dramatic 
potentiality of the dialogue form. While it shares with the Meno an unequivocal 
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critique of epistemology, it gives more substantive content to the alternative model of 
philosophy which will be set up in the place of the latter. 
In the previous section, I focused on the question of the Forms in the Phaedrus. It is 
the new emphasis on the incarnation of the Forms which allows Plato to move beyond 
the tentativeness of the Meno's formulations. This philosophical development takes 
place at two levels. In the first place, Socrates continues the thematic of tharraleos 
which was begun in the Meno. Although this term never explicitly appears in the 
Phaedrus, the whole discussion concerning "love" is directed at the very same 
philosophical problem - namely, is rationalism or nonrationalism the best 
philosophical methodology? As with the Meno, Socrates eventually rejects 
rationalism in favour of a nonrational methodology. Here the specific discussion 
concerning the nature of this nonrational methodology is already more advanced than 
the analogous discussion in the Meno, but what really constitutes the difference 
between the two dialogues is the link which is now made between nonrationalism as a 
subjective capacity for "love" and the reaching out of this love towards its object, 
whether this be the sensible environment of the llissus, Socrates' attraction towards 
Phaedrus, or Socrates' concern with the Forms of the "just, the true and the good". In 
the "Cogito" essay Derrida declared the essence of philosophical crisis to be the 
chasm between the idea of infinity and the failure of rationalism to "prove" this idea. 
However, in the Phaedrus this chasm is no longer seen as being philosophically 
important. The failure of rationalism is basically the primary theme of the dialogue 
but whereas for Derrida this failure leads to an infinite regress for Plato the 
deconstruction of rationalism opens up the space within which a new relationship 
between the subject and object of philosophy can be developed. 
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This new conception of a subject-object reciprocity is perhaps nowhere more 
expressively outlined than in the opening passage on the banks of the Ilissus. This 
passage captures both the sense of a nonrational philosophical model and the sense 
that this nonrationalism must not remain a simply subjective capacity; it must rather 
open up to the extrasubjective context within which philosophy finds itself located. 
Both these insights in this opening passage revolve around the discussion of the myth 
of Oreithuia and Boreas. Phaedrus asks Socrates whether he believes the myth to be 
true - 
Phaedrus: But please tell me, Socrates, for goodness' sake, do you believe 
this fairy-tale to be true? 
Socrates: If I disbelieved (apistoien) it, like the experts (sophoi), I would 
not be extraordinary; I might then cleverly say that a blast of Boreas pushed 
her down from the nearby rocks while she was playing with Pharmaceia, and 
that when she met her death in this way she was said to have been seized by 
Boreas - or else from the Areopagus; for this account (logos) is given too, that 
it was from there and not from here that she was seized. But, Phaedrus, while 
I think such explanations attractive in other respects, they belong in my view 
to an over-clever (lian de demon) and laborious (epiponou) person who is not 
altogether fortunate (ou paint eutukhous); just because after that he must set 
the shape of the Centaurs to rights, and again that of the Chimaera, and a mob 
of such things....... if someone is sceptical (apiston) about these, and tries to 
reduce each to what is likely, with his boorish kind of expertise (agroiko Ifni 
sophia), he'll need a good deal of leisure [229e-230a]. 
This important passage looks ahead to Socrates' second speech which is a more 
developed critique of rationalism. Indeed Hackforth makes the point that Plato is here 
outlining the philosophical methodology which must be applied to Socrates' later 
speech. If that speech is judged on rationalist terms, on the terms of a "boorish kind 
of expertise" (agroiko thu sophia) , then it will be interpreted as philosophically 
inadmissible particularly in the context of Socrates' invocation to the "local 
divinities" for inspiration. Hackforth's claim however is that this earlier passage at 
229-230 outlines a nonrational methodology which for Plato is the philosophical 
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methodology par excellence. This passage is not only important from an intra - 
Phaedrus perspective. It is significant that many of the concepts from the crucial 
passages in the Meno are here reiterated by Plato. For example, the maligned 
rationalists are again (as with Gorgias / Meno in the Meno) the "sophoi". These 
sophists are criticised because they "disbelieve" (apistoien) and the term which Plato 
uses for the further reference to the scepticism of sophism is "apiston". This is 
important with regard to the Meno because there the philosophers' way out of Meno's 
paradox is guided by pistis or belief. Once again therefore one has a fundamental 
contrast between the rationalism of sophism and the "belief' or "faith" of genuine 
philosophy. At 228b Socrates has already described himself as being "sick with 
passion" (nosounti) for hearing people speak (logoi). As with Heraclitus, the Socratic 
/ Platonic logos is nonrational. Indeed the term nosounti derives from the noun nosos 
which designates sickness and in this context a "disease of the mind, especially 
madness". Nosos can also mean distress, affliction, evil or a plague. This emphasis 
on the nonrational bears an affinity with Derrida's foregrounding of "terror" and 
"horror" in the "Cogito" essay. But whereas Derrida sees these elements as 
destructive of philosophical dialectic, for Plato they constitute the precise driving 
force of philosophy. This will become clearer in our discussion concerning Socrates' 
speech on "love" (philosophy as love; as Hackforth puts it "philosophy is love"). 
Before analysing this speech and its relation to Socrates' earlier refutation of 
rationalism, I will first look briefly at how Plato links this nonrationalism in the 
Boreas / Oreithuia passage to a crucial sense of place or objective context. In the last 
section I spoke of this Platonic emphasis on the extra-subjective (e. g. what Hackforth 
terms "External Nature") as being fundamental to his move away from a two-world 
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ontology. It is therefore significant that the Boreas / Oreithuia passage is first 
introduced in terms of a reference or question concerning place - 
Socrates: So lead on, and keep a lookout for a place for us to sit down. 
Phaedrus: Well then, you see that very tall plane-tree? 
Socrates: I do indeed. 
Phaedrus: There's shade and a moderate breeze there, and grass to sit on, or 
lie on, if we like. 
Socrates: Please lead on. 
Phaedrus: Tell me, Socrates, wasn't it from somewhere just here that Boreas 
is said to have seized Oreithuia from the Ilissus? 
Socrates: Yes, so it's said. 
Phaedrus: Well, was it from here? The water of the stream certainly looks 
attractively pure and clear, and just right for young girls to play beside it. 
Socrates: No, it was from a place two or three stades lower down, where one 
crosses over to the district of Agra; and somewhere there is an altar of Boreas 
(229c). 
This detailed discussion of "place" appears rather bizarre in the context of the figure 
of Socrates who has "never left the city". However, given Sayre's thesis (see above) 
of the Forms becoming "ontologically homogeneous" with the sensible world in 
Plato's later work (e. g. the Phaedrus) the detailed reference becomes more 
understandable. In other words, "place" or one's empirical context now becomes 
philosophically significant in so far as the Forms are now manifest within the world. 
Although the altar of Boreas is said to be "two or three stades lower down" from the 
Ilissus, the discussion reemphasises the sense that some places may be sacred and this 
becomes particularly important in relation to Socrates' later invocation of the "local 
divinities". 
It is also important that the Boreas / Oreithuia discussion directly precedes the flowery 
eulogy to the Ilissus at 230b-c. There, detailed and loving description is given of the 
plane-tree, the stream, the grass, the cicadas' song and indeed of the "sacred" spot of 
figurines and statuettes which appear to be dedicated to "some Nymphs and to 
Achelous". Socrates apologises to Phaedrus for having to "interrupt our conversation 
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(logoi)" (230a) with a question concerning place but the following context of eulogy 
to place suggests that the nonrational logos and the beauty of the empirical context are 
mutually dependent. In many respects this emphasis on objective place looks forward 
to the development of a philosophy of the Object in Neo- and Christian- Platonism. 
Perhaps the most striking example of this Platonic principle in operation is to be 
found in Meister Eckhart's On Detachment [9], where Eckhart calls for a complete 
"annihilation of self' so as to be more "receptive" to the divine Object. It will be 
discussed in more detail in Chapter 7 with regard to De Cusa's motif of the 
"incomprehensibility" of the infinite "object" - 
it comes to pass that the very inaccessibility or incomprehensibility of its 
infinite life becomes that which is most desired and longed for. It is as if a 
man discovers that the treasure of his life is innumerable, unweighable and 
immeasurable. And this very awareness of the incomprehensibility is most 
desirable not because it refers to the one comprehending but to 
the....... incomprehensible loveliness of the thing loved (Sap., p. 107) [my 
emphasis] (10) 
The negative reference to subjectivity is crucial here - "not because it refers to the one 
comprehending". The focus is shifted from the locus of comprehension, the subject, 
to the object being comprehended, the objective or extra-subjective. This movement 
outside subjectivity is analogous to the emphasis on objective place which is found in 
the Phaedrus. A little later in "De Sapientia", De Cusa explicitly states that the 
eternal wisdom will not be obtained if the criterion of subjectivity is held to - 
the eternal wisdom will not be obtained unless the possessor keeps nothing of 
his own. That which we have of our own are our vices and that which we have 
of the eternal wisdom are nothing but good things (Sap., p. 112) 
In "De Docta Ignorantia" [11], De Cusa further distinguishes between the 
"vegetative" (DI, p. 84) and "intellectual" (DI, p. 94) aspects of subjectivity as they 
relate to their respective objects. In this context, "vegetative" seems to have a 
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broader than usual sense, including all kinds of rationalism which claim to 
exhaustively understand their objects. The nature of vegetative power, De Cusa 
states, is that it "transmutes nourishment into its own system" (DI., p. 84), the food 
becomes "the nature of the feeder" (DI, p. 95) - in other words, the "object" is 
reduced to "subjective" terms. In contrast, in genuine philosophy where the subject is 
directed towards its object - 
the food of life is eaten ever, but never to become the nature of the 
partaker..... the intellect becomes the thing it understands (DI, p. 96) 
The focus is therefore shifted - from rationalism where the object becomes subjective, 
to the life of the "intellectual spirit" where the subject as it were becomes its object. 
De Cusa's analysis of this problem of "objectivity" is a direct development of the 
logic of the Phaedrus - both in the sense of the latter's emphasis on objective place 
(the Ilissus etc) and in the sense of Socrates' subjective wisdom being influenced by 
extra-subjective "local divinities". In the first case of objective place there is a further 
quotation from "De Sapientia" which perfectly captures this Platonic logic of the 
"object" - "Wisdom cries out in the streets and her cry is that she dwells in the 
highest". If one was to translate this into the terms of the Phaedrus one might say that 
wisdom cries out along the banks of the river Ilissus. The second sense of the 
"objective" in the Phaedrus as a wisdom which comes from outside oneself (as in the 
case of Socrates' being "possessed" by divinity; 238d) finds a closer analogue in 
Augustine's concept of "intellectual vision" than in De Cusa's more alienated learned 
ignorance but the De Cusa's Idiota [12] dialogues are nonetheless an explicit carrying 
on of the Socratic ideal of wisdom. I will discuss these issues in more detail in 
Chapter 7. In concluding this chapter, I will be concerned rather with the specifics of 
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the Socratic ideal of wisdom as outlined in the Phaedrus and how once again this 
concept might be employed against Derrida's reading of philosophy in "Plato's 
Pharmacy". 
The Socratic ideal of wisdom as a "divine madness" or "love" is most explicitly 
stated in Socrates' second speech, the third and final speech of the Phaedrus (after 
Lysias' and Socrates' first speech). However, the essence of this wisdom is already 
articulated by Socrates directly after Lysias' speech. He expresses his philosophical 
discontent with Lysias' thinking as follows - 
Phaedrus: Where have you heard anything better than this? 
Socrates: I can't tell you off-hand; but I'm sure I have heard something 
better, from the fair Sappho maybe, or the wise Anacreon, or perhaps some 
prose writer. What ground, you may ask, have I for saying so? Good sir, 
there is something welling up within my breast, which makes me feel that I 
could find something different, and something better, to say. I am of course 
well aware it can't be anything originating in my own mind, for I know my 
own ignorance; so I suppose it can only be that it has been poured into me, 
through my ears, as into a vessel, from some external source; though in my 
stupid fashion I have actually forgotten how, and from whom, I heard it 
(235c-d). 
The reference at this early stage of the Phaedrus to an "external source" for Socrates' 
arguments is an initial thematization of the pronounced sense of "divine possession" 
which will be integral to Socrates' second speech. At 242b-c Socrates declares that he 
has been visited by a "divine sign" which now necessitates him to recant his original 
speech - 
At the moment when I was about to cross the river, dear friend, there came to 
me my familiar divine sign - which always checks me when on the point of 
doing something or other - and all at once I seemed to hear a voice, forbidding 
me to leave the spot until I had made atonement for some offence to heaven. 
Now, you must know, I am a seer; not a very good one, it's true, but, like a 
poor scholar, good enough for my own purposes; hence I understand already 
well enough what my offence was. The fact is, you know, Phaedrus, the 
mind itself has a kind of divining power; for I felt disturbed some while ago 
as I was delivering that speech, and had a misgiving lest I might, in the words 
of Ibycus 
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By sinning in the sight of God win high renown from man. 
But now I realise my sin (242c-d). 
At this point of the dialogue Socrates is just about to introduce his second speech 
which will be a complete recantation of both the initial speech of Lysias (recounted by 
Phaedrus) and Socrates' own first speech. "I am a seer" - it is crucial that at this 
juncture in the dialogue Socrates once again reiterates his nonrational paradigm. 
Already through the myth of Boreas / Oreithyia Socrates has outlined his distrust of 
rationalism and its "over-clever.... boorish kind of expertise", emphasising in contrast 
the "belief' (pistis) upon which nonrational mythology is dependent. And as we saw 
above, even introducing his first speech Socrates is clear in distancing his thinking 
from rationalism, in this case in so far as his thoughts "cannot be anything originating 
in his own mind" (the direct contrast with the Cartesian ideal of subjective clear and 
distinct ideas is obvious). But it is Socrates' second speech which constitutes the 
centre-point of the dialogue, at least in terms of its underlying philosophy if not its 
"formal structure" (Hackforth, p. 136). 
On this point, Hackforth claims that there is an apparent "formal defect" (Hackforth, 
p. 137) in the Phaedrus to the extent that the formal structure of the dialogue, which 
appears to be guided by the importance of "dialectic" as a new philosophical 
methodology (of "collection and division"; 264e-266b) is undermined by the 
nonrational excess of the second speech. Hackforth nonetheless sees this "formal 
defect" as purposeful on Plato's part - the Phaedrus is really about philosophy as love 
and this underlying basis of the dialogue is perfectly exemplified by the extremism of 
the second speech. Formalism, despite initial appearances, plays only a small part in 
the P/haedrus. There is also a point to be made here concerning the nature of Plato's 
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formalism. The distinction which Hackforth maintains between the second Socratic 
speech and the formal emphasis on dialectic assumes that the latter is exclusively 
rational. But Hackforth himself clearly shows that even the formal aspects of the 
Phaedrus are far from being rationalist in a simple sense of the term. While Socrates 
sets very high standards for dialectical procedure in general his own employment of 
this technique in the Phaedrus is undermined by inconsistency and a lack of precisely 
the clear definition which the new methodology is intended to inaugurate. 
Commenting for example on the passage 265e-266b, Hackforth states the following - 
There are serious difficulties in this paragraph. Socrates speaks as though the 
generic concept of madness (to aphron, paranoia, mania) had been common 
to his two speeches, and there had been a formal divisional procedure 
followed in both of them. Neither of these things is true. In the first speech 
Socrates starts by bringing eros under the genus epithumia but this is 
superceded by hubris, which is declared to be polumeles kai polueides (238a); 
it is then shown that eros is a species of hubris, but this is done not by 
successive dichotomies, but by an informal discrimination from an indefinite 
number of other species, of which only two are named. It is only in the 
second speech that Socrates starts with a clear concept of "madness"; but 
here again there is no scheme of successive divisions, whether dichotomous 
or other: there is merely the single step of a fourfold division. 
It must therefore be admitted that Socrates' account of the dialectical 
procedure followed in his speeches is far from exact (Hackforth, p. 133). 
On this interpretation the extremism of the second speech (i. e. its complete rejection 
of rationalism) is no longer diametrically opposed to the formalism concerning 
dialectic. The emphasis on dialectic now becomes at least compatible with the stress 
on Eros so pronounced in the second speech in so far as the new Socratic dialectic is 
itself far from being completely rational (or as Hackforth observes, "far from exact"). 
This affinity between Eros and dialectic seems hardly surprising. The Platonic 
dialectic is after all a dialectic grounded in "love" - at 266b for example Socrates 
describes himself as a "lover (erastes) of these divisions and collections". It seems 
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possible therefore to read Hackforth's so-called "formal defect" in the Platonic 
dialectic as being purposeful on Plato's part. If dialectic is driven by a love of 
wisdom rather than wisdom itself (which at 266b Socrates describes as being 
accessible to God alone; "God alone knows") then one can refer its nonfinalisation 
back to, for example, the Heraclitean model of striving (or orexis) for an unattainable 
truth. In Epistle VII, surveying a life lived as a seeker after truth, Plato himself states 
that he has never outlined a manual of his doctrine (341c; Hackforth p. 163) thus 
supporting the sense of philosophy as an open-ended project. In other words the 
failure of the Platonic dialectic in the Phaedrus to live up to its stated intentions is not 
a specific failure due to error which might be superseded by a better methodology. 
Rather this is the failure which is intrinsic to the philosophical project as such - as 
Socrates himself so frequently observes, one can know only that one doesn't know. 
Understood from this perspective the emphasis on dialectic no longer seems 
incongrous with the radical invocation to "mania" in Socrates' second speech. The 
second speech itself is Plato's most eloquent invocation of philosophy as an activity of 
the erotic. Socrates outlines the thrust of the speech in the interlude prior to the 
speech when he locates the defect of the previous two speeches in their conviction that 
love could involve any kind of evil. Is not love a god, Socrates asks Phaedrus 
rhetorically, and the two early speeches in their attribution of evil to it have been 
guilty of gross blasphemy - 
Socrates: Well, do you not hold Love to be a god, the child of Aphrodite? 
Phaedrus: He is certainly said to be. 
Socrates: But not according to Lysias, and not according to that discourse of 
yours which you caused my lips to utter by putting a spell on them. If Love is, 
as he is indeed, a god or a divine being, he cannot be an evil thing: yet this 
pair of speeches treated him as evil. That then was their offence towards 
Love...... in awe of Love himself, I should like to wash the bitter taste out of 
my mouth with a draught of wholesome discourse; and my advice to Lysias is 
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that he should lose no time in telling us that, other things being equal, favour 
should be accorded to the lover rather than to the non-lover (242d-e, 243d). 
Socrates' second speech is basically a spirited development of the logic of this 
interlude. In the first case, Socrates makes clear that the primary reason for the 
preferability of a lover over a nonlover derives not from the former's rationality but 
rather from an affirmation of his / her very mania ("in reality, the greatest blessings 
come by way of madness, indeed of madness that is heaven-sent" 244a-b). Socrates 
then delineates three types of "divine madness" of which the manic "love" of the 
philosopher is posited as a fourth possibility. The three initial types of divine 
madness described are prophecy (244d), the mania of rites of purification (244e) and 
the poetic madness for which the Muses are the source (244e). This analysis is 
intended as a revaluation of madness against those who would wish to subordinate it 
to sanity or rationalism - 
let us not be disturbed by an argument that seeks to scare us into preferring the 
friendship of the sane to that of the passionate. For there is something more 
that it must prove if it is to carry the day, namely that love is not a thing sent 
from heaven for the advantage both of lover and beloved. What we have to 
prove is the opposite, namely that this sort of madness is a gift of the gods, 
fraught with the highest bliss. And our proof assuredly will prevail with the 
wise, though not with the learned (245b-c). 
The final point deserves reiteration - "our proof asuredly will prevail with the wise, 
though not with the learned". Socrates is reemphasising his distance from the 
rationalists. If madness is indeed a gift from the gods, a divine blessing, this is not 
something which can be understood by what he has earlier referred to as the "over- 
clever" and "laborious" explanations of science. Just as the Boreas / Oreithuia myth 
must be accepted on "faith" (pistis), so too the sense of a blessed divine madness is 
inaccessible to "the learned". It is, we are told, accessible to the "wise" and this 
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accessibility will come through an analysis of the "nature of soul, divine and human, 
its experiences and its activities" (245c). 
Socrates initially describes his projected analysis of soul as a "proof' (245c), but 
again this turns out to be no rationalist proof but rather an enigmatic myth. Frutiger 
classifies this particular myth as parascientific and his explanation of this type of 
myth in general is instructive with regard to the difference between rationalism and 
the nature of Platonic dialectic - 
To complete the results of logos, to extend them beyond the limits of pure 
reason, to take the place, by way of deuteros pious, of dialectic when it 
comes up against some inpenetrable mystery - that is the function of those 
myths which, for want of a better epithet, we have called parascientific 
(Frutiger, p. 223). 
It is this extra-rational function which Frutiger (and Hackforth; "I would agree that 
our myth belongs to this class", p. 76) believes the Myth of the Soul (246a-247c) 
performs in the Phaedrus. When one considers that Socrates has introduced the 
analysis of the soul as being the philosophical basis of the invocation of divinity (or 
"divine madness") it is clear that this invocation of "divine madness" does not rest on 
a rational foundation. Following Frutiger and Hackforth one might say that the 
Phaedrus rests on a parascientific basis - extending philosophy "beyond the limits of 
pure reason" into the realm of "inpenetrable mystery". This sense is reinforced at the 
very beginning of the telling of the myth when Socrates disallows a finalised human 
understanding of the soul, distinguishing between the inaccessible attributes which 
the soul has in itself (oion esti) and the accessible knowledge of what it resembles (ho 
eoike) [246a]. Socrates then proceeds to compare the soul to a winged charioteer 
driving a team of winged horses. Again Socrates is quick to make a distinction 
between the divine chariots and the merely human - 
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Let it (the soul) be likened to the union of powers in a team of winged steeds 
and their winged charioteer. Now all the gods' steeds and all their charioteers 
are good, and of good stock; but with other beings it is not wholly so. With 
us men, in the first place, it is a pair of steeds that the charioteer controls; 
moreover one of them is noble and good, and of good stock, while the other 
has the opposite character, and his stock is opposite. Hence the task of our 
charioteer is difficult and troublesome (246a). 
This duality between the divine and the human at the level of soul causes the human 
charioteer to be continuously "confounded by her steeds" (248a); in the effort to 
reach that place where true Being dwells (247c) even the best human charioteers are 
capable of only seeing in part ("her unruly steeds sees in part, but in part sees not"; 
248a). The "rest" are condemned to be "sucked down as they travel, they trample and 
tread upon one another, this one striving to outstrip that" (248a). Socrates makes 
clear that if souls succeed in maintaining their direct vision of Being (thus "following 
in the train of a god" 248c) they will remain exempt from a "fall" (Hermeias, quoted 
by Hackforth p. 79) into a body. But once they come across any 
"mischance"(suntukhia; 248c) their fall into embodiment becomes inevitable and it is 
simply a question of what level of embodiment they enter. Socrates distinguishes 
between nine levels of embodied life (248d) positioning the worst kinds of soul at the 
ninth stage of being a "tyrant" and the eight stage of being a "sophist or demagogue" 
(248e). The first stage unsurprisingly is the level at which the soul of the philosopher 
enters embodied life - 
the soul that hath seen the most of being shall enter into the human babe that 
shall grow into a seeker after wisdom or beauty (philokalos), a follower of the 
muses (mousikos) and a lover (erotikos) [248d]. 
As Hackforth notes (Hackforth, p. 83), the philokalos, mousikos and erotikos are not 
persons other than the philosophos (the philosopher), but denote aspects of him. 
Through the enigmatic Myth of the Soul which takes the Phaedrus "beyond the 
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bounds of pure reason" (Frutiger) [13] one therefore has a Platonic delineation of the 
philosopher as a being in harmony with wisdom, beauty and love respectively. It is 
this mythology which leads into Socrates' introduction of the fourth and highest kind 
of "divine madness", the mania of this very philosophical soul. At 249d Socrates 
outlines the process by which initiation into this mania takes place. Every human 
soul, Socrates tells us, by reason of its nature has had at least some contemplation of 
true Being (249d). To remember this vision of Being is however not easy for every 
soul to the extent that, for example, the reasoning powers of man are merely "dull 
organs" (di amttdron organon - 250b-c; cf also Hackforth p. 95). But the sensible 
manifestation of beauty is singled out by Socrates as an exception to this dullness - 
but with beauty it is otherwise. Beauty it was ours to see in all its brightness in 
those days when, amidst that happy company, we beheld with our eyes that 
blessed vision, ourselves in the train of Zeus...... Now beauty, as we said, 
shone brightest amidst these visions, and in this world below we apprehend it 
through the clearest of our senses, clear and resplendent. For sight is the 
keenest mode of perception vouchsafed us through the body; wisdom, indeed, 
we cannot see thereby - how passionate had been our desire for her, if she had 
granted us so clear an image of herself to gaze upon - nor yet any other of 
those beloved objects, save only beauty; for beauty alone this has been 
ordained, to be most manifest to sense and most lovely of them all (250d). 
This sense of a specific incarnation of Beauty in the sensible world refers back to the 
discussion in Section 4.2 concerning the later Plato's break with his earlier two-world 
ontology. Here in the Phaedrus the Form of Beauty is no longer ontologically 
separated from the sensible world but is rather embodied within this very world. For 
the purposes of this section's discussion of wisdom, the crucial point concerning 
"beauty" is one's mode of access to it. Again, the concept of rational access is 
radically undermined by Plato. In a passage which must rank as one of the most 
intense paens to Eros in the history of philosophy, Socrates makes clear that it is not 
reason which should relate to this Beauty but rather a "madness" characterized by 
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every aspect of extreme emotion from shuddering fever and anguish to floods of 
passion and rejoicing - 
when one who is fresh from the mystery, and saw much of the vision, 
beholds a godlike face or bodily form that truly expresses beauty, first there 
comes upon him a shuddering and a measure of that awe which the vision 
inspired, and then reverence as at the sight of a god; and but for fear of being 
deemed a very madman he would offer sacrifice to his beloved, as to a holy 
image of deity. Next, with the passing of the shudder, a strange sweating and 
fever seizes him: for by reason of the stream of beauty entering in through his 
eyes there comes a warmth, whereby his soul's plumage is fostered; and with 
that warmth the roots of the wings are melted, which for long had been so 
hardened and closed up that nothing could grow; then as the nourishment is 
poured in the stump of the wing swells and hastens to grow from the root over 
the whole substance of the soul: for aforetime the whole soul was furnished 
with wings (251a-c). 
Socrates then describes the analogous state of the lover who is "throbbing with 
ferment in every part" and alternating between great anguish and joy (251c-e); as with 
the first lover the throes of love allow her to regrow the wings of her soul (the section 
248e-249d describes how the nonphilosophical soul cannot regrow its wings and 
return to its heavenly home in less than 10,000 years, but the philosophical lover can 
achieve this return in only 3,000 years). As Hackforth observes, while the "formal" 
aim of the Phaedrus may be to introduce a new philosophical dialectic the real 
underlying philosophical motivation is rather the "praise of the philosophic life as 
Plato and Socrates understood it" (p. 164), as a life guided by Eros rather than reason. 
In applying this point to Derrida's reading of Plato one can say that "Plato's 
Pharmacy" interprets the emphasis on madness in the Phaedrus as a sign of the 
"unravelling" of Platonic dialectic. In contrast the reading outlined by Hackforth (and 
other commentators such as Frutiger and Ferrari) sees Eros as being the very condition 
of Platonic dialectic, here understood as the "spiritual education" (241c) of the soul 
i. e the regrowing of the soul's wings. 
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One possible rejoinder to this interpretation of the Phaedrus as an anti- 
epistemological dialogue is the concluding discussion concerning the relationship 
between speech and writing, and the possible types of so-called "good" and "bad" 
writing and "good" and "bad" speech (cf. particularly 259e-261a). The relevance of 
this discussion for the problem of epistemology is located in the apparent 
identification which Socrates makes at this point between philosophy and 
"knowledge" - 
Socrates: Well, the subject we proposed for inquiry just now was the nature 
of good and bad speaking and writing: so we are to inquire into that. 
Phaedrus: Plainly. 
Socrates: Then does not a good and successful discourse presuppose a 
knowledge in the mind of the speaker of the truth about his subject? (my 
emphasis; 259e). 
Whereas the refutation of Lysias' speech seemed to involve a radical critique of 
knowledge, now in the discussion concerning speech / writing it is the episteme of 
philosophy which appears to be privileged over the mere semblance of episteine which 
is characteristic of sophism - 
Phaedrus: what I have heard is that the intending orator is under no necessity 
of understanding what is truly just, but only what is likely to be thought just 
by the body of men who are to give judgement; nor need he know what is 
truly good or noble, but what will be thought so; since it is on the latter, not 
the former, that persuasion depends (260a). 
But as with the aforementioned "formal defect" (Hackforth, p. 137) in the Phaedrus, 
one can explain this apparent inconsistency concerning epistemology without serious 
difficulty. The primary point to be noted is that the Platonic "knowledge" (259e) here 
described can only come by way of a continuous dialogue, preferably between a 
teacher and a pupil (276e-277a). The reciprocity involved in this relation already 
differentiates it from the subject-centred epistemology of the Cartesian type - one 
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cannot find truth by merely looking to one's isolated reason. Additionally, the 
position of the teacher as well as that of the pupil is open to continuous vulnerability - 
as Socrates says at one point, wisdom is proper only to the gods - 
To call him (i. e. the dialectician) wise, Phaedrus, would, I think, be going 
too far: the epithet is proper only to a god; a name that would fit him better, 
and have more seemliness, would be "lover of wisdom", or something similar 
(278d). 
The most revealing case in point is of course the teacher-pupil relation of Socrates / 
Phaedrus, where Socrates' position as teacher does not constitute a self-contained 
knowledge but is rather open to being educated by his interlocutor Phaedrus as well as 
by the outside context of the Ilissus. 
Crucially, from a Platonic perspective, although Socrates seems to build the 
distinction between philosophy and sophism on a knowledge / delusion axis, the 
identification of Socrates / philosophy with "knowledge" is misleading if one takes it 
to be a refutation of the previous emphasis on Eros. The situation is analogous to 
Hackforth's discussion of the "formal defect" in the discontinuity between the 
emphasis on Eros and on a new method of rational dialectic. This discontinuity is 
superseded once one sees how the method of dialectic is actually employed in the 
argument of the Phaedrus. Far from being a conclusive rational system (such as 
Cartesianism) the method of dialectic is rather a nonfinalised method of moving 
towards the truth rather than actually fully grasping the latter. This point is reinforced 
by Socrates when he talks of philosophy as being grounded on "pieces" of knowledge 
as opposed to the "unity" of definition proposed by the dialectical method of 
collection. The case is similar with the problem of the "knowledge" which Socrates 
describes as being the definitive difference between metaphysics and sophism. Taken 
at his word, Socrates' philosophical ideal would exclude for example the very method 
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of dialectic which seems completely incapable of achieving "knowledge". This point 
is reinforced by Socrates' concluding prayer to Pan and the Nymphs of the local area 
(279b-c). The "knowledge" achieved by the dialogue between Socrates and Phaedrus 
is through this very prayer thematised as irreducibly mystical (i. e. nonrational) and 
also crucially as nonfinalised. The prayer concerns the vulnerability of both Socrates' 
and Phaedrus' future about which only the gods seem to have knowledge - in their 
respective ignorance, Socrates and Phaedrus must rely on the epistemological 
inconclusiveness of prayer. One can also make reference in this context to the 
analogous prophecy made by Socrates concerning the future of the orator Isocrates 
with regard to philosophy (279a-b); a future similarly divested of certainty and made 
even more problematic by the hindsight available to Plato's readers. The prophecy is 
described by Socrates as being "a report which I convey from the gods of this place" 
(279b). To this extent, it is fair to question any simple reading of the reference to 
"knowledge" in the concluding section. Just as with the method of dialectic, the 
surrounding context is suggestive of an undermining of epistemology and a strong 
adherence to the ideal of a love of wisdom rather than a possession of wisdom. 
Near the end of the dialogue (278b) , in summing up the prior arguments, Socrates 
explicitly reiterates the empirical context of the discussion, making clear that the 
banks of the Ilissus have been crucial (along with the local divinities) in inspiring his 
philosophical insight - 
Socrates: Then we may regard our literary pastime as having reached a 
satisfactory conclusion. Do you now go and tell Lysias that we two went 
down to the stream where is the holy place of the Nymphs, and there listened 
to words which charged us to deliver a message (278b). 
Any discussion of "wisdom" in the Phaedrus must therefore combine a sense of the 
subjective nonrationalism (i. e. the paradigm of "divine possession") with the 
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emphasis on the objective nonrationalism (e. g. the divinisation of the Ilissus as an 
inspirational place). It is this doubling aspect of Platonism which makes it seem 
similar to the structure of deconstruction, but whereas Derrida reads this doubling as 
an "unravelling" Plato rather interprets it as providing the possibility within which 
philosophy can progress beyond the epistemological quagmire of Meno's paradox. 
My last four chapters have been concerned to address the underlying problem from the 
perspective of Derrida's interpretation of Plato in "Plato's Pharmacy", seeking in 
chapters 2,3 and 4 to offer an alternative to the interminability of difference. The 
next three chapters will be focused on the same philosophical issue ("wisdom" contra 
"knowledge") but primarily with regard to Derrida's readings of Neo- and Christian- 
Platonism. In the next chapter, I will specifically concentrate on several Derridean 
texts so as to clarify the characteristic features of the deconstructive reading of 
Platonism. Having delineated the primary aspects of this reading, 1 will then in 
Chapters 6 and 7 attempt to provide a counter-interpretation of Platonism focusing on 
the work of Plotinus, Augustine, Boethius and Nicholas De Cusa respectively. I will 
continue to make reference to Plato's own work and its relation to Derrida's as 
appropriate. Finally in the Conclusion I will sketch one way in which the reworking 
of an ancient-modern quarrel points beyond deconstruction towards a renewal of 
Platonism. 
143 
CHAPTER 5- DERRIDA ON "PLATONISM": DECONSTRUCTION, 
APOPHASIS AND DIALECTIC 
Section 5.1 - Prefatory Remarks 
In the first four chapters, I introduced the problematic of `Derrida and Plato'. After 
setting the stage by exploring Derrida's symbiotic relationship with Cartesianism, the 
first chapter outlined Derrida's influential reading of Plato in "Plato's Pharmacy", 
which stresses an interminable doubling at the heart of the Platonic dialogues. In the 
next three chapters, I attempted to elaborate an alternative reading of Plato based 
initially on the influence of Heraclitus / Parmenides (chapter 2) and then on the 
interpretation of specific Platonic works, the Meno (chapter 3) and the Phaedrus 
(chapter 4). In this reading of Plato, I emphasised a three-tiered dialectic - 
Stage 1- The disablingly arrogant (tharraleon) character of sophism 
Stage 2- The negative deconstruction of such sophism (practised by Derrida and 
Plato) 
Stage 3- The positive overcoming of aporia through faith (pistis) and striving 
(orexis) [ practised by the Presocratics and Plato but not by Derrida]. 
My analysis of the relationship between Derrida and "Platonism" will follow a similar 
trajectory, locating an enigmatic dialectic in the latter which remains absent in the 
former. Before introducing the details of this debate, it will be helpful to clarify the 
relationship between "Plato" and what 1 have rather schematically termed 
"Platonism". By "Plato", I refer exclusively to the Athenian author of the famous 
dialogues. "Platonism" however is a more bastardised concept. It includes the neo- 
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Platonism of Plotinus, the early medieval Christian Platonism of Augustine, the dual 
pagan / Christian Platonism of Boethius and the late medieval Christian Platonism of 
de Cusa. In each of these cases, there are obvious differences between style and 
content. Fundamentally, however, each of the four examples remains an inheritor 
(and developer) of the Platonic legacy. There are other examples of course - the 
pseudo-Dionysius, Scotus Erigena, Bonaventura, Duns Scotus, Angelus Silesius [1] 
etc. Aside from questions of space, I have chosen the four thinkers specified because 
of their explicit advocacy of the three-tiered dialectic mentioned above. In other 
words, all four Platonists (like Plato himself) combine a provisional stress on 
negativity with an ultimate recourse to affirmation and the positing of wisdom. 
This positive dimension differentiates these thinkers from Derrida but also from less 
positive aspects of the Platonic heritage. The "apophasis" which Derrida foregrounds 
in negative theology (most notably in the essay Sauf le nom) [2] is on my 
interpretation closer to the second stage of the Platonic dialectic than to the third i. e., 
closer to deconstructive impasse than to an overcoming affirmation. In the essay 
Passions [3] Derrida makes reference to the philosophical paralysis created by the 
Platonic term khora (taken from the Tj naeus) - 
khora discourages, it "is" precisely what disarms efforts at persuasion - and 
whoever would like to find the heart to believe or the desire to make believe: 
for example, in the figures, tropes, or seductions of discourse (p. xv, OTN). 
This theme of a discouraging or disarming of philosophy is developed in the essay 
Sauf le none. Derrida cites the complex "history" of negative theology as "one of the 
most remarkable manifestations of this self-difference" (p. 71, OTN), i. e. the self- 
difference of the so-called History of Metaphysics. This "self-difference" is found 
most acutely at moments of apophasis, such as Plato's reference to the khora. It is 
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this emphasis on aporia which links deconstruction to an already self-differing 
philosophical tradition. Alongside this emphasis on apophasis, however, there is also 
a strong reactive moment of philosophy, that of the dialectic of Aufklärung - 
it is true that, on the other hand, and according to the law of the same double 
bind, the dissident uprooting (i. e. apophasis) can claim to fulfill the vocation 
or the promise of Christianity in its most historic essence; thereby it responds 
to the call and to the gift of Christ, as it would resonate everywhere, in the 
ages of ages, rendering itself responsible for testifying before him, that is, 
before God (Aufklärung rather than Enlightenment..... ) [p. 72, OTN]. 
The reference here by Derrida to Aufklärung is revealing. It can be referred back to 
the discussion in Passions of that exemplary thinker of Aufklärung, Kant. In 
Passions, Derrida outlines a deconstruction of Kantian morality centred around the 
concept of a dutiful and responsible self. The concept of a free selfhood is integral to 
a Kantian notion of Aufklärung. In the essay "What is Aufklärung? " [4], Kant makes 
this point clearly - 
Aufklärung is man's release from his self-incurred tutelage. Tutelage is man's 
inability to make use of his understanding without direction from another. 
Self-incurred is this tutelage when its cause lies not in lack of reason but in 
lack of resolution and courage to use it without direction from another. Sapere 
nude! (Dare to be wise). "Have courage to use your own reason! " - that is the 
motto of Aufklärung. (p. 462). 
In Passions, Derrida outlines how this rationalism underlies the Kantian concept of 
responsibility and describes this conceptual matrix as "the most classically 
metaphysical definition of responsibility" (Pass., p. 10). As we saw above, this 
supposed affinity between Kantianism and classicism is extended in Sauf le Notn 
where Derrida describes the essentialism of Christianity as an Aufklärung. It is in 
contrast to this monolithism that Derrida emphasises apophasis in Sauf le Nom, a 
movement he describes as the "self-difference" (OTN, p. 71) of the metaphysical 
tradition. 
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In this Preface I will not enter into the details of these analyses as these points will be 
developed in more detail in the succeeding sections where Derrida's texts will be 
examined closely. Here I will rather propose a more general question: if Derrida's 
equation of Kantian and classical morality is mistaken, does this not call into question 
his avowal of apophasis, an avowal which seems to be dependent upon the 
congruence of Kantianism and classicism? For me, this is a rhetorical question which 
I elaborate so as once again to thematize an ancient-modern quarrel. On my 
interpretation, there is a fundamental opposition between Kantianism (as a "modern" 
philosophy) and Derrida's so-called "classical metaphysics" which not only includes 
Platonism but cites the latter as the first defining moment of the Western heritage. 
This opposition centres around the difference between the concepts of "wisdom" 
(classicism) and "knowledge" (modernity). Derrida's critique of Kantian 
epistemology in Passions becomes in Sauf le Nom the basis of a critique of a classical 
Aufklärung and the advocacy of a very particular kind of negative theology. But the 
critique of Kantian epistemology does not hold for the critique of classical wisdom 
and thus the advocacy of negative theology becomes problematic. 
One can relate this issue back to our original three stages of Platonic dialectic. An 
example of the first stage of this dialectic would be Kantian epistemology and the 
responsible and dutiful subject which it founds. In problematizing this Kantianism 
Derrida moves to the second stage - 
responsibility would be problematic to the extent that it could sometimes, 
perhaps even always, be what one takes, not for oneself, in one's own name 
and before the other (the most classically metaphysical definition of 
responsibility) but what one must take for another, in his place, in the name of 
the other or of oneself as other, before another other, and an other of the other, 
namely the very undeniable of ethics (p. 10 / 11, OTN). 
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Kantian epistemology is thereby undermined by an "other" which refuses to be 
reduced to the concepts of responsibility or duty. This brings Derrida from the first 
epistemological stage to the second deconstructive stage. In Sauf le Nom, Derrida 
repeats this movement but the first stage is now characterized as a classical 
Aufklärung, most particularly a Christian essentialism. This is contrasted by Derrida 
with a second stage of Platonic or Christian apophasis, most particularly the work of 
Angelus Silesius. The difficulty with this interpretation is that it hinges firstly on an 
identification of Kantianism (representing modern Aufklärung) with Christian 
essentialism (representing classical Aufklärung), and secondly an identification of 
deconstruction with Platonic / Christian apophasis. Both of these identifications are 
problematic. To put it succinctly, on my interpretation modern Aufklärung represents 
the first stage of the dialectic, Derridean deconstruction the second, and both classical 
"essentialism" and "apophasis" (at least of the Platonic / Christian variety) can be 
located at the third stage. 
In other words, the respective identifications of Kantianism with classical Aufklärung 
and deconstruction with classical apophasis appear inadmissible. In the next section, I 
will develop the nature of this problematicity from the perspective of Derrida's three 
essays, Passions, Sauf le Nom and Khora [5]. In the following section I will analyse 
two other relevant Derrida texts, `How to avoid speaking: Denials' and The Gift of 
Death. 
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Section 5.2 - Questioning Derrida's "Crisis" - On the Problem of the "Problem" 
Each of these three essays, Passions, Sauf le Nom and Khora, forms an 
independent work and can be read as such. If it has nonetheless been judged 
advisable to publish them simultaneously, this is because, in spite of the 
singular origin of each of them, the same thematic thread runs through the 
three. They form a sort of Essay on the Nanie - in three chapters or three steps. 
Derrida (OTN, p. xiv /xv) 
Derrida here tells us of a common "thematic thread" linking the three essays, 
Passions, Sauf le Nom and Khora. This commonality concerns the question of "the 
name". The essay which is published first in the English translation edition, 
"Passions", puts forward a deconstruction of what is termed a "classically 
metaphysical" (OTN, p. 10) attitude towards the name. This attitude for Derrida is 
represented by the system of Kantianism, most particularly its moral system e. g. the 
Kantian concepts of duty and responsibility - 
There would be a concept and a problem (of this or that, of duty, for example, 
it matters little for the moment), that is to say, something determinable by a 
knowing ("what matters is knowing whether") and that lies before you, there 
before you (problema)..... like an object pro-posed or posed in 
advance.... therefore quite as much a subject proposed (p. 10, OTN). 
While `Passions' outlines a deconstruction of this Kantian subject-object 
epistemology, Derrida is keen to emphasise a positive aspect of the relation between 
Kant and deconstruction - 
we cite once more the Groundwork for a Metaphysics of Morals of Kant, our 
exemplary "critical reader", indebted as we are, as his heirs, to the great 
philosopher of critique (p. 8, OTN). 
The propositions of "Passions" are thus adumbrated "against Kant" (p. 7, OTN), but 
this "against" is ambiguous. With reference to Derrida's description of contemporary 
philosophy as being "indebted" (OTN, p. 8) to Kant, "as his heirs" (OTN, p. 8) the 
suggestion would appear to be that deconstruction represents a development of 
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Kantianism rather than a simple refutation of it, a kind of neo-Kantianism (obviously 
in the general sense rather than with regard to the specific school of neo-Kantianism). 
This claim is consistent with the earlier discussion of Derrida's relation to Husserl, 
and of Husserl's own Cartesian / Kantian heritage. Indeed a little further on in the text 
Derrida makes an implicit reference to Descartes when he states that the so-called 
classically metaphysical system of naming / responsibility involves the positing of the 
same "I think" as accompanying all one's representations, a clear invocation of 
Descartes' Cogito ergo sum. 
For Derrida, the philosophical difficulty or problem stems from this very positing of a 
self-identical "I" or a determinable knowing by Descartes or Kant (and here Derrida 
seems to see the great difference between Descartes and Kant as being insignificant in 
relation to their more fundamental agreement) - 
responsibility would be problematic to the further extent that it could 
sometimes, perhaps even always, be what one takes, not for oneself in one's 
own name and before the other (the most classically metaphysical definition of 
responsibility) but what one must take for another, in his place, in the name of 
the other or of oneself as other, before another other, and an other of the other, 
namely the very undeniable of ethics (p. 10, OTN). 
This very "otherness" becomes irreconcilable with the classically metaphysical 
definitions of responsibility and duty outlined by Kant (and themselves developed 
from the "I think" of Descartes). "Passions" proposes a different way of thinking 
about responsibility and about the "I" - 
At a certain place in the system, one of the elements of the system (an `I', 
surely even if the I is not always and "with all candor" (sans facon) "me") no 
longer knows what it should do. More precisely, it knows that it must do 
contradictory and incompatible things (p. 6, OTN). 
The "I" no longer knows what it should do. In other words, the epistemological 
project of Descartes and Kant has given way to a deconstruction of the knowing I and 
150 
what remains is for this "I" to do "contradictory and incompatible things". This is 
perhaps the passage where one can make greatest sense of Derrida's earlier 
declaration that we are all "heirs" (p. 8, OTN) of Kant. For in speaking of 
"contradiction" and "incompatibility", one is still speaking an epistemological 
language, however negative. This conception of deconstruction as a kind of neo- 
modernism (rather than a post-modernism) is given credence by Derrida's concluding 
remarks in "Passions" concerning an emphasis on "democracy" (OTN, p. 29) and the 
"hyper-responsibility of a subject" (OTN, p. 29). Here modernity is intensified rather 
than debunked. Derrida also introduces an enigmatic concept of the "secret" (OTN, 
p. 25) which he significantly distinguishes from Platonism, neo-Platonism and 
Christian Platonism - 
There is something secret (il ya du secret): neither a learned ignorance (in a 
Christian brotherhood practising a kind of negative theology), nor the content 
of an esoteric doctrine (for example, in a Pythagorean, Platonic, or neo- 
Platonic community). In any case, it cannot be reduced to these because it 
makes them possible (OTN, p. 25). 
This is a crucial passage for bridging the gap between the first essay in the English 
edition of On the Name, "Passions", and the later two essays, "Sauf le Nom" and 
"Khora", as the latter deal explicitly with the issues of Platonism and Christian 
Platonism. It would seem that when Derrida earlier referred to the Cartesian / Kantian 
concept of responsibility as "classically metaphysical", he was implicitly positing a 
continuity in the philosophical tradition extending back to Plato, through neo- 
Platonism and Christian Platonism, and up to Descartes and Kant. According to 
"Passions", this is the continuity of the epistemological subject-object relation, of the 
knowing `I' representing to itself a set of moral `problems'. And it is in response to 
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this epistemological monolithism that the now deconstructed `I' must do 
"contradictory and incompatible things" (p. 6, OTN). 
In "Sauf le Nom", Derrida seems to change perspective somewhat. Deconstruction 
now no longer appears at the end of a rather monolithic heritage but is related to 
specifically subversive movements within this heritage, most notably the movement of 
negative theology - 
the one onto-theology, the one phenomenology, the one Christian revelation, 
the one history itself, the one history of being, the one epoch, the one tradition, 
self-identity in general....... that finds itself contested at its root...... negative 
theology is one of the most remarkable manifestations of this self-difference 
(p. 71, OTN). 
"Sauf le Nom" is therefore suggesting that deconstruction is not a critique of 
metaphysics per se to the extent that there is no metaphysics per se. Metaphysics is 
rather always subject to its own "self-difference" as manifested by, for example, 
negative theology. Nonetheless, this self-difference or self-deconstruction is not 
always apparent and the more reactive epistemological structure outlined in 
"Passions" seems to be shared in common by Platonism, Cartesianism and 
Kantianism. It is this more repressive aspect of metaphysics which seems to be the 
raison d'etre of deconstruction. Derrida's work would appear to be an attempt to 
continuously remind reactive metaphysics that it must cut loose and begin to "self- 
differ" (this of course is the crucial import of Derrida's famous term "differance"). 
One can therefore read the transition from "Passions" to "Sauf le Nom" as precisely a 
representation of this requirement - one must deconstruct epistemological essentialism 
and supplement it with a kind of thinking akin to negative theology in its emphasis on 
"contradiction" and "incompatibility". On this interpretation, one thus has a clear 
Derridean perspective on the history of philosophy. Deconstruction is nothing "new" 
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or "original", but rather a re-emphasising of subversive aspects of the metaphysical 
tradition. 
The difficulty with this Derridean interpretation is not so much, as is often claimed, 
that it simply posits metaphysics as monolithic. For it is clear that Derrida's emphasis 
on negative theology is precisely a rejection of such monolithism. The difficulty (on 
my interpretation) is rather that the specific continuity which Derrida does ascribe to 
metaphysics overgeneralises the epistemological paradigm. Not only Descartes and 
Kant, but Platonism, neo-Platonism and Christian Platonism are all interpreted as 
inherently epistemological. For example, in "Sauf le Nom", Derrida describes the 
work of Angelus Silesius as a "fracture" (OTN, p. 66) of the "Augustinian" and 
"Cartesian" cogitos (OTN, p. 66), failing to take note of a crucial distinction between 
an Augustinian emphasis on faith and a Cartesian emphasis on knowledge (cf. 
especially Ch. 7 below). In a fascinating earlier section, Derrida does however make 
reference to a certain agnosticism in Augustine's Confessions - 
Confession does not consist in making known - and thereby it teaches that 
teaching as the transmission of positive knowledge is not essential. The 
avowal does not belong in esence to the order of cognitive determination; it is 
quasi-apophatic in this regard. It has nothing to do with knowledge - with 
knowledge as such (p. 39, OTN). 
This apophasis however, Derrida suggests, should be distinguished from Augustinian 
"charity, fraternity........ revelation, memory and time...... we won't elaborate on that 
here" (OTN, p. 40). The implication, as with metaphysics in general, is of there being 
a reactive Augustine and a "self-differing" Augustine, Augustine the positive 
ontologist and theologian and Augustine the negative theologian (the second strand 
linking him with Silesius and Derrida). "Sauf le Nom" is in effect a eulogy to a most 
extreme variant of negative theology - 
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Perhaps this precisely, that this theology would be nothing...... the discursive 
possibilities of the via negativa are doubtless exhausted, that is what remains 
for us to think. Besides, they will be very quickly exhausted; they will always 
consist in an intimate and immediate exhaustion (exhaustion) of themselves, 
as if they could not have any history ........ briefly, a critique of ontology, of 
theology, and of language (p. 49/50/55, OTN). 
My difficulty with Derrida's preference for apophasis and the via negativa is that it 
stems from a very selective interpretation of "positivity". Returning again to the 
relation between "Passions" and "Sauf le Nom", it is fair to say that they more or less 
correspond to the first and second stages of the Platonic dialectic outlined in the 
analysis of the Meno in Chapter 3. In "Passions", one has Derrida's elaboration of the 
system of Cartesian / Kantian positive morality and philosophy which is analogous to 
the epistemologism of Gorgias as advocated by Meno at the beginning of the dialogue. 
By the end of "Passions", one has a complete breakdown of this system and a 
description of an unstable `I' who must do "contradictory" and "incompatible" things. 
This is already close to the impasse of Meno's paradox which results from Socrates' 
deconstruction of sophism. In "Sauf le Nom", this thinking of paradox is taken to the 
extreme limits of negative theology, to use Derrida's actual term, to "exhaustion". 
What is striking is that there is no analogue to Socrates / Plato's third stage of positive 
faith (pistis) in truth. If included at all (as in the case of Derrida's reference to 
Augustine's concepts of charity, memory etc. ) it is identified with the first reactive 
stage of epistemologism. 
In other words, the positive possibilities for philosophy are defined exclusively in 
epistemological terms. One's choice seems to be between knowledge and apophasis 
and as (according to Derrida) the "I" finally ends up knowing nothing, one is left with 
the inevitability of being as apophatic or negative as one possibly can be - 
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We are in absolute exemplarity as in the aridity of the desert, for the essential 
tendency is to formalize rarefaction. Impoverishment is de rigueur (p. 49, 
OTN). 
This theme of `impoverishment' is developed further in the final essay of the 
Derridean trilogy, "Khora". This latter Platonic motif is introduced in the Timaeus as 
an extremely enigmatic "third term" which resists the categories of binary logic. 
Again, Derrida is keen to locate two primary moments of the Platonic text, that of the 
apophatic k: hora and secondly the more reactive metaphysical movement which 
directs the Tiniaeus in more general terms. Derrida describes this second movement 
as "the cosmo-ontologic encyclopedia of the Timaeus" and interprets this system as 
being transgressed by khora - 
If the cosmo-ontologic encyclopedia of the Timaeus presents itself as a 
"probable myth", a tale ordered by the hierarchized opposition of the sensible 
and the intelligible, of the image in the course of becoming and of eternal 
being, how can one inscribe therein or situate the discourse on khora?..... It 
exceeds or precedes, in an order that is moreover, alogical and achronic, 
anachronistic too, the constitutive opposition of mytho-logic as such, of 
mythic discourse and of the discourse on myth (p. 113, Kh). 
Plato's "khora" is therefore another sign, according to Derrida, of the "self-difference" 
of philosophy, a movement within philosophy which resists the "cosmo-ontologic 
encyclopedia" of reactive metaphysics. The Thnaeus is, as it were, a microcosmic 
example of this generalized problem at work - 
The ontologico-encyclopedic conclusion of the Tiniaeus seems to cover over 
the open chasm in the middle of the book (p. 104, OTN). 
One has already seen Derrida describe this movement in both "Passions" and "Sauf le 
Nom". In the first case, a "classically metaphysical" concept of responsibility 
(exemplified by Kantianism) was resisted by an irreducible "otherness". In "Sauf le 
Nom", this movement of otherness was linked to specific aspects of negative 
theology, most notably the work of Angelus Silesius. Crucially, here Augustine was 
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noted as being both a thinker of ontologico-encyclopedic metaphysics (e. g. via his 
concepts of eternity and memory) and a thinker of apophasis (through his emphasis on 
nonepistemological confession). Derrida also generalised this point to the history of 
philosophy, positing a project of self-identity which existed side by side with specific 
moments of "self-differing". 
It is this interpretation of the history of philosophy which also guides Derrida's 
reading of "khora" in the eponymous essay. In the Timaeus, the "khora" is that which 
"exceeds" and "precedes" the ontologico-encyclopedic logic. But the "dominant 
effect" (OTN, p. 120) of "Platonism" has been to "cover up" and "dissimulate" (OTN, 
p. 119) this "khora" with a "thetic abstraction" (OTN, p. 120). Drawing on Hegel's 
interpretation of Plato, Derrida states that this dominant reading of Plato as a thinker 
of thesis and ontology is not some extrinsic imposition onto his work from outside - 
this logico-philosophical evaluation is not applied to Plato. It derives already 
from a certain "Platonism"........ A certain programme of this evaluation seems 
already legible in this work (the Ti, naeus) [OTN, p. 102/3]. 
And this "programme" of logico-philosophical evaluation is not specific to the 
Ti, naeus. Derrida generalises this evaluation to "Platonism" and in a further move to 
"philosophy" - 
The forces that are thus inhibited continue to maintain a certain disorder, some 
potential incoherence, and some heterogeneity in the organization of the 
theses..... "Platonism" is not only an example of this movement, the first "in" 
the whole history of philosophy. It commands it, it commands this whole 
history. A philosophy as such would henceforth always be "Platonic". Hence 
the necessity to continue to try to think what takes place in Plato, with Plato, 
what is shown there, what is hidden, so as to win there or to lose there (OTN, 
p. 121). 
While this may be Derrida at his most polemical, it is nonetheless revealing as regards 
the perspective of deconstruction -"a philosophy as such would henceforth always be 
"Platonic". Here Derrida is reiterating the continuity of metaphysics we saw 
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described in "Passions" and "Sauf le Nom". Philosophy, according to Derrida, can 
only posit its theses by "covering up" the "heterogeneity" of inhibited "forces". This 
structure of philosophy is inaugurated by Plato ("the first") and maintained in the 
"whole history" (i. e. through Descartes, Kant etc. ). Having said this, there is already 
in Plato an emphasis on apophasis and negativity which will be repeated in the 
tradition of negative theology. Already at the beginning of philosophy, therefore, 
there is a manifestation of the "self-difference" or otherness of philosophy - 
But what is said about khora is that this name does not designate any of the 
known or recognised or, if you like, received types of existent (OTN, 
p. 96)..... Simply this excess is nothing, nothing that may be and said 
ontologically. This absence of support, which cannot be translated into absent 
support or into absence as support, provokes and resists any binary or 
dialectical determination, any inspection of a philosophical type, or let us say, 
more rigorously, of an ontological type (OTN, p. 99). 
This final reference to an exemplary "philosophical" or "ontological" type is followed 
by a reference to the Hegelian dialectic. One is thinking concerning this philosophy 
and ontology, according to Derrida, "after Hegel and according to him" (OTN, p. 100), 
which is also "after Plato, with Plato" (OTN, p. 100). But returning to the ancient- 
modern problematic it seems clear that one is at least not entitled to treat as identical 
the Platonic and Hegelian dialectics. In "Khora", for example, Derrida describes 
philosophy as the - 
subordination of myth, as a discursive form, to the content of the signified 
concept, to the meaning, which, in its essence, can only be philosophical 
(OTN, p. 102). 
Once again, Derrida is here understanding philosophy in exclusively epistemological 
terms. Everything becomes subordinate to the "content of the signified concept". But 
as we described in Chapter 3, the Platonic dialectic is rather based in "faith" (pistis). 
This faith-dialectic is introduced as a projected antidote to the very impasse resulting 
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from a lack of knowledge in Meno's paradox ("how can I recognise that which I do 
not know"). On my interpretation, Plato's emphasis on faith is a direct critique not 
simply of lack of knowledge, but of the value of knowledge itself, as it breeds over- 
confident (tharraleon) assertion. This also accounts for Socrates' dismissal of the 
idea that philosophers have any "expertise" to inculcate. 
Applying this interpretation to Derrida's reading, one can say that Platonic dialectic is 
far closer to the "khora" than is Hegelian dialectic. Derrida's explicit introduction of 
a type of battle scenario ("to win there or to lose there") is misleading in the measure 
to which the prospective opponents are wrongly described. If it is a case of 
philosophy vs. the "khora", one must at least explicate the fundamentally different 
models which one can call "philosophical". Derrida describes an exclusively 
epistemological (Cartesian / Hegelian) model. To conclude this section, I will outline 
a philosophy based on Platonic dialectic and evaluate the possible responses which 
such a philosophy might make to the claims of a deconstructive "khora". 
Derrida prefaces the "khora" essay with a quotation from Jean-Pierre Vernant which is 
relevant to our problem. Vernant (like Derrida) is interested in a "structural model" 
which can be contrasted with "the logic of the logos" - 
the structural model of a logic which would not be that of binarity, of the yes 
or no, a logic other than the logic of the logos (quoted, KH. p. 88). 
The difficulty with Vernant's interpretation stems from his making "logic" and 
"logos" interdependent. It is far from evident that "logos" means either "yes or no" 
in a binary logical sense. Heraclitus' use for example of the term logos testifies to this 
difficulty. For Heraclitus, logos represents precisely a coincidence of opposites and 
Vernant fails to take account of this alternative view of logos which is historically 
proximate to Platonic philosophy. In Chapter 2,1 considered Heraclitus' influence on 
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Plato. Here one does not need to ascribe an exact Heraclitean view of logos to Plato. 
It is rather a case of exemplifying the problematicity of making logos and `logic' 
interdependent. It is this identification which guides Derrida's interpretation. To this 
extent, the "khora" is seen as exceeding logos / logic, as being irreducible to the 
categories of philosophy. 
However, if one re-evaluates the Platonic concept of "logos" (beyond this direct 
association with logic) then the irreducibility of the "khora" becomes qualified. From 
this perspective (which is effectively an epistemological perspective) the "khora" is 
irreducible. But if one interprets "logos" in Plato's historical context as a 
development of Heraclitean / Parmenidean ideas, the "khora" is no longer as 
subversive as it may at first appear. In other words, if one returns for example to the 
Meno, the Platonic dialectic there articulated is itself precisely a subversion of logic. 
Its second stage involves a complete deconstruction of sophistic logic, of in effect 
"yes or no" binary thinking. This second stage resembles very closely the thematics 
which surround the concept of the "khora" in the Timaeus. Meno's paradox (like the 
"khora") involves an apparent paralysis of all philosophy. 
There is of course a third stage in the Meno but this does not involve a return to some 
prior epistemologism. It is rather belief or faith (pistis) which is introduced as the 
movement beyond "khora", or perplexity. One can argue that this third stage is 
unsuccessful, that it fails to overcome perplexity and the paralysis of philosophy. But 
one must at least distinguish (as Vernant / Derrida do not) this third stage of a 
specifically Platonic logos from a binary logic of "the yes or no". In failing to make 
this clear distinction Derrida seems to opt too early for an excess over "logos", a stress 
on "impoverishment", "exhaustion", "apophasis" etc. If philosophy is defined 
159 
exclusively in logical / epistemological terms then the Platonic concept of "khora" as 
anepistemological undoubtedly leads back to the deconstruction ad infinitum which 
Derrida describes. But defined otherwise, via the Presocratic heritage, as a love of 
wisdom (philo - sophia), as primarily striving (orexis), philosophy already involves 
this self-deconstruction. By the same token, this philosophy also involves a 
simultaneous positive affirmation, a movement beyond apophasis and exhaustion. 
It is at this point that one can perhaps locate a limit-point of Derrida's thinking. It is 
this limit which Platonism allows one to, as it were, transgress. In the next section, I 
will analyse how deconstruction attempts to resist this Platonic movement in two 
revealing texts on apophasis and dialectic, "How to Avoid Speaking: Denials" [6] 
and The Gift of Death [7]. 
Section 5.3 - On "Denials" and The Gift of Death 
It is perhaps The Gift of Death which best exemplifies Derrida's thinking on the 
philosophical issues surrounding dialectic, Platonism and Christianity. Originally 
published as "Donner la mort" in 1992, this essay shows a strong continuity with 
Derrida's earlier work but the relationship between deconstruction and Platonism is 
now more explicity clarified. The Gift of Death, in its stated intention, is an analysis 
of the work of the Czech philosopher Jan Patocka. In his Heretical Essays on the 
Philosophy of History Patocka seeks to reaffirm a particular concept of "religion" 
("Religion presumes access to the responsibility of a free self"; GD. p. 2) which he 
derives from a reading of Christianity as fundamentally opposed to Platonism. But 
while this Derridean text is on one level concerned with a specific analysis of Patocka 
it is also instructive with regard to our own probematic. For Patocka (and Derrida 
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here concurs) the residual influence of Platonism is one of the primary factors in the 
"decline" of Western civilisation as a whole. Patocka takes up this question in his 
essay "La civilisation technique est-elle une civilisation de declin, et pourquoi? " (cf. 
GD, p. 1) and it is this thematic of the problematic nature of Platonism which I will 
address in this section. 
Firstly, it is important to see how the analysis of Platonism in The Gift of Death 
differs from similar analysis in earlier texts such as "Plato's Pharmacy" and "Khora". 
In previous sections I have examined the latter texts (as well as several others 
concerning Platonism) which have all been linked in terms of their stress on the dual 
aspect of Platonism, its so-called "doubling" movement - Platonism is both a 
metaphysics par excellence and a completely self-deconstructive philosophy. This 
schema is repeated with great clarity in the text "How to avoid speaking: Denials". 
Here Derrida is interested in distinguishing between what he calls "two movements or 
two tropics of negativity..... in the Platonic text" ("Denials", p. 101). He refers to these 
structures as being "radically heterogeneous" ("Denials", p. 101). In the first case 
Derrida identifies "the idea of the Good" which for Plato "has its place beyond being 
or essence" ("Denials", p. 101). This conception is found primarily in the Republic 
(509b et seq. ) - 
One of them [i. e. one of the movements of negativity] finds both its principle 
and its exemplification in the Republic (509b et seq. ). The idea of the Good 
(idea tou agathou) has its place beyond Being or essence...... whatever may be 
the discontinuity marked by this beyond (epekeina) in relation to Being, in 
relation to the Being of beings or beingness (nevertheless, three distinct 
hypotheses), this singular limit does not give place to simply neutral or 
negative determinations, but to a hyperbolism of that, beyond which the 
Good gives rise to thinking, to knowing, and to Being. Negativity serves the 
hyper movement that produces, attracts or guides it. The Good is not of 
course in the sense that it is not Being or beings, and on this subject every 
ontological grammar must take on a negative form. But this negative form is 
not neutral. It does not oscillate between the ni ceci - ni cela (the neither / 
nor). It first of all obeys a logic of the sur, of the hyper, over and beyond, 
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which heralds all the hyperessentialisms of Christian apophases ("Denials", 
p. 102). 
Derrida's point here is that this first negative moment in Platonism remains 
metaphysical - in denying the predicate of "being" to the Good Plato is not putting 
the Good in supension or doubting its existence in Derridean fashion. Rather "the 
idea of the Good beyond Being" suggests that the Good has an Existence greater than 
empirical being. Plato therefore subverts essentialism with this conception (and in 
this he is a deconstructionist) but only to replace this prior essentialism with what 
Derrida calls a "hyperessentialism" ("Denials", p. 102). At this point, Derrida refers 
specifically to the "hyperessentialisms of Christian apophases" ("Denials", p. 102), 
and the suggestion is that while Christian negative theology (or apophasis) involves 
something of deconstruction it nonetheless supersedes this deconstruction with a 
hyper-positive predication. However, like all philosophical systems for Derrida 
Christianity is a dual structure, and I will analyse below how Derrida also identifies a 
radical deconstructive element in Christianity in the text The Gift of Death. In 
"Denials" Derrida is already identifying this deconstructivism in Plato. The second 
"tropic of negativity" ("Denials", p. 101) which Derrida describes can be found in the 
Timaeus - 
I will distinguish the tropics of negativity, which I have just outlined in such a 
schematic manner, from another manner of treating what is beyond (epekeina) 
the border, the third species, and the place. This place is here called khora; I 
am, of course, alluding to the Timaeus ("Denials", p. 104). 
The "khora" for Derrida represents the most radical aspect of Plato's thought in so far 
as it avoids the hyperessentialism which is present in "the idea of the Good beyond 
Being" and in the so-called "Christian apophases" ("Denials", p. 102). Or rather the 
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"khora" avoids this hyperessentialism in its second moment which Derrida is careful 
to distinguish from a first more metaphysical aspect - 
To be sure, one of these languages [in the Timaeus] multiplies the negations, 
the warnings, the evasions, the detours, the tropes, but with a view to 
reappropriating the thinking of the khora for ontology and for Platonic 
dialectic in its most dominant schemas. If the khora - place, spacing, 
receptacle (hypodokhe) - is neither sensible nor intelligible, it seems to 
participate in the intelligible in an enigmatic way (51a). Since it "receives 
all", it makes possible the formation of the cosmos. As it is neither this nor 
that (neither intelligible nor sensible), one may speak as if it were a joint 
participant in both. Neither / nor easily becomes both..... and, both this and 
that ("Denials", p. 105). 
Derrida sees this first exposition of the "khora" (in the Timaeus) as still a form of 
"hyperessentialism" - the neither / nor of deconstruction becomes the both / and of 
metaphysics. To this extent, this first exposition of the "khora" is, for Derrida, 
analogous to the structure of the "Good beyond being" in the Republic (509b et seq. ). 
In "Denials" Derrida describes how this first metaphysical "khora" has come to 
define the readings of the Timaeus in the history of philosophy, most notably 
inaugurated by Aristotle - 
Aristotle provided the matrix for many of the readings of the Timaeus and, 
since his Physics (bk. 4), one has always interpreted this passage on the khora 
as being at the interior of philosophy, in a consistently anachronistic way, as 
if it prefigured, on the one hand, the philosophies of space as extensio 
(Descartes) or as pure sensible form (Kant); or on the other hand, the 
materialist philosophies of the substratum or of substance which stands, like 
the hypodokhe, beneath the qualities or the phenomena (Derrida's emphasis, 
"Denials", p. 105). 
This is a crucial passage for our understanding of Derrida. As with essays such as 
"Khora" and "Sauf le Nom" Derrida wishes to distinguish between two aspects of the 
history of philosophy. In the next section of "Denials" Derrida will elaborate why he 
thinks Aristotle's interpretation of Plato does not correspond to the "neither / nor" 
moment of the Ti, naeus, the nondialectical moment ("Denials", p. 105 - "something 
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that no dialectic, participatory schema, or analogy would allow one to rearticulate 
together with any philosopheme whatsoever"). But here he is rather concerned with 
the dialectical aspect of the Timaeus, what links it to the similarly dialectical 
hyperessentialism of the "Good beyond Being". Crucially, this interpretation also 
links Platonic dialectic to Cartesianism (the "Cartesian philosophy of space") and 
Kantianism (Kantian "pure sensible form"). This interpretation will be repeated by 
Derrida very clearly in The Gift of Death and one has already seen how Derrida 
generalises a certain interpretation of the history of philosophy from the specificity of 
Cartesianism (cf. Chapter 1, particularly the analysis of the "Cogito" essay). 
The most important point here concerns a very evident dualism in Derrida's own 
work, between "dialectic" on the one hand and a philosophy of deconstruction on the 
other. Simply put, Derrida puts forward a critique of dialectical thought and in its 
place substitutes a philosophy of apophasis (e. g. the apophasis of the second moment 
of the "khora" discussed below). But Derrida's understanding of "dialectic" is 
extremely homogeneous - he tends to identify dialectic along the lines described in the 
passage on Aristotle, as a continuity between Plato, Descartes and Kant. The 
difficulties with this interpretation have already been described as it glosses over the 
fundamental philosophical disagreements in the history of the concept of "dialectic", 
most notably the disagreement encapsulated in the ancient-modern quarrel (cf. 
particularly Chapter 1, Chapters 3 and 4). The Platonic dialectic which is practised in 
the Phaedrus for example (when understood not in its formal aspect but rather as 
practised in the dialogue itself; cf. Chapter 4) is structured in accordance with a 
model of philosophy as Eros or "love of wisdom" rather than as the Cartesian dialectic 
which is grounded in a deductive system. Derrida's claim is that the failure of 
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philosophical dialectic must lead inevitably to a recourse to apophasis, but this claim 
is only valid if dialectic as such is proved to be a failure (to "unravel") and remains 
provisional if one is only considering a particular kind of dialectic. Additionally, 
there is the question of the relation between apophasis and dialectic - Derrida seems 
to link a priori the concepts of dialectic and philosophical clarity such that authentic 
apophasis must remain andialectical. In The Gift of Death for example (GD., p. 66) 
Derrida sees deconstructive "morality" (exemplified in the biblical figure of Abraham) 
as the subversion or "betrayal" (GD., p. 66) of "essence as presence and 
manifestation". 
Again however it would seem that Derrida is working with a historically very specific 
concept of dialectic - in The Gift of Death as we will see below this model is 
unequivocally Cartesian / Kantian. In this section I will again contrast this model with 
that of Platonic dialectic as this contrast relates to Derrida's reading of Platonism / the 
history of philosophy in The Gift of Death. But it is Derrida's interpretation of the 
dual structure of Platonism in "Denials" which provides the groundwork for the later 
analysis to the extent that it sees the two respective "tropics of negativity" as being 
mutually exclusive. Plato is at different moments of his text (here the Thnaeus) both a 
dialectician and a deconstructionist, but it is the latter deconstructionism which must 
be privileged over the former dialectics. For Derrida, the apophatic moment of the 
"khora" is what leads to the "unravelling" ("Plato's Pharmacy") of the first movement 
of dialectic. But the question I will address below is whether Platonism is not rather 
precisely an attempt to dialecticize the relation between "presence" and "apophasis", 
a relation which Derrida is seeking to keep apart. Derrida's grounds for this 
interminable separation or "deferral" (differance) consist in the inability of rationalism 
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to prove such a dialectical relation - here one could cite Derrida's early 
deconstructions of Descartes and Husserl (in the "Cogito" essay, Edmund Husserl's 
"Origin of Geometry": An Introduction and Speech and Phenomena). But what 
makes Platonic dialectic so resistant to Derrida's attempt at a paralysis of its progress 
is exactly the Platonic affirmation of a lack of proof (for example in the Meno where 
Socrates grounds philosophy in "belief' or pistis and makes a crucial distinction 
between positive and negative tharraleos, the latter agnosticism being cited as the 
proper attitude of the metaphysician). Platonic dialectic does not founder on 
apophasis; such negativity is rather the very condition of dialectical thought. One 
might also refer here to Socrates' paradigmatic rejection of rationalism in the 
Phaedrus and his invocation of Eros as being the only proper method of philosophy 
(and dialectic), a rejection which is all the more striking in being a critique of his own 
prior stand in the dialogue. 
In "Denials", however, Derrida is rather concerned with keeping Platonic dialectic 
and apophasis strictly apart. Having outlined the first moment of the "khora" as being 
still too metaphysical, he now describes the second section of the Timaeus as being 
appropriately deconstructive - 
The other language and the other interpretive decision interest me more.. . The 
synchronicity of a reading has no chance here and no doubt would lack exactly 
that to which it claimed to adjust itself. This other gesture would inscribe an 
irreducible spacing interior to (but hence also exterior to, once the interior is 
placed outside) Platonism, that is, interior to ontology, to dialectic, and 
perhaps to philosophy in general. Under the name of khora, the place 
belongs neither to the sensible nor to the intelligible, neither to becoming, nor 
to non-being (the khora is never described as a void), nor to Being.... All the 
aporias, which Plato makes no effort to hide, would signify that there is 
something that is neither a being nor a nothingness; something that no 
dialectic, participatory schema, or analogy would allow one to rearticulate 
together with any philosopheme whatsoever, neither "in" Plato's works nor in 
the history that Platonism inaugurates and dominates. The neither / nor may 
no longer be reconverted into both.... and ("Denials", p. 105 / 106) 
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The second moment of the "khora" in the Timaeus is affirmed by Derrida to the extent 
that it no longer (in contrast with the first instance of "khora") turns apophasis into 
hyperessentialism - in Derrida's words, the neither / nor no longer becomes a both / 
and. It is this instance of "khora" which can be said radically to undermine 
Aristotle's reading of Platonism (Physics Book 4, quoted above) as a harbinger of 
Cartesianism and Kantianism - 
This [i. e. the "khora"] is neither an intelligible extension, in the Cartesian 
sense, a receptive subject, in the Kantian sense of intuitus derivativus, nor a 
pure sensible space, as a form of receptivity. Radically nonhuman and 
atheological, one cannot even say that it gives place or that there is the 
khora.... It does not give place as one would give something, whatever it may 
be; it neither creates nor produces anything, not even an event in so far as it 
takes place. It gives no order and makes no promise. It is radically ahistorical, 
because nothing happens through it and nothing happens to it. Plato insists on 
its necessary indifference; to receive all and allow itself to be marked or 
affected by what is inscribed in it, the khora must remain without form and 
without proper determination. But if it is amorphous [amorphon; Timaeus, 
50d], this signifies neither lack nor privation. Khora is nothing positive or 
negative. It is impassive but it is neither passive nor active ("Denials", p. 107) 
Derrida's reading of a duality in the history of philosophy is thus reinforced. On the 
one side, one has the philosophies of essentialism such as Cartesianism and 
Kantianism, and within this group there is also included the philosophies of 
hyperesse/ztialism (the examples in "Denials" being the Platonic "Good beyond 
Being", the first description of the "khora" and the "Christian apophases"). On the 
other side, one has the nonessentialist thinking of deconstruction which is practised 
not simply by Derrida but often by the essentialist philosophies in their "dual" nature. 
In "Denials" the obvious example is the dual thinking of the "khora" which at separate 
instances of the Timaeus is interpreted by Derrida as being alternately 
hyperessentialist ("both / and"; p. 104; Timaeus 51a-52b) and nonessentialist 
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("neither / nor"; p. 105; Timaeus 50b-d). What marks the second instance of 
"khora" as nonessentialist and deconstructionist is precisely its nondialectical nature - 
it is neither this nor that ("Denials", p. 106). And what marks the first instance of 
"khora" (as well as the "Good beyond Being" and the "Christian apophases") as 
essentialist / hyperessentialist or nondeconstructive is exactly its dialectical aspect - 
the "khora" becomes both this and that. 
Derrida's analysis of the nondialectical "khora" in "Denials" is primarily employed as 
a clarification of the fundamental difference between deconstruction and negative 
theology. While the apophasis of negative theology is often cited as being a precursor 
of Derrida's work, "Denials" points to the radical aspects of the Thnaeus as being a 
more accurate analogy and interprets negative theology as being rather a case of a 
metaphysical hyperessentialism - 
No, what I write is not "negative theology". First of all, in the measure to 
which this belongs to the predicative or judicative space of discourse, to its 
strictly propositional form, and privileges not only the indestructible unity of 
the word but also the authority of the name - such axioms as a 
"deconstruction" must start by reconsidering (which I have tried to do since 
the first part of Of Granunatology). Next, in the measure to which "negative 
theology" seems to reserve, beyond all positive predication, beyond all 
negation, even beyond Being, some hyperessentiality, a being beyond 
Being .... No, I would hesitate to 
inscribe what I put forward under the familiar 
heading of negative theology, precisely because of that ontological wager of 
hyperessentialism that one finds at work both in Dionysius and in Meister 
Eckhart, for example..... ("Denials", p. 77). 
Christian negative theology is therefore interpreted in "Denials" as being a 
hyperessentialist thinking "in service of a dialectic" ("Denials", p. 108) and here it is 
contrasted with the thinking of the "khora" which is "barren, radically nonhuman and 
atheological...... wholly other" ("Denials", p. 108). But the dual structure which 
Derrida has already shown to be present in Platonism is also constitutive of 
Christianity as a philosophical system. In "Denials" one is presented with merely the 
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dialectical aspect of Christianity (or strictly speaking, Christian negative theology), a 
dialectic which Derrida wishes to deconstruct. But Christianity also has a 
nonessentialist aspect and although this is nowhere thematised in "Denials" it 
becomes the central concern of The Gift of Death. While these two texts differ, as the 
former stresses the nondialectical elements of Platonism while the latter stresses the 
nondialectical aspects of Christianity, they fundamentally agree in an emphasis on the 
nondialectical as such. I will return to the significance of this point below after an 
analysis of some more particular points with regard to the structure of The Gift of 
Death. 
At the beginning of this section, I outlined how this text was ostensibly an analysis of 
the work of Jan Patocka, the Czech philosopher. Patocka's philosophy is very close 
to Derrida's in being a concern with the open-endedness of history. Derrida quotes 
directly from Patocka's Essais heretiques sur la philosophie de l'histoire - 
Such is the conclusion that the whole essay moves towards: Modern 
civilisation does not just suffer from its own faults, its own myopia, but also 
from failing to resolve the whole problem of history. But the problem of 
history cannot be resolved; it must remain a problem. The danger of the 
present time is that an excess of knowledge of detail might lead us to forget 
how to look at the question and the grounds that give rise to it. 
It might also be that the question of the decline of civilisation has been badly 
put. Civilisation does not of itself exist. The question would be rather a 
matter of knowing if historical man can yet acknowledge history (priznavat se 
k dejinam) [ Patocka, p. 127; GD., p. 4] 
In asking whether "historical man can yet acknowledge history" Patocka is making a 
similar point to Derrida's in "Denials" when he distinguished between a dual structure 
of philosophy. The first philosophical typology there described, that of essentialist / 
hyperessentialist dialectic, would fail to "acknowledge history" in Patocka's sense to 
the extent that such dialectics posit a resolution to the problem of history. For Patocka 
however, as for Derrida, "the problem of history cannot be resolved". In 
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consequence, both thinkers privilege the nondialectical over the dialectical and in The 
Gift of Death their respective privilegings become concentrated in the apophatic 
elements of Christianity. Again a quotation from Patocka is instructive - 
Because of its foundation (zaklad) within the abyssal profundity of the soul, 
Christianity represents to this day the most powerful means - never yet 
superseded but not yet thought right through either - by which man is able to 
struggle against his own decline (Patocka, p. 117; GD, p. 28) 
In particular, the phrase "the abyssal profundity of the soul" is significant here. 
Christianity is emblematic for Patocka precisely because it (on his interpretation) does 
not seek to resolve the so-called problem of history. This is what links his analysis to 
the perspective of deconstruction. Leading into his analysis of Patocka, Derrida also 
refers to the "abyss (l'abhne)" [p. 4] of history. Crucially he also uses this concept to 
follow Patocka in a distinction between Platonism and Christianity - 
For at the heart of this history there is something of an abyss (il ya de 
l'abIme), an abyss that resists totalising summary. Separating orgiastic 
mystery from Christian mystery, this abyss also announces the origin of 
responsibility [GD, p. 4]. 
It is "Christian mystery" and not the "orgiastic mystery" of Platonism which respects 
the open-endedness of history, "an abyss that resists totalising summary". As with 
"Denials", Derrida is opposing a dialectical thinking to a nondialectical ("abyssal"; 
GD, p. 28) thought. But whereas, in "Denials", it was Platonism (in the case of the 
"khora" at least) which was interpreted as being an abyssal thinking while Christian 
apophasis was interpreted as dialectical, here in The Gift of Death the roles are 
completely reversed. The "orgasm" ("orgiastic mystery") of Platonism symbolises its 
dialectical nature - there is a fulfilment, a resolution to history. Derrida (following 
Patocka) is pointing to the fundamental difference between Platonism and Christianity 
with regard to their respective relationships to the "abyss" of history. Platonism, here 
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seen for Derrida in the dialectical aspect of its duality, is a "rationalism" (p. 24, GD. ) 
and Patocka denounces its residual influence on a Christianity which in its true 
essence is rather "abyssal". Patocka presents Platonism as a dialectical philosophy 
attempting to resolve the "problem" of history into what Derrida terms a "metaphysics 
of knowledge" (GD, p. 24). Christianity in contrast remains nondialectical in its 
recognition of a "beyond" of knowledge - 
In the final analysis the soul [in the Christian mystery] is not a relation to an 
object, however elevated (such as the Platonic Good) [which implies therefore 
"such as in Platonism where the soul is the relation to a transcendent Good 
that also governs the ideal order of the Greek polis or the Roman civitas"], 
but to a person who fixes it in his gaze while at the same time remaining 
beyond the reach of the gaze of that soul (Essais, p. 116; GD, p. 25) 
Patocka's analysis is analogous to Derrida's critique (in "Denials") of a 
hyperessentialism in the Platonic concept of a "Good beyond Being" (Republic, 509 
et seq. ). The Platonic Good, for both Patocka and Derrida, remains an 
"object..... however elevated". In contrast "Christian mystery" offers no such 
fulfilment; it is rather a recognition of the abyss which prevents philosophy from 
resolving the problem of history. The apparent inconsistency which exists in 
Derrida's respective analyses of Platonism and Christianity in "Denials" and The Gift 
of Death is not in itself surprising. In "Denials", Derrida had already stressed the 
dual nature of philosophy; each philosophy has its dialectical and nondialectical 
elements and the "inconsistency" between the two texts is therefore simply a question 
of emphasis - at different points, the respective elements of both Platonism and 
Christianity are being emphasised. 
However, there is nonetheless a possible problem for Derrida in this context. While 
his hypothesis of a dualism gives credence to his differing emphases, nonetheless his 
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actual interpretation of what constitutes dialectic can be questioned. In both "Denials" 
and The Gift of Death, Derrida interprets Platonic and Christian dialectic on the 
model of essentialism / hyperessentialism which he links in both cases to the 
essentialism of Descartes and Kant. It is this essentialism which he contrasts with the 
apophasis of deconstruction (which is also manifested in certain moments of the 
Platonic / Christian texts). But if one can redefine Platonic / Christian dialectic contra 
Derrida, one must re-evaluate the relationship between dialectic and apophasis and 
perhaps the implicit justification which guides Derrida's privileging of nondialectical 
thought. I will return to this point below after an examination of Derrida's discussion 
of apophasis in The Gift of Death. 
In The Gift of Death, Derrida employs the biblical story of Abraham and Isaac to 
exemplify the nature of authentic apophasis. Following Patocka, Derrida contrasts 
this apophasis with the philosophy of essentialism / hyperessentialism which is 
described as being central to Platonism (e. g. GD, pp. 24 / 25). For Patocka the 
essentialism of Platonism is intrinsically linked to the "decline" of Western 
civilisation ("une civilisation de declin"; quoted GD, p. 1). Derrida himself seems to 
see such essentialism as an avoidance of what he terms "responsibility" - 
To "subordinate responsibility to the objectivity of knowledge" is obviously, 
in Patocka's view, to discount responsibility. And how can we not subscribe 
to this implication? (GD, p. 24) 
Platonism, for both Patocka and Derrida, in so far as it emphasises the "objectivity of 
knowledge" is not faithful to the true task of moral responsibility. This is where the 
story of Abraham and Isaac becomes paradigmatic in its moral and philosophical 
significance. God demands of Abraham ("without revealing his reasons"; GD, p. 58) 
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the most extreme of gestures - to offer his son Isaac as a sacrifice. This story 
exemplifies the one-sidedness of the God-mortal relation as emphasised by both 
Derrida and Patocka. Abraham is incapable of "knowledge" concerning the nature of 
God as an "object". Against Platonism which interprets the "Good beyond Being" as 
an object, the concept of Good for both Derrida / Patocka remains "absolutely other"; 
On what condition is responsibility possible? On the condition that the Good 
no longer be a transcendental objective, a relation between objective things, 
but the relation to the other, a response to the other; an experience of personal 
goodness and a movement of intention. That supposes, as we have seen, a 
double rupture: both with orgiastic mystery and with Platonism. On what 
condition does goodness exist beyond all calculation? On the condition that 
goodness forget itself, that the movement be a movement of the gift that 
renounces itself, hence a movement of infinite love (GD, p. 51). 
There is a clear contrast in this passage between "the Good as a transcendental 
objective" which is supposedly representative of Platonism and "a movement of 
infinite love" which is said to be characteristic of Christianity. The former constitutes 
the nature of dialectic while the latter is representative of nondialectical thinking. A 
little later in The Gift of Death, Derrida clarifies the concept of God which must 
underlie his emphasis on "infinite love" - 
God is himself absent, hidden and silent, separate, secret, at the moment he 
has to be obeyed. God doesn't give his reasons, he acts as he intends, he 
doesn't have to give his reasons or share anything with us: neither his 
motivations, if he has any, nor his deliberations, nor his decisions. 
Otherwise he wouldn't be God, we wouldn't be dealing with the Other as God 
or with God as wholly other (tout autre) [GD, p. 57] 
This "wholly other" God is therefore the ground of Derrida's emphasis on an infinite 
responsibility as exemplified in the Abraham story. If one is to be responsible to this 
God, one must renounce any attempts at a dialectical understanding of divinity. It is 
this complete "otherness" which Patocka / Derrida interpret as being central to the 
essence of Christianity and which in The Gift of Death is contrasted with the 
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objectivism of Platonism. In an analysis of Baudelaire's text "The Pagan School" 
(GD., pp. 110 / 111), Derrida quotes Baudelaire's affirmation of Augustine in just 
this context, concerning a refutation of objectivism - 
I admit all the remorse of St. Augustine for the too great pleasure of the eyes. 
The danger is so great that I excuse the suppression of the object (GD, p. 111; 
"Pagan School" pp. 74-77). 
This is then the fundamental characteristic of Christianity for Derrida. Whereas 
Platonism opts for a dialectic of the "object", Christianity (here in the case of 
Augustine) would completely "suppress" the object i. e. respect the "otherness" of 
God / the Good. But if this is the case, if Christianity and Platonism are so opposed, 
how is one to make sense of for example Augustine's traditional categorization as a 
"Christian Platonist"? In the argument I will develop in succeeding chapters, 
Platonism and Christianity are presented as completely "compatible" philosophical 
systems. I will outline this in more detail in Chapters 6 and 7, but in concluding this 
chapter it will suffice to take an aspect of the Augustinian example. If Derrida's 
Baudelaire reference can be shown to be a misinterpretation of Augustine, then one 
may reconsider the question of "otherness" and dialectic as it relates to Platonism and 
Christianity. 
On one level, the Derrida / Baudelaire interpretation of Augustine seems well- 
founded. Bourke for example refers to the irreducible movement of apophasis or 
incompletion in Augustine's thinking concerning God - 
The answer to which Augustine comes....... is never an exhaustive description 
of God's essential nature. Like the One of Plotinus and the divinity of many 
medieval mystics, the God of Augustinian thought transcends all efforts at 
complete description (Bourke, p. 140) [8] 
To this point one can say that Augustine's Christianity is consistent with Derrida's 
emphasis on nondialectical thought, through for example the case of Abraham. But a 
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difficulty is encountered when one considers the event of the Incarnation and how this 
is developed into a Christology in Augustine's thought (we will also see this 
Christology in De Cusa's thinking). In a crucial passage of The Gift of Death Derrida 
distinguishes between Christian dogmas (such as the reality of the Incarnation) and a 
"nondogmatic doublet of dogma" (GD., p. 49) which he sees as being characteristic of 
his own work and that of Patocka's - 
If it [i. e. Patocka's philosophy] does involve Christianity, it is at the same 
time a heretical and hyperbolic form thereof. Patocka speaks and thinks in the 
places where Christianity has not yet thought or spoken of what it should have 
been and is not yet. The Christian themes can be seen to revolve around the 
gift as gift of death, the fathomless gift of a type of death: infinite love (the 
Good as goodness that infinitely forgets itself), sin and salvation, repentance 
and sacrifice. What engenders all these meanings and links them, internally 
and necessarily, is a logic that at bottom (that is why it can still, up to a 
certain point, be called a "logic") has no need of the event of a revelation or 
the revelation of an event. It needs to think the possibility of such an event but 
not the event itself. This is a major point of difference, permitting such a 
discourse to be developed without reference to religion as institutional dogma, 
and proposing a genealogy of thinking concerning the possibility and essence 
of the religious that doesn't amount to an article of faith [GD., p. 49]. 
Patocka's and Derrida's Christianity, as nondialectical and "heretical" (GD., p. 49), 
"has no need of the event of a revelation or the revelation of an event". Derrida 
chooses the Abraham example precisely because of its nonmanifestation; indeed he 
describes the "moral" (GD., p. 66) of the Abraham story as being a "betrayal of 
everything that manifests itself in general" (GD., p. 66). But this interpretation of 
Christianity founders if applied to Augustine whose thought (although including 
apophatic elements) nonetheless involves a continuous emphasis on the revelation of 
God. I will examine Augustine's thinking in more detail in Chapter 7 but here one 
can refer primarily to his concept of Creation as a "visible God" ("the heaven and 
earth, they tell me to love thee") or to his Christology which, by definition, requires 
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an acknowledgement of the very "event" Derrida says Christianity can do without, 
both of these cases involving an emphasis on manifestation which is opposed to 
Derrida's sense of the "wholly other". 
This issue also refers back to the question of the relation between Platonism and 
Christianity. In Chapter 41 described how the Phaedrus is very much concerned with 
the question of the 'naiiifestation of the Forms (particularly the Form of Beauty) in the 
world. Nonetheless, it is inaccurate to refer, as Derrida does, to this Platonic 
philosophy of manifestation as a philosophy of the "object". In The Gift of Death, 
Derrida (following Patocka) interprets Platonism as a "rationalism" and sees the 
Platonic concept of the Good as thus a rational "object". But this is misrepresentative 
of Plato's thinking in so far as we have already seen in Chapters 2 and 3 that the Meno 
and the Phaedrus (as two dialogical examples) are clear rejections of rationalism. In 
the Meno, rationalism in the guise of Meno's initial invocation of Gorgias is 
completely deconstructed by Socrates / Plato leading to perplexity (aporia) and 
philosophical benumbment (narkosa). In the Phaedrus Plato actually thematises the 
need to make a philosophical conversion from rationalism in presenting Socrates as 
himself recanting his original defence of reason. 
In the succeeding chapters I will outline how this critique of rationalism is continued 
by "Platonism" as a movement, most notably in the examples of Boethius and 
Plotinus. Boethius' text The Consolation of Philosophy outlines how the divine figure 
of "Philosophy" manifests herself to Boethius as he finds himself without knowledge 
or direction. Crucially this manifestation cannot be properly accessed by "reason" but 
requires the further faculty of "intellectual vision" which is again an undermining of 
the hegemony of reason. Plotinus also, in his Enneads, disallows access to the 
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divine One through the employment of reason alone. What gives one access to this 
divinity is rather the nonrational state of "rapture" or "enthusiasm", concepts which 
can be seen as being directly inherited from Plato's Phaedrus. In The Gift of Death 
however Derrida makes no reference to this Platonic "nonrationalism", rather 
continuously interpreting Platonism as a "philosophy of the [rational] object". 
As with our discussion of the "Cogito" essay in Chapter 1, this Derridean emphasis 
on a Platonic rationalism seems to derive from a failure to recognise the import of the 
ancient-modern quarrel. The Gift of Death presents the philosophical quarrel as being 
between a rational dialectic and a nondialectical apophasis. For Patocka, the primary 
example of the former rationalism is Platonism, but Derrida also links this 
rationalism to Descartes, Kant and Hegel. With regard to Descartes, he speaks of the 
"chez soi as ego cogito" (GD, p. 92) and outlines the requirement to go beyond the 
rationalism of "who am I? " (GD., p. 92) to the deconstructive problem of "who is 
this `I' that can say `who'? " (GD., p. 92). The general implication is that Platonism in 
its "rationalism" is analogous to the Cartesian philosophy. 
Derrida also makes continuous reference to Kant in The Gift of Death, perhaps most 
notably in the following passage where he is addressing those philosophers or 
commentators who would label his deconstructive apophasis as having failed in its 
"ethical duty" - 
Philosophers who don't write ethics are failing in their duty, one often hears, 
and the first duty of the philosopher is to think about ethics, to add a chapter 
on ethics to each of his or her books and, in order to do that, to come back to 
Kant as often as possible (GD, p. 67). 
Derrida therefore sets up this philosophical problematic around the confrontation 
between deconstructive "otherness" (or nondialectical thinking) and the rationalised 
177 
responsibility of Kant's thinking. The implicit assumption (as with the earlier 
reference to Descartes) is that Platonism remains on the side of modern rationalism 
while Christianity is rather a case of deconstructive "otherness", a nondialectical 
relation to God. Finally with regard to Hegel, Derrida quotes Patocka's critique of 
"the Hegelian philosophy" (GD., p. 62; Patocka p. 82) ["the Hegelian philosophy 
assumes no justified hiddenness, no justified incommensurability"] and makes a 
claim concerning the continuity between Plato and Hegel, indeed from "Plato to 
Hegel" (which of course includes Descartes and Kant) - 
In the end, secrecy is as intolerable for ethics as it is for philosophy or for 
dialectics in general, from Plato to Hegel (GD., p. 62). 
"Dialectics in general, from Plato to Hegel". Once again, Derrida has set up a 
dualist reading of the history of philosophy; on the one side, one has the dialectical 
rationalism of Plato, Descartes, Kant and Hegel. But this rationalism fails to do 
justice to the complete "otherness" of "goodness" / God. In consequence dialectics 
must be rejected and a thinking of nondialectical "otherness" put in its place, where 
one avoids any kind of "manifestation" and rather privileges the "secrecy" (GD., p. 
62) of apophasis. In The Gift of Death, Derrida finds this apophasis in a certain 
thinking of Christianity, citing as one example (through Baudelaire) the philosophy of 
Augustine (GD., p. 111). In the following chapters I will attempt to undermine this 
Derridean interpretation of the history of philosophy. Rather than setting up (with 
Derrida) a duality between dialectical and nondialectical thought, I will rather focus 
on the question of rationalist and nonrationalist dialectic. Above, I referred to the 
specificity of Platonic dialectic in so far as it involved precisely a refutation of 
rationalism, and cited the particular cases of the Meno and the Phaedrus. I also 
briefly made reference to Plotinus and Boethius. In the following chapters I will 
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develop the issue of dialectic as it relates to the wider movement of Platonism. 
Crucially, I will interpret Christianity as a consistent extension of Platonic dialectic 
rather than (with Derrida) an undermining of dialectic. I will foreground the essence 
of Platonic / Christian dialectic as the most suitable answer to Derrida's claims 
concerning an interminable differance. 
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CHAPTER 6- PLATONISM CONTRA DERRIDA I: THE CASES OF 
PLOTINUS AND BOETHIUS 
Section 6.1 - Prefatory Remarks 
It may appear curious to group on the one hand Plotinus and Boethius and on the other 
hand Augustine and De Cusa together in terms of an interpretation of Platonism. 
From a chronological perspective, the order would rather link Plotinus and Augustine 
and then Boethius and De Cusa. My justification for the particular scheme employed 
here however is philosophical rather than chronological - although Boethius was a 
Christian and wrote theological tracts, his central text (The Consolation of 
Philosophy) [1] with which I am here primarily concerned avoids reference to 
Christian faith. The Consolation is therefore closer in spirit to the work of the pagan 
Platonist, Plotinus, than it is to the avowedly Christian Platonism of Augustine and 
De Cusa. 
This chapter in consequence focuses exclusively on the two former figures, Plotinus 
and Boethius. While their thinking is far from being identical, in both cases there is 
the unmistakeable fundamental influence of Plato. In previous chapters I 
foregrounded Plato's distinction between wisdom and knowledge and attempted to 
show how Plato's criterion of wisdom can take one beyond the perplexity (aporia) 
attendant upon the deconstruction of knowledge. The work of Plotinus and Boethius 
is also a meditation on the ultimate limits of rationality. But in both cases, like Plato 
and unlike Derrida, the very necessary deconstruction of knowledge is accompanied 
by an equally urgent contructivist impulse. In the next sections I will analyse this 
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simultaneous deconstructivism and constructivism from the perspectives of Plotinus 
and Boethius respectively. 
Section 6.2 - On "The One" or "First Existent" in Plotinus 
For Plotinus, "Divinity" or "God" is a graded triad. In this section, I will be 
primarily concerned with the uppermost and primary aspect of this divinity, what 
Plotinus calls "the One" or "First Existent". Plotinus' discussion of the One is crucial 
because his discussion of the latter institutes the fundamental ground of Plotinian 
philosophy. As the exemplary neo - Platonist - 
the system of Plotinus is a system of necessary Emanation, Procession, or 
irradiation accompanied by necessary Aspiration or Reversion - to - Source: 
all the forms and phases of existence flow from the Divinity and all strive to 
return Thither and to remain There (McKenna, Enn. p. xxxi). 
There are certainly intrinsic differences between the Plotinian system so described and 
its Platonic equivalent. However, both share a significant problematizing of their 
fundamental principles. In Plato's case, one could cite particularly Republic 509b (a 
section of which Plotinus is very fond) concerning the "Good beyond Being" but also, 
with reference to Chapter 3, the admission in the Meno of the lack of knowledge with 
regard to the Good. 
As we have seen, there is a strong strain of epistemological scepticism in Plato and 
this is carried forward into Plotinian neo - Platonism. For Plotinus, our lack of 
knowledge of the First Principle disallows us ascribing Being to its nature or indeed 
even referring to it as the Good - 
And yet this "He is" does not truly apply: the Supreme has no need of Being: 
even "He is good" does not apply since it indicates Being: the "is" should not 
suggest something predicated of another thing; it is to state identity....... It is 
not that we think it exact to call him either good or the Good: it is that sheer 
negation does not indicate; we use the term The Good to assert identity 
without the affirmation of Being [Enn., VI (7) 38-39] (my emphasis) 
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The First Principle is therefore neither The Good nor Being. With this neither / nor 
strategy, Plotinus' work resembles that of Derrida. At this point, one is at the second 
stage of the Meiio, the deconstruction of false tharros. However, as with Plato, 
Plotinus wishes to move beyond simple deconstruction. As he states in his own words 
- "it is that sheer negation does not indicate". If Plotinus were simply to adopt a 
neither / nor strategy, the danger would be that the system of Emanation and 
Reversion to Source would no longer retain a foundation. Grounded in simple 
negation it would remain groundless and this can be seen to be the consequence of 
Derrida's philosophy. While denying knowledge of the One, Plotinus wishes to 
maintain that there "is" nonetheless such a unifying principle. However - 
the "is" should not suggest something predicated of another thing; it is to state 
identity (ibid). 
The question thus hinges on the status of the term "identity". This is not an 
epistemological identity, a knowledge accruing to Plotinus of the essence of the One. 
In effect it is precisely the opposite. Identity marks the limits of epistemology. 
Plotinus is stating that the One is "unknowable", but that this does not make it any 
less the One. As such, Plotinus is subverting the hegemony of epistemology, the 
conviction that philosophy must base its principles on knowledge by giving 
epistemological evidence of their existence. Plotinus' simultaneous epistemological 
scepticism and faithful assertion of the One puts him at the forefront of the ancient- 
modern quarrel. One can trace the lineage of this Plotinian agnostic (non-knowing) 
wisdom back to Plato and the Presocratics. In Chapter 2,1 foregrounded Parmenides' 
and Heraclitus' original sense of philosophy as pliilo - Sophia; "love of wisdom". 
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This paradigm emphasised the wisdom of the search as much as the acquisition and 
indeed for both Presocratics perfect wisdom remained inaccessible to mortals. 
This fundamental agnosticism was continued by Plato but as with the Presocratics the 
lack of knowledge was accompanied by an unshakeable faith or belief (pistis) in the 
One or First Existent. This double-edged strategy is repeated by Plotinus in the 
Enneads. As John Dillon observes - 
Plotinus certainly emphasises the transcendence and otherness of the One, its 
superiority to Being and Intellect, and its unknowability by any normal faculty 
of cognition, but in a number of passages, he makes some attempt to explore 
what sort of apprehension the One might have of itself....... he became more 
cautious in his language on this subject as he came to write more, but he was 
always anxious to avoid the impression that the One was some sort of blank or 
negativity...... that the One is neither constrained by necessity nor yet random 
and accidental (p. xciv) [3] 
A distinction which Boethius employs in The Consolation of Philosophy (discussed in 
more depth in the next section) is useful here as a clarification of the philosophical 
significance of Plotinus' own method. From an epistemological viewpoint, there is 
an apparent inconsistency between the admission of the One's "unknowability by any 
normal faculty of cognition" [Enn., p. xciv] and its assertion as more than simply "a 
blank or negativity" (ibid. ). Boethius runs into similar difficulties in the Consolation 
when he comes to discuss the question of divine foreknowledge and the freedom of 
human willing. The Consolation of Philosophy is a text written in the context of 
Boethius' imprisonment (and eventual execution) on what he believes to be false 
charges. Having always followed the right path of philosophy, he now wonders 
whether such a life is worthwhile if it will only end in unjust punishment, while those 
who deserve punishment (the "evil") go free. From his private disillusionment, 
Boethius moves to question metaphysics at a more general level and the Consolation 
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represents a dialogue between his own questioning spirit and a defence of metaphysics 
put forward by a female personification of Philosophy. 
This dialogue becomes very relevant to the issue of the Plotinian One, particularly as 
it reaches its close. Here Boethius outlines what he sees as a paradox in the doctrine 
of divinity or the One. If there is divine foreknowledge there can be no room for 
human freedom and thus in consequence no room for human responsibility - 
Therefore, human thoughts and actions have no freedom, because the divine 
mind in foreseeing all things without being led astray by falseness binds 
human thoughts and actions to a single manner of occurrence (p. 
153)..... Nothing more wicked can be conceived than this, for as the whole 
order of things is derived from Providence and there is no room for human 
thoughts, it follows that our wickedness too is derived from the Author of all 
good (p. 153) [Consol. ] 
In Boethius' elaboration of the problem there is a certain Aristotelian influence which 
is absent in Plotinus. The conception of divine foreknowledge is rooted in Aristotle's 
conception of God as Self-Thinking Thought which is alien to Plotinus' view of the 
One as being devoid of all epistemological attributes. Nonetheless there is a 
fundamental parallel between the cases of Plotinus and Boethius in terms of the 
relation between epistemology and the divine. For Boethius, or rather for Philosophy 
responding to Boethius, while God or the One has knowledge of human affairs, this 
knowledge is incomparable to human knowledge. Strictly speaking one cannot 
properly refer to it as knowledge as this would be to diminish its status through a 
blasphemous anthropocentrism. V. E. Watts in his notes to the Consolation explains 
Boethius' position through recourse to a distinction made by Thomas Aquinas 
between "intellect" and "reason". He quotes directly from Aquinas - 
intellect (intelligere) is the simple (i. e. indivisible, uncompounded) grasp of an 
intelligible truth, whereas reasoning (ratiocinari) is the progression towards 
an intelligible truth by going from one understood (intellecto) point to another. 
The difference between them is thus like the difference between rest and 
motion or between possession and acquisition (Consol., p. 157). 
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For Boethius, God or the One is the site of a perfect "intelligence" or "intellect". 
This is precisely the foundation for divine foreknowledge of human affairs. If there 
was to be a perfect human rationalism which would understand all human action in 
advance, then there would be no room for human responsibility and one would have 
to locate the origin of evil in God. But as Aquinas states so clearly, the realm of 
reason is the realm of imperfect "motion" and "acquisition". As such from an 
epistemological perspective human affairs remain free and open; chaotic even. 
In other words, the necessity or inevitability of human action is only a conditional 
necessity and the specificity of divine necessity is so heterogeneous to human 
necessity (what Boethius calls "simple necessity"; e. g. "it is necessary that all men are 
mortal" [Consol., p. 166]) that it allows room for human responsibility and obligation 
Avoid vice, therefore, and cultivate virtue; lift up your mind to the right kind 
of hope, and put forth humble prayers on high. A great necessity is laid upon 
you, if you will be honest with yourself, a great necessity to be good, since 
you live in the sight of a judge who sees all things (Consol., p. 169). 
Boethius thus resolves a difficulty of interpretation by pointing to a heterogeneity 
between the human and the divine and, more strictly, between reason and 
intelligence. This insight is directly applicable to the case of Plotinus. The 
"unknowability" (Enn., p. xciv) of the One does not imply that the One is "some sort 
of blank or negativity" (ibid. ). Once one accepts the limits of epistemology, a 
different space of philosophy opens up and the Enneads is very much an "initiation" 
into this different space. As with Plato, Plotinus favours the terms "wisdom" and 
"dialectic" (over the term "knowledge") to delineate this philosophical method. In 
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Ennead 1, Section 3, under the title-heading of "Dialectic" (Enn., p. 24), Plotinus 
states the following - 
What art is there, what method, what discipline to bring us there where we 
must go? (Enn., p. 24)..... the virtue of Wisdom (i. e. the virtue peculiarly 
induced by Dialectic) is a certain super - reasoning much closer to the 
Universal (Enn., p. 28). 
Such statements lead Paul Henry (in "The Place of Plotinus in the History of 
Thought", included in the Penguin edition) to describe Plotinus as the founder of a 
very specific kind of "speculative mysticism" (p. xlii). This mysticism leads as 
Plotinus says to a kind of "super - reasoning". In Boethian terms, this super - 
reasoning would be closer to intellect than to reason. That is, Plotinian dialectic leads 
to the simple grasp of intelligible truths rather than the apparently endless attempt to 
deduce some truths from other truths. C. S. Lewis puts the matter well in The 
Discarded Image - 
A life of unmitigated ratio where nothing was simply "seen" and all had to be 
proved, would presumably be impossible; for nothing can be proved if 
nothing is self - evident (quoted by Watts in Consol. p. 157). 
This is obviously a controversial claim but one which is nonetheless acutely Plotinian 
in spirit. It looks back to Socrates' supersession of Meno's paradox through faith 
(pistis); it looks forward to both Augustine's "believe so that you shall understand" 
as well as Boethius' distinction between the "conditional" necessity of divinity and 
the "simple" necessity of the mortal. Divine necessity is conditional because its 
"proof" is impossible. It is therefore self - evident or it is nothing at all and this is 
why Plotinus' language concerning the One is simultaneously reverential and highly 
understated. 
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However, one is not here speaking of rational self - evidence. If such a thing as 
"divinity" is self - evident, it can only be so for the philosopher or dialectician once 
certain processes of initiation have been achieved. These are at various times called 
(amongst other names) "the Term" and "the Way" [cf. MacKenna, p. xxxix]. 
Stephen MacKenna lyrically describes these processes - 
the main need, the cry, of man's nature is to become actually, as he always is 
potentially, Divine: all his faculties, images each of its next highest, 
culminate in the Intellectual-Principle or Intellective-Principle, the Intuitional 
or True-Knowing Faculty; and his duty, or rather his happiness, his 
blessedness, his deepest inner voice, is to labour his entire being into 
identification with this, the Divine in him: through this inner Divine, in an 
ecstasy away from all the lower and first, from all that links him to Matter, he 
may even in this life attain to the "possession" of the God-head in an ineffable 
act of identification, becoming UNIATE, one with God, actually God, and 
foretasting the blessedness of the final return after which he is for all the space 
of eternity to be with the Godhead, to be Divine, or to be God (Enn., p. 
xxxix). 
This is a crucial point for the understanding of Plotinus' relation to the more Christian 
Platonism which succeeds his work. Although I include Boethius in this chapter next 
to Plotinus as the author of the "pagan" or secular Consolation of Philosophy, one 
would have to agree with Henry Chadwick that the Consolation is open to a 
Christianized reading (Chadwick, p. 222) [4]. In addition, there is the fact that 
Boethius was a practising Catholic and the author of several theological tractates. In 
contrast, Plotinus' work, consciously or unconsciously, maintains a distance from 
Christianity. However, this distance can all too easily be overstated. There is the 
obvious matter of the absence of Christology but while this may be an insurmountable 
problem for a Christian theologian it is the affinities which are important from the 
perspective of this thesis. 
The problem I am foregrounding in this thesis is the issue of the nature of philosophy, 
particularly with reference to the distinction between wisdom and knowledge. 
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Christian Platonism, as we will see below, involves a simultaneous epistemological 
scepticism and philosophical assurance. In other words, for Christian Platonists such 
as De Cusa, the limits of epistemology are not the limits of philosophy. Unlike 
Derrida who derives an interminable doubling from the lack intrinsic to knowledge, 
De Cusa sees this lack as constitutive of the philosophical journey towards a truth 
beyond knowledge. This issue relates back to the case of Plotinus. 
In the Plotinian system, Divinity or The First Existent (the One) involves a graded 
triad. If one looks at this system from the perspective of knowledge, it appears 
hierarchical. As "unknowable", the One appears to maintain a lofty distance from its 
subordinates - 
Standing before all things, there must exist a simplex, differing from all its 
sequel, self-gathered not interblended with the forms that rise from it, and yet 
able in some mode of its own to be present to those others (Enn., V. 4) [p. 
387]. 
This passage from Plotinus captures perfectly the paradox - the One must remain 
distant and yet somehow accessible. The difficulty from an epistemological 
perspective is that there can only be distance without accessibility. Human reason 
cannot reach the simplicity of the One. To this extent one can say that Plotinus' 
system is epistemologically hierarchical. The first principle is inaccessible not simply 
to human reason but also to the second and third grades of the triad of divinity. The 
second gradation which is known as the "Intellectual Principle" or "Divine 
Thought"[Enn., p. xxxii] cannot accurately even be termed the "offspring" of the One 
in the measure to which the One is not involved in the multiplicity of generation. The 
third gradation, the "All-Soul" (Enn., p. xxxiii) is at one further remove. As the 
product of the Intellectual Principle, it is the offspring of that which is not even an 
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offspring of the One. These Plotinian gradations thus seem to maintain a rigid 
hierarchical system. 
However, this is only the case from an epistemological viewpoint. Because the One 
according to Plotinus is not only inaccessible to human reason but is itself so free of 
episteme as to debar the Aristotelian label of "Self-Thinking Thought, 
epistemological criteria alone are incapable of enabling communication between the 
different gradations of divinity. This is why the Plotinian system, in the context of 
"knowledge", is hierarchical. Crucially however this is not a hierarchy of knowledge. 
In other words, the One is not superior because it is greater in knowledge than the 
Intellectual-Principle or the All-Soul. Quite the contrary. Rational knowledge 
increases in accordance with the lower level of gradation. To invoke the Boethian 
distinction, the Intellectual-Principle has less rational knowledge, less reason than the 
All-Soul, to the extent that the Intellectual-Principle is rather the grade of intellect (as 
opposed to mere reason). And of course the One is even devoid of intellect, never 
mind reason. 
If this is a hierarchy therefore, it is a hierarchy which diminishes the value of reason / 
knowledge, first in relation to the more immediate faculty of intellection and then in 
relation to an enigmatic "unknowability" inaccessible even to the subtleties of 
intellect. Moreover, there is a sense in which this anepistemological (agnostic) 
Plotinian system can no longer even be referred to as hierarchical. What Plotinus calls 
the Term or the Way is the method by which one's soul can come into contact with 
the One, despite the latter's very unknowability. In fact this unknowability is a virtue 
rather than a vice insofar as it allows the individual soul to open up to "rapture" 
(harpastheis) and "enthusiasm" (Enn., VI; 11,12), what MacKenna calls "a going 
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forth from the self' (Enn., p. lxxx). Paul Henry notes (in an essay included in the 
Penguin edition) how Plotinus prefers these terms which derive from a sense of touch 
(haphe) than the rather more epistemologically influenced sense of "vision" and 
"contemplation" (Enn., p. lxxx). 
Meditating on this point, Henry makes the crucial claim that this more "concrete and 
tactile phraseology" (Enn., p. lxxx) signals not a hierarchical but a concentric [i. e. 
more equally distributed] Plotinian system. Emphasis on hierarchy in Plotinus derives 
from his subordination of epistemology. But beyond epistemology, a Term or a Way 
opens up for the Plotinian to a remarkably egalitarian fluidity between apparently rigid 
gradations. Here the value of knowledge is replaced with that of love - 
He is borne, so to speak, to the inmost of Himself in love of that pure 
radiance which He is, He Himself being that which He loves (Enn., VI, 8, 
16). 
The crucial point with regard to Plotinus' system is that this love is not to be regarded 
as solely the attribute of the One whilst divested from all the other gradations. Rather, 
in line with the typical neo-Platonic thesis of "illumination" or "irradiation" (Dillon, 
in Enn. p. xci), the One involves an "undiminished giving" (Enn., p. lxxiii) to the 
rest of the universe. Even "matter" has some participation (metaskhein) in this love 
or Good. As Henry observes - 
matter, whatever its origin, has some participation (inetaskhein) in the Good 
and it is not completely separated from it (ou khoris). The physical world 
Plotinus at no time regards as wholly bad, but, along with the Stoics and in 
opposition to the Gnostics, sees it as an harmonious whole, a theatre in which 
the least virtuous characters are necessary to the drama. For him, as for Plato, 
it is a "beautiful, visible God" (Enn., p. lxvii). 
Through the subordination of knowledge and the introduction of a specific kind of 
faith or mysticism, Plotinus, like Plato, thus arrives at a vision of Unity and Good. 
The Derridean conviction that the loss of knowledge involves the loss of Unity, Good 
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etc. is therefore highly questionable from a Platonic / Plotinian perspective. The 
limitations of epistemology do not always have to imply negative consequences. As 
Plotinus shows, these very limitations may open the way for a very different kind of 
dialectic. To requote the passage on this dialectic (Enn., 1.3, p. 27/28) - 
What then, is Philosophy? Philosophy is the supremely precious.... the virtue 
of Wisdom (i. e. the virtue peculiarly induced by Dialectic) is a certain super - 
reasoning much closer to the Universal. 
This vision of a Universal beyond knowledge which is nonetheless accessible to a 
different kind of philosophic wisdom is continued in the work of Boethius (again 
under the direct influence of Plato). In the next section, I will analyse this Boethian 
metaphysic from the perspective of his masterpiece, The Consolation of Philosophy. 
Section 6.3 - On The Consolation of Philosophy 
In the Prefatory Remarks to this chapter, I outlined a justification for what might 
have otherwise appeared a strange decision i. e. the subversion of chronological order 
and the grouping of Boethius with Plotinus and (in the next chapter) Augustine with 
De Cusa. I pointed to the theoretical context of Boethius' The Consolation of 
Philosophy, that is its nonChristian path of thought and its recourse to a seemingly 
pagan methodology. It was precisely this Boethian strategy which, in my view, 
brought him closer to Plotinus than to either Augustine or De Cusa. Nonetheless, the 
term "pagan" requires clarification. It in no way signifies an anti-religious 
perspective. Rather, with regard to the contrast with Christian Platonism, the pagan 
Platonism of Plotinus and Boethius (as indeed that of Plato himself) is most accurately 
described as a non Christian religious mysticism. 
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From the point of view of Boethius, I am obviously referring here to the Consolation 
and not to the theological tractates which, explicitly at least, are Christian tractates. 
Even on this issue however, there is room for a reading of the Boethian theological 
tractates as implicitly pagan in intent and methodology. Chadwick alludes to this fact 
when he states that - 
the tractates, other than the fourth, contain even more Neo-Platonism than the 
Consolation of Philosophy itself [Chadwick, p. 175]. 
It is this fundamental Neoplatonism which forges the link between the respective 
philosophical systems of Plotinus and Boethius. I have already outlined the intricacies 
of the Plotinian universe, in particular the graded triad of divinity. Appearing 
hierarchical from an epistemological perspective, the system becomes concentric 
once epistemology is superseded by a holistic mysticism. With Boethius, this is again 
the case. The "paganism" of the Plotinian and Boethian philosophies replaces 
revelation with "intellect" rather than simple "reason". Moreover for Boethius as for 
Plotinus, human intellect is inferior to divine intellect. One difference between 
Plotinus and Boethius is that at times Boethius seems to opt for an Aristotelian rather 
than Platonic understanding of the One to the extent that he sees the One as having 
"divine foreknowledge" (Cf. for example Consol. p. 155, especially Book V of the 
Consolation). This is in clear contrast to Plotinus who believed any ascription of 
knowledge or consciousness to the One to imply a dimunition of the power of 
divinity. 
Despite this particular kind of Aristotelianism, Boethius nonetheless often reverts to a 
Platonic or neo-Platonic key when describing the First or God. Maintaining a long 
lineage which finds its source traditionally in Plato's "Good beyond Being" (Republic, 
509b), but which also has a Presocratic ancestry (cf. chapter 2), Boethius 
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continuously uses oblique language to describe the One. In Book IV for example, 
attempting to posit the fundamental order which rules the cosmos, Boethius becomes 
suddenly reticent, having recourse to an authority even prior to the Presocratics, that 
of Homer - 
But as the Iliad puts it, "'Tis hard for me to speak as though a God". And it is 
not allowed to man to comprehend in thought all the ways of the divine work 
or expound them in speech [Consol., p. 140 / 141]. 
This is a gesture which relates back to the earlier discussion of Plotinus. In 
emphasizing Plotinus' simultaneous assertion of the absolute "transcendence" and 
"otherness" of the One [cf. Dillon, in Enn. p. xciv] and nonetheless its not being a 
simple blank or negativity, I employed the Boethian conceptual framework as an 
explanatory tool. The absence of Christian apologetics or dogma in the Consolation is 
nevertheless supplemented by an analogous mystical vocabulary and system. As with 
Christianity, reason is seen as being an inferior faculty incapable of accessing the One 
or God. In its place one finds for Boethius intelligentia or "intelligence". In its ability 
to transcend the isolation of reason, intelligence is powerful but it still remains 
ultimately insufficient as is exemplified by the above quoted Boethian passage - "it is 
not allowed to man to comprehend...... all the ways of the divine work" [Consol., p. 
140 / 141]. Just below this statement in the Consolation one finds the incapacity of 
Boethius' reason emphasized by his interlocutor Philosophy - 
You are worn out by the prolixity of the reasoning and have been looking 
forward to the sweetness of song [Consol., p. 141]. 
This reference to "song" brings the Boethian methodology very close to that of 
Plotinus' Term or Way. As noted in the previous section, Plotinus is often inclined in 
the Enneads to adopt a "concrete and tactile phraseology" (Enn. p. lxxx). On one 
level, he replaces the faculty of reason with the nonetheless epistemologically 
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influenced "vision" or "contemplation". But crucially this "super-reasoning" as he 
calls it in the Ennead on "Dialectic" [Consol. I, 3] is itself superseded by a more 
mystical emphasis on "rapture" (harpastheis) and "enthusiasm" (Consol., VI, 11,12), 
what MacKenna lyrically translates as "a going forth from the self'. Here in the 
Consolation Book IV we have an analogous Boethian recourse to "song" beyond the 
"prolixity of reason". As with Plotinus, this transference from epistemology to a 
unifying mysticism allows the Boethian system to replace hierarchy with concentrism, 
a reversion to source - 
Those things which stable order now protects, 
Divorced from their true source would fall apart, 
This is the love of which all things partake, 
The end of good their chosen goal and close: 
No other way can they expect to last, 
Unless with love for love repaid they turn, 
And seek again the cause that gave them birth [Consol., Bk. IV, p. 142]. 
This Boethian strategy gives a significant response to the questions which Derrida 
poses to Platonism and to philosophy in general. Boethius and Derrida share an 
epistemological scepticism, an agnosticism as it were. But whereas Derrida derives 
an interminable doubling from this scepticism which undercuts any attempt at 
philosophical constructivism, Boethius employs this philosophical crisis to reevaluate 
the very nature of the metaphysical project - 
It is because you men are in no position to contemplate this order that 
everything seems confused and upset........ Everything that is known is 
comprehended not according to its own nature, but according to the ability to 
know of those who do the knowing [Consol., p. 157, Book V]. 
Boethius thus admits that everything "seems confused and upset", he admits there is a 
philosophical crisis. But crucially and unlike Derrida, he believes this to be a crisis 
not of but within philosophy. He offers a prospective resolution of this difficulty by 
turning the tables on the accusers of philosophy. The contemporary confusion and 
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upset which in effect is Boethius' lack of knowledge concerning God and truth, 
cannot be said to imply a consequent lack of God and truth in themselves. In other 
words, the absence of the object may only be an absence in relation to the ineptitude 
of the subject. And of course this is ultimately the moral of Boethius' tale. 
Philosophy answers his questioning as follows - 
Let us, then, if we can, raise ourselves up to the heights of that supreme 
intelligence. There reason will be able to see that which it cannot see by itself 
- it will be able to see how that which has no certain occurrence may be seen 
by a certain and fixed foreknowledge, a knowledge that is not opinion, but 
the boundless immediacy of the highest form of knowing [Consol., Book V, 
p. 162]. 
The section [Book V, Section V] then closes with an exhortation (in the form of a 
song) to elevate one's thoughts to enable one to overcome the ineptitude of human 
subjectivity - 
You who raise your eyes to heaven with thrusting face, 
Raise up as well your thoughts, lest weighted down to earth, 
Your mind sinks lower as your body rises high [Consol., p. 16]. 
This philosophical blueprint is not intended as an abstract meditation. As with 
Plotinus' "concrete and tactile phraseology", Boethius' move beyond epistemology 
leads to mysticism as a way of life. Abstract hierarchy is superseded by a very 
intimate union with the One, which from an epistemological perspective seemed so 
distant and remote. In Book III, Boethius had already made this more practical aspect 
of his endeavour clear through an emphasis on happiness as only possible through 
"participation" [Consol., p. 102] in divinity. 
Of course any accusations of abstraction on Boethius' part are already out of court, so 
to speak, from the very beginning of the Consolation with regard to the latter's very 
raison d'ctre. Boethius is no longer an ivory tower metaphysician but a prisoner 
unjustly awaiting torture and execution in a dark cell. His dialogue with Philosophy is 
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intended as a consolation in the most profound of senses -a helpless mortal seeks 
salvation. Amidst all the metaphysical questioning one can forget this most material 
(materialist) of bases. Those who accuse Platonism of negating the material or 
sensible in favour of the supersensible (cf. for example Heidegger's "Language in the 
Poem") [5] find here a rather uncomfortable rejoinder. This is again made clear in the 
passage on happiness in Book III - 
Since it is through the possession of happiness that people become happy, and 
since happiness is in fact divinity, it is clear that it is through the possession of 
divinity that they become happy........... so those who possess divinity 
necessarily become divine. Each happy individual is therefore divine. While 
only God is so by nature, as many as you like may become so by participation 
[Consol., p. 102]. 
It is perhaps the last phrase which is the most revealing. The theory of participation is 
a central Platonic tenet. It is most clearly elaborated by Plato at Sophist 248e and is 
the basis of the link between the material and the spiritual world. The sensible can be 
said to participate in the supersensible. As such, there can be no question of rejecting 
the sensible world in the name of some intelligible realm. The doctrine of 
participation lends credence to the view of a concentric rather than hierarchical 
universe. Plotinus develops this view of participation, most notably in his theory 
concerning matter. Matter maintains a participation (metaskhein), despite its lowly 
origin in the Good and is not completely separated from it (ou khoris) [Henry, in Enn. 
p. lxvii]. 
This then is the traditional Platonic lineage which Boethius develops through his 
tenet of human happiness as a participation in divinity. Boethius represents a crucial 
historical juncture in this line of thinking, as he perhaps more than any other thinker 
signifies the bridge between the Platonic doctrine of participation and the Christian 
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doctrine of the Incarnation. Boethius in effect is the prime exemplar of the strong 
affinity between Platonism and Christianity. Some commentators would no doubt 
point, in opposition to this view, to a chronological issue. Surely St. Augustine of 
Hippo, they might say (not to mention Origen and Clement), is a more appropriate 
bridge between Platonism and Christianity to the extent that first, he is a Christian 
Platonist and second, he precedes Boethius. 
There is of course an undeniable truth in this reference to Augustine. Nonetheless 
with Augustine, Platonism had already become Christianized; it had already lost 
some of its original Platonic flavour. The paradox is that Boethius, a full century 
later (and despite the undoubted Augustinian influence on his work) maintains 
Platonism and Christianity as almost two parallel lines which never fully converge; 
Between Boethius and Augustine there are also many notable differences. 
Most important of these is the difference in the ways in which the two men 
speak of the relation between faith and reason: for Augustine, parallel and 
reconcilable ways of knowing the truth; for Boethius parallel ways which can 
only meet at certain points....... [Chadwick, p. 251]. 
The individual integrity of both Christianity and Platonism are therefore more readily 
discernible in the work of Boethius than in that of Augustine. The two are set out side 
by side and one awaits their reconciliation. In this sense, Boethius builds a bridge 
between Platonism and Christianity, but does not cross. From either a Platonic or 
Christian perspective, this may appear to be Boethius' failing. But from the viewpoint 
of this thesis, there is no real philosophical difficulty at issue. Platonism and 
Christianity (or more specifically Christian Platonism) represent compatible but 
independent metaphysics, both equally useful in the attempt to offer a response to the 
challenge of Derrida and . deconstruction. Both stress . the role of wisdom over 
knowledge, both stress concentrism over hierarchy. In this chapter, I have attempted 
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to outline this emphasis from the perspective of the (neo)Platonism of Plotinus and 
Boethius. In the following chapter, I will attempt a similar analysis from the point of 
view of the Christian Platonism of Augustine and Nicholas De Cusa. 
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CHAPTER 7- PLATONISM CONTRA DERRIDA II - THE CASES OF 
AUGUSTINE AND DE CUSA 
Section 7.1 - Prefatory Remarks 
the thinking of Being, precisely because it does not substitute Being for God, 
can think God as the example par excellence of a mode of thought oblivious to 
difference ( Gasche, Inventions of Difference, p. 156) [1] 
The context of the above quotation from Rodolphe Gasche is his attempt to outline 
(and defend) Derrida's critique of the positing of God as "an absolute and universal 
grounding efficiency" (ID, p. 154). In essays such as "Denials", Derrida is keen to 
stress that this universalist grounding is not simply an attribute of affirmative theisms 
but also intrinsic to the projects of negative theology, which he therefore wishes to 
distinguish from deconstruction. In other words, Derrida's critique of epistemology 
(e. g. in the case of Husserl) is extended to include negative theology as itself a 
misguided epistemological absolutism. As Gasche puts it above, such negative 
theology would be "oblivious to difference" (ID, p. 156). 
In this chapter, I will challenge this interpretation not simply of negative theology but 
also of a particular kind of affirmative theology (that of Augustine). In the case of De 
Cusa, one can say that he is both a positive and negative theologian. This doubling 
effect one has already encountered in Plotinus and Boethius. For Plotinus, intellect 
can say little if anything of the nature of the One and yet through rapture and 
enthusiasm even the low form of human soul has the prospect of making contact with 
this highest principle. Similarly, Boethius' Consolation is addressed to a particular 
individual in a sorry plight (Boethius himself) with all the attendant material and 
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lowly context. Here Boethius is stressing a positive philosophy / theology which can 
address even the merely particular. And yet God also remains ultimately inaccessible 
as is evinced by the closing discussion in the Consolation concerning divine 
foreknowledge and human freedom. Although the simultaneous reality of both 
foreknowledge and freedom seems contradictory, Boethius (or rather the 
personification of Philosophy) maintains that this is only contradictory from a human 
perspective, the divine perspective remaining beyond our cognition. This is in effect a 
subtle kind of negative theology. 
This simultaneous positive and negative theology is continued by Augustine and De 
Cusa. Such a doubling strategy is a crucial rejoinder to Gasche who (with Derrida) 
claims that such theologies as Christian Platonism are "oblivious to difference". For 
both Plotinus and Boethius, the One or God always remains outside the sphere of 
human reason. To this extent, both thinkers emphasise an irreducible difference. 
Similarly, Augustine and De Cusa are far from thinking that all difference can be 
reduced. Bourke for example makes the point that - 
any attempt at presenting his (Augustine's) views in an organised, logically 
developed system of philosophy is doomed to end in distortion. Augustine's 
notion of "order" (ordo) places great stress on symmetry but great emphasis on 
using a variety of inner discoveries to reach a desired end (Bourke, p. 21)[2] 
This stress on "particularity" and "contingency" is linked by Augustine (as with 
Boethius) to the "incomparable" nature of the divine in relation to the human. From a 
philosophical perspective, therefore, there can be no ultimate finalization of 
Augustinianism - 
The answer to which Augustine comes....... is never an exhaustive description 
of God's essential nature. Like the One of Plotinus and the divinity of many 
medieval mystics, the God of Augustinian thought transcends all efforts at 
complete description (Bourke, p. 140). 
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Book 10 Chapter 6 of the Confessions [3] is a particular case in point. Having 
expressed an "assured" love of God and a conviction that Creation itself is a visible 
God ("the heaven and earth, they tell me to love thee"), Augustine nonetheless 
introduces difference into his discussion. In seeking to answer the question "But 
what do I love, when I love Thee" (quid autem amo, cure to amo) Augustine is forced 
to employ the language of negation and analogy - 
But, what do I love, when I love Thee? Not the prettiness of a body (non 
species: corporis), not the gracefulness of temporal rhythm, not the 
brightness of light (that friend of these eyes), not the sweet melodies of songs 
in every style, not the fragrance of flowers and ointments and spices, not 
manna and honey, not limbs which can be grasped in fleshly embraces - these 
I do not love, when I love my God (non haec amo, cure amo deum meuna). 
Yet I do love something like a light (et tanzen aino quandam lucem), a voice, 
an odor, food, embrace of my inner man, wherein for my soul a light shines, 
and place does not encompass it (ubi fulget animae meae, quod non capit 
locus), where there is a sound which time does not sweep away, where there 
is a fragrance which the breeze does not disperse, where there is a flavor 
which eating does not diminish, and where there is a clinging which satiety 
does not disentwine (et ubi haeret quod non diuellit satietas). This is what I 
love, when I love my God (hoc est quod aino, cum deum meuni amo) 
[Confessions Book 10 Chapter 6]. 
This is a revealing passage for an understanding of Augustine's philosophy, 
highlighting both the positive and negative movements of his thought. One can refer 
this Augustinian dialectic back to Plato's dialectic in the Meno. There are three stages 
1) In the first case, there is the existing orthodox philosophy or mode of predication. 
In Plato's case, this is obviously sophistry but for Augustine one might imagine a 
naively positive predication of God. 
2) A deconstruction of this orthodoxy in Plato's case via Meno's paradox, and in 
Augustine's case through the employment of a negativizing vocabulary ("But what do 
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I love, when I love Thee? Not the prettiness of a body (non specium corporis"). This 
is also the stage at which, on my interpretation, Derrida's thought remains. 
3) The overcoming of negation through an affirmation which respects difference but 
which nonetheless through faith (Plato - pistis) or love (Augustine - amor) posits a 
philosophical Unity. Crucial here also is the difference between wisdom and 
knowledge. For Plato and Augustine, one cannot know but this conviction is rather 
grounded in a philosophical wisdom which is often closer to ignorance than to 
knowledge. 
I will develop these points from an Augustinian angle in more detail in the next 
section. However, to conclude these prefatory remarks I will briefly introduce De 
Cusa's perspective on these matters and will deal with the latter's thought in more 
detail in Section 7.3.1 referred above to Augustinian wisdom as being often closer to 
ignorance than to knowledge. De Cusa, in developing this fundamentally Platonic 
perspective, emphasises the concept of "learned ignorance". This is nowhere more 
clearly expressed than in his central text "De Docta Ignorantia" - 
Truly the precision of combinations in corporeal things and the suitable 
adaptation of the known to the unknown so far exceeds human reason that 
Socrates believed that he knew nothing except his own ignorance, the most 
wise Solomon asserted that all things are difficult and inexplicable in speech, 
and a certain other man of divine spirit said that wisdom and the locus of the 
intelligence are hidden from the eyes of all the living. If, therefore, this is 
true as even the most profound Aristotle affirms it to be concerning the most 
manifest things in nature, in his Metaphysics, then the difficulty which befalls 
us is like that of owls trying to look at the sun. Indeed, in order that the 
appetite within us not be frustrated, we desire to know that we are ignorant 
[quoted Moffitt-Watts, p. 33] [4] 
Again, the comparison with Derrida is helpful. The recourse in this passage to the 
successive agnosticisms of Socrates, Solomon, "a certain other man of divine spirit" 
(this could be Plato, Plotinus, Augustine or Boethius - De Cusa was influenced by 
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each) and Aristotle exemplifies a specific continuity between De Cusa and Derrida. 
There is an inbuilt impossibility in the task of philosophy. But the crucial last 
sentence of the passage marks De Cusa's move beyond the deconstruction of 
epistemology - 
in order that the appetite within us not be frustrated we desire to know that we 
are ignorant 
This "knowledge" of ignorance is not simply a recourse to paradox for the sake of 
paradox. As Moffitt-Watts observes, what marks De Cusa's metaphysics as 
historically important is the simultaneous positing of a metaphysical disjunction and a 
constructive role for philosophy [Watts, p. 74]. In other words, De Cusa first 
outlines a disjunction between human knowledge and divine reality which appears 
unsurpassable. This is the De Cusian moment of deconstruction. Epistemology 
cannot reconcile the finite with the infinite - 
there is no proportion between the finite and the infinite (infiniti ad finitum 
proportionem non esse)......... [quoted Watts, p. 25]. 
However, as Moffitt-Watts notes, there remains in De Cusa "a potent affirmation of 
human creativity" [Watts, p. 74]. Once again therefore (as with Plato, Plotinus, 
Augustine and Boethius) one has a doubling strategy which follows the first two 
phases of Derrida's own thinking but moves beyond these into a third constructive 
phase. I will analyse the details of this project from a De Cusian perspective in the 
third section of this chapter. Below, however, I will first concentrate on Augustine. 
Section 7.2 - Augustine's Love of Wisdom 
This thesis (in chapter 2) has already traced the importance of the Presocratic 
understanding of philosophy for the development of Platonic metaphysics. In chapter 
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1,1 outlined how Derrida's understanding of philosophy can be seen to have been 
influenced by Husserl and can be traced back fundamentally to the Cartesian 
revolution in philosophy. This thesis depends upon a radically alternative view of 
philosophy as epitomized by, for example, a particular strand of Platonic thought. 
Crucial to this alternative view is the distinction between wisdom and knowledge. 
Although Augustinianism differs from the thinking of Plotinus and Boethius (the 
previous two examples) in being avowedly a Christian Platonism, the philosophical 
implications of this thinking remain strikingly similar. 
This continuity is summed up in Augustine's famous dictum "unless you will have 
believed, you will not understand" (nisi credideritis, non intellegetis) which was 
transformed by some later medievals into the principle of "faith seeking 
understanding" (fides quaerens intellectum). Once again one has in this instance a 
case of Platonic dialectic being split into two stages. The first stage involves a 
(negative) dimunition or deconstruction of knowledge. The second phase is a 
(positive) affirmation of wisdom beyond knowledge. Augustine clarifies this logic in 
his text On the Trinity - 
Yet action, by which we use temporal things well, differs from contemplation 
of eternal things; and the latter is reckoned to wisdom, the former to 
knowledge [ 14: 21, p. 37] (5) 
A little later in this text Augustine comments that "no one doubts but that the former 
(wisdom) is to be preferred to the latter (knowledge)" [14: 25]. This judgement is 
grounded in Augustine's three-tiered system of "vision" or "seeing", which Bourke 
outlines as follows [EA, p. 11] - 
1) corporeal seeing 
2) cogitating 
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3) intellectual vision 
It is the relationship between the second and third levels which interests us here. For 
Augustine, the second level of "cogitating" involves "the rational cognizance of 
temporal things" [On The Trinity, [14: 25], EA. p. 40]. This is also described as "the 
word of knowledge" [14: 25]. In the context of Augustine's principle "unless you will 
have believed, you will not understand" (nisi credideritis, non intellegetis) one can 
say that for Augustine the second level of cogitating is insufficient to bring us to an 
understanding not simply of God, but of Creation or the sensible world in general. 
"Creation is a Great Book", he declares in a crucial Sermon [Mai 126.6; EA., p. 123] 
but this Book is unreadable by reason alone. 
Instead it requires the third level of intellectual vision, what Augustine calls in On the 
Trinity the "intellectual cognizance of eternal things" [14: 25] or "the word of 
wisdom" [14: 21]. Although this is undeniably a Christian Platonism (the Incarnation 
being a central Augustinian tenet), in his emphasis on intellect and wisdom Augustine 
can be firmly placed in the tradition which proceeds from Plato through to Plotinus 
and Boethius. The Christian Platonism of Augustine and De Cusa remains part of this 
lineage. The essence of Augustine's wisdom leads one towards God but it resists the 
divinisation of man which was to become such a central part of modernity - 
to attain to these [divine truths] with the eye of the mind is the lot of the few; 
and when they are attained as much as they can be, he himself who attains to 
them does not abide in them but is, as it were, repelled by the resounding of 
the eye itself of the mind, and so there comes to be a transitory thought of a 
thing not transitory [On the Trinity, [14: 23], EA. p. 38]. 
This passage is crucial because it highlights another important difference between 
wisdom and knowledge. I have already outlined the claim that wisdom involves a 
concern of the intellect with eternal truths, while knowledge involves the rational 
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understanding of temporal truths. Additionally, however, while knowledge seeks to 
possess its object, wisdom remains separated from or "repelled" by eternal truth. 
This reminds one of of Heraclitus' stress on orexis or "striving". Philosophy is not 
simply wisdom but love of wisdom, the striving for or journey towards wisdom. 
Parmenides' poem is an analogous meditation on this distance from Truth. In Plato's 
Meno, the shift from a negative tharros (of the overconfident sophists) to a positive 
tharros is best read as an invocation to "take heart". This is far from, for example, 
Descartes's ideal of reducing everything to a series of "clear and distinct ideas" or 
Husserl's attempt to make philosophy a "rigorous science". Plotinus also thematizes 
the "wandering" of the soul from the One, and for Boethius, divinity must always 
remain beyond human comprehension, whether through reason or even through 
intellect. 
The substitution of wisdom for knowledge by Augustine should not therefore be seen 
as simply the replacing of one transcendental signified by that of another. The nature 
of philosophical wisdom (as understood by Platonism) is fundamentally 
heterogeneous to the nature of epistemological knowledge. This is precisely the crux 
of the ancient-n: oderit quarrel. At issue is the very nature of philosophy itself - is 
metaphysics to be an epistemological project or a project which attempts to transcend 
the limits of knowledge? In the Confessions Book 7, Augustine describes his own 
philosophy as "the way of man's salvation". He is very critical of the reductionism of 
epistemology as for example in Book 7 where he outlines his disagreement with the 
Manichees [Confessions, p. 109]. For Augustine, the Manichees exemplify a 
philosophy of "the things of space" [Confessions, p. 107], a description which tallies 
with his discussion in On the Trinity of the "cognizance of temporal things" or "the 
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word of knowledge" [14: 25, EA p. 40]. In the Confessions, Augustine is 
unequivocal in his condemnation of this mode of epistemology - 
I should utterly have vomited them up [the Manichees] from my overcharged 
breast, because they had no way of escape, without horrible sacrilege of heart 
and tongue, from what they held and said of You [Confessions, Book 7, p. 
109]. 
This attack is not simply directed at the Manichees but rather at the nature of the 
epistemological project which they exemplify. Having been himself an initial convert 
to the "word of knowledge", Augustine rails against what he sees as an 
epistemological failure to think of God as anything other than "a corporeal substance" 
[Confessions, p. 107]. He describes his earlier situation in terms of three tiers or 
levels - 
A) God 
B) the light of wisdom directed towards God 
C) the light of reason directed towards the corporeal [Confessions, p. 115, Book 7]. 
For Augustine, the Manichean epistemology remained at the third and lowest level 
and under its influence he became stifled - 
those lower things became greater than I and pressed me under so that I could 
neither loosen their grip nor so much as breathe [Confessions, p. 115]. 
It is "the Platonists" [Confessions, p. 123] whom Augustine credits with taking him 
beyond the "word of knowledge" to the "word of wisdom". These "Athenian" 
[Confessions, p. 117] texts direct his mind from a thinking rooted in "space" and the 
"corporeal" [Confessions, p. 107] to a metaphysics of "incorporeal" truth - 
Now that I had read the books of the Platonists and had been set by them 
towards the search for a truth that is incorporeal, I came to see Your invisible 
things which are understood by the things that are made [Confessions, p. 123, 
Book VII]. 
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This is reminiscent of Augustine's "Creation is a Great Book". God is as it were the 
Divine Artist and the created world is perhaps his greatest work. As Plato observed, 
the world is a "visible God". We can therefore direct ourselves towards the 
incorporeal through a realization or recognition of the divine elements within the 
realm of the corporeal. To an astute philosophical eye, the "invisible" is "visible". 
Again however, this philosophical wisdom is attained by the "wise" (the Platonists) 
but denied to the "knowledgeable" (the Manichees). The Book of Creation can 
therefore only be read given the proper methodology and here Augustine puts himself 
in the tradition of Platonic wisdom. 
Augustine nevertheless does have some criticisms to make of Platonism. Although 
directing his attention toward the "incorporeal", his reading of the Platonists led him 
to become arrogant concerning his wisdom - 
I had begun to wish to appear wise, and this indeed was the fulness of my 
punishment; and I did not weep for my state, but was badly puffed up with 
my knowledge [Confessions, p. 124, Book 7]. 
This concern regarding a "puffed up" philosophy highlights the continuing Pauline 
influence on Augustine. It reminds one of Paul's declaration "Beware lest anyone 
seduce you by philosophy" (Col. 2: 8). Here in the Confessions Augustine would seem 
to be prepared to go only so far with Platonism. While moving beyond the 
epistemology of the Manichees, the thinking of the "incorporeal" in Platonism still 
remains too close to the arrogance of wisdom. However, one would have to make 
qualifications to this blunt pronouncement. In the first case, there is Augustine's 
specific response to Paul's declaration which appears in his treatise Morals of the 
Catholic Church. Bourke outlines the nature of this response which, crucially, is not 
anti-philosophical as such - 
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Augustine clarifies that Paul does not wish to downgrade the love of wisdom; 
"This [philosophy] generates so much pride that they seem to dwell in the very 
heavens that they so frequently discuss. So the soul should restrain itself from 
craving for this sort of empty knowledge, if it proposes to serve God with an 
unsullied mind"...... So it is in reference to this that a person is warned to avoid 
false images [Bourke, p. 211]. 
Applying this Augustinian theology to the Manichees, it may well be that Augustine's 
critique is well justified. But the question of "Platonism" poses a more difficult 
problem. For example, can Socrates be recognised in the description concerning 
"pride" and the "craving for empty knowledge"? If anything, Augustine's concern 
directly echoes the logic of Meno's paradox and as such it is difficult to understand 
Augustine's criticisms in this context. The same argument could be employed to 
absolve Plato and Plotinus and the later Boethius and De Cusa of guilt. So what are 
we to make of this negative reference to Platonism? 
Firstly, it is important to make clear that Augustine does distinguish (positively) 
between Manichean epistemology and Platonic wisdom. Even therefore if Platonism 
is inadequate, it is less inadequate than epistemology. Secondly, one can wonder as 
to the exact sense of "Platonism". Notwithstanding the reference to the "Athenians" 
it is clear that little if any of the original dialogues were available to Augustine. It is 
therefore unfair to categorise the accusations of Book 7 as simply referring to "Plato". 
However, Augustine's fundamental difficulty with "Platonism" is irrefutable to the 
extent that it captures the chasm between Platonism and Platonic - Christianity - 
I did not find that the Word became flesh....... these books did not tell me that 
He emptied Himself, taking the form of a servant, being made in the likeness 
of men......... I did not read that in due time he died for the ungodly 
[Confessions, p. 116 / 17]. 
This Augustinian Christology is of course absent in earlier Platonism. Above 
however I made the point that the more secular or pagan Platonism of Socrates / Plato, 
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Plotinus and Boethius' Consolation could be made compatible with the more 
Christian Platonism of, for example, Augustine and De Cusa. In other words, 
Augustine's ultimate reticence concerning Platonism is not fatal to the effort of this 
thesis to outline a Platonic wisdom in opposition to Derrida. This is because, firstly, 
Augustine says many positive things about Platonism. Without Platonism there would 
by definition be no Christian Platonism. In the second case, when one considers 
Augustine's criticisms of Platonism in the context of Pauline suspicion and 
Tertullian's absolute disavowal of philosophy, they appear very moderate. These two 
qualifying points lead us to the question of compatibility. Despite Augustine's 
wariness in the face of Platonic wisdom, it seems clear that Augustinianism and 
Platonism are wholly compatible metaphysics. To conclude this section, I will 
outline an analysis of this compatibility from the perspective of the problem of 
"wisdom". 
In the Confessions, as we saw above, Augustine distinguishes between two crucial 
levels of human intellection - the level of reason trained on the things of space and 
temporality, and the level of intellectual vision which is directed towards the 
incorporeal truths of eternal wisdom. At the first level , he locates the despised 
Manichean philosophy, of which initially he had been a follower. At the second 
level, he locates the writing of the "Platonists" whom he credits with enabling him to 
leap from a thinking of the corporeal to a thinking of the incorporeal. Nonetheless, 
he expresses ultimate reservations about these Platonists with regard to two crucial 
points - 
1) They do not recognise that the Word became flesh i. e. they do not recognise the 
Incarnation as a philosophical truth. 
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2) They consequently lack a necessary "humility" and are prone to become "puffed 
up" with arrogance. 
Addressing the first point one can say that Plato at least can be absolved of 
responsibility for not recognising the Incarnation in the measure to which he 
historically preceded Christ. In addition, there are strong resonances of a divine 
"participation" in the mortal in Plato's work. This can even be traced back as far as 
Heraclitus - 
Fragment XCIT - Immortals are mortal, mortals immortal, living the other's 
death, dead in the other's life [p. 70 / 71, Kahn] 
[athanatoi thnetoi, thnetoi athanatoi, zontes ton ekeinon thanaton, ton de 
ekeinon bioii tethneotes]. 
This emphasis upon the reciprocal relation between the mortal and the immortal is 
developed by Plato through his doctrines of the immortality of the soul, of 
participation of the finite in the infinite, and of anamnesis or remembrance from past 
lives. While neither the Heraclitean nor Platonic conceptions of the human / divine 
relation directly mirror the Incarnation, they are extraordinarily similar. While from a 
theological perspective they remain incompatible, from a philosophical perspective 
they are very close to being compatible. In this context, Augustine's critical remarks 
concerning the absence of a Platonic Christology can be seen as relatively 
insignificant from a philosophical viewpoint i. e. outside the specifics of Christian 
dogmatics. 
Additionally, considering the case of Plotinus one could argue that the Plotinian 
concept of the Term or Way bears affinities to the import of the Incarnation to the 
extent that it involves an individual soul partaking of the One. The case of Boethius is 
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more clearcut in so far as he was a practising Catholic and alongside the Consolation 
wrote five theological tractates which were meditations on the reality of the 
Incarnation and the exact nature of Christ. Boethius' work is almost a microcosm of 
the larger relation between Platonism and Christian Platonism, the Consolation 
representing a pagan wisdom (of "participation" in the infinite) while the tractates 
invoke the Incarnation. While Boethius himself was keen to stress a "disjunction" 
between faith and reason [cf. Chadwick, p. 180], the concept of intellectual vision 
(or "intelligence") which he introduces in the Consolation [p. 157] is clearly of 
Augustinian origin. Boethian Platonism therefore also appears to evade the (prior) 
criticisms of Augustine. As for De Cusa, his philosophy is perhaps nothing other 
than an extended Christology and bears a very profound Augustinian trajectory (cf. 
Section 7.30). 
Augustine's first criticism of Platonism therefore would seem to be philosophically 
unjust although from a dogmatic theological perspective it is undoubtedly irrefutable. 
His second criticism concerns the nature of Platonic "wisdom" - according to 
Augustine, the latter lacks a necessary "humility" - 
Further I read [in the Platonists]...... that of His fullness souls receive that they 
may be blessed, and that by participation in that wisdom which abides in them 
they are renewed that they may be wise. But I did not read that in due time He 
died for the ungodly...... For Thou hast hid these things from the wise and hast 
revealed them to the little ones, that those who labor and are burdened should 
come to Him and He should refresh them, because He is meek and humble of 
heart; and the meek He directs in judgement, and the gentle He teaches His 
ways..... [Confessions, Book 7 p. 117]. 
Augustine then elaborates how far the Platonists remain from this humility and 
meekness - 
But those who wear the high boots of their sublimer doctrine do not hear Him 
saying: Learn of me for I am meek and humble of heart and you shall find rest 
for your souls; and if they know God, they have not glorified him as God or 
given thanks: but become vain in their thoughts; and their foolish heart is 
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darkened. Professing themselves to be wise, they become fools [Confessions, 
p. 117, Book 7]. 
In this passage, Augustine has therefore both commended and criticised Platonism. 
In the first case, he credits the Platonic doctrine of "participation", for it it this 
philosophy which has elevated him from the spatio-temporality of the Manichees to 
his vision of "incorporeal" things. However, the second part of the passage outlines 
his grievances. The "height" and "sublimity" of Platonism is said to disdain what 
Augustine regards as a necessary "meekness" and "humility" of heart. There is a lack 
of praise and thanks to God and this "vanity" transforms Platonic wisdom into 
foolishness. As with the problem of the Incarnation, one can ask how accurate this 
description of Platonic wisdom really is. I will take one example from Plato's Meno 
to exemplify not simply the inaccuracy of Augustine's description but more 
importantly how close Socratic / Platonic wisdom is to what Augustine will present as 
a specifically Christian wisdom. 
At Meno 96A, Socrates introduces the issue of the uniqueness of philosophical 
wisdom in so far as it attempts to deal with the question of "whether virtue (arete) 
can be taught" (95e). But this uniqueness is not asserted positively or vainly as 
Augustine would have us believe in terms of a "higher" and more "sublime" doctrine. 
Quite the contrary - 
Socrates: Well, can you name any other subject (pragmatos) in which the 
professing teachers (phaskontes didaskaloi) are not only refused recognition 
(homologocaitai) as teachers of others, but regarded as not even understanding 
it themselves (houde autoi epistasthai), and indeed as inferior (poneroi) in the 
very quality (pragina) of which they claim to be teachers; while those who are 
themselves recognised as men of worth and honour, (kaloi kagathoi) say at one 
time that it is teachable and at another that it is not? When people are so 
confused (tetaragmenous) about this or that matter, can you say they are 
teachers (didaskalous) in any proper sense of the word? [ Meno, 96a-b]. 
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If there is a Socratic / Platonic vanity here, it is certainly difficult to find. In the 
Confessions Book 7 (quoted above) Augustine had stated that "professing themselves 
to be wise, they become fools". But here in the Meno, the "professing teachers" 
(phaskontes didaskaloi) are shorn of all authority. They are not merely divested of 
superior wisdom; they are in fact said to be inferior (poneroi) to non-teachers, to 
those professedly without wisdom. The Greek term here is particularly negative - 
poncroi could also be translated as cowardice, badness, ill-conditioned, evil, 
worthless. This is an example of Socrates' conviction that philosophical wisdom 
leads to an emptying of knowledge, a realisation that one knows nothing. As Socrates 
concludes, amidst all the ensuing confusion (tetaragmenous), "can philosophers be 
said to be proper teachers (didaskalous)? " The question is self-evidently rhetorical 
and at 96d Socrates outlines his fears - 
Socrates: I fear, Meno, you and I are but poor (phauloi) creatures..... (96d, 
p. 357). 
Again Plato's choice of phrase is not insignificant - phauloi can mean slight, easy, 
paltry, petty, bad. It refers to persons low in rank, the mean, common, worthless, 
those of no account. It can also refer to the uneducated and physically ugly. One is 
thus quite far from the heights and sublimity of Augustine's supposed Platonism. 
What is crucial in this context is that Socrates / Plato not only replace knowledge with 
wisdom, but define this wisdom as absolute lowliness, a complete lack of vanity and 
power. It thus bears a striking affinity to the very Christian wisdom with which 
Augustine will seek to replace Platonism [6]. Despite the reference to Christ one 
cannot help thinking of Socrates when one reads the following passage from the 
Confessions - 
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They scorned to learn from Him, because He is meek and humble of heart. 
For thou hast hidden these things from the wise and prudent and hast revealed 
them to the little ones (Confessions, p. 125). 
The upshot of the analysis of Augustine is not to denigrate the great thinker from 
Algeria. It is rather to bring Augustinian Christianity closer to its Platonic 
predecessors, to give a genuine meaning to the term "Christian Platonism". In the 
next section, I will analyse how this Platonic / Augustinian legacy is developed 
through the very singular work of Nicholas de Cusa. 
Section 7.3 - De Cusa on "Wisdom". 
De Cusa is no different from the figures already discussed in being steeped in a very 
particular philosophical history. In the first place late Plato is an obvious influence on 
his work - one can cite for example the Parmenides as being crucial to the 
development of De Cusa's own dialectics of unity and plurality (cf. Moffitt-Watts, 
p. 22). Additionally, Boethius' De Trinitate (via the commentary on this text by 
Thierry of Chartes) is pivotal to the formation of De Cusa's distinction between 
complicatio and explicatio. For Boethius, complicatio is the "enfolding" of all created 
things in God, that is God represents the grounding context in which all things are 
maintained. Explicatio, on the other hand, is the "unfolding" of God in created things 
- in other words, the primacy of God which enfolds the universe manifests itself 
(unfolding) through the very things of the universe. This Boethian idea bears striking 
resemblances to the Platonic conception of participation in the Good or Being - the 
Good unfolds in beings which themselves are enfolded in the Good. It is developed 
by De Cusa who maintains its overarching sense while also applying it to the relation 
between "faith" and "understanding". Here De Cusa is influenced both by Boethius' 
215 
cosmology and Augustine's conditioning of faith by understanding. As Moffitt-Watts 
observes - 
[echoing Augustine]...... knowledge rests upon first principles, which are taken 
to be true on the basis of faith...... understanding is the unfolding (explicatio) of 
faith and that faith in turn is the enfolding (complicatio) of understanding. 
Without true faith there can be no understanding: "Therefore the intellect is 
directed by faith and faith is extended through the intellect" (p. 83, Moffitt- 
Watts). 
De Cusa's most famous text, "De Docta Ignorantia", develops this philosophy of faith 
seeking understanding through an emphasis on an irreducible metaphysical and 
epistemological disjunction. This conception is most clearly articulated in De Cusa's 
principle that "there is no proportion between the finite and the infinite" (infiniti ad 
finituin proportionem non esse). To this point one would seem to be quite close to 
Derrida's idea of an infinite differance - De Cusa, like Derrida, would seem to 
believe in an andialectical moment, an "unravelling" of philosophical truth. In terms 
of the Platonic text, one could locate this moment as that of Meno's paradox. And De 
Cusa certainly describes in vivid terms in the "De Docta Ignorantia" a state of 
"intellectual death" which seems very reminiscent of the Menoian / Derridean 
situation - 
if, freed from the body in which it was subject to the conjectures of time, the 
intellect reaches not its desired end..... it is rightly said to fall into intellectual 
death...... thrown into the very gulf itself of confusion...... without extinction 
and without end, it ever dies in agony. This is a life bitter above all imagining, 
for it is death in life, it is being in nothingness, and knowledge more empty 
than ignorance..... (p. 85/86, "OLI") [7]. 
It seems appropriate on first inspection to link this Cusian passage to a similar 
nihilistic trajectory in Derrida. For example, one could cite Derrida's opening and 
closing passages in "Plato's Pharmacy". The text initially opens with a reference to 
the Greek term kalaphos, meaning "a blow, knock, slap..... ", or also "penetration, 
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hollowing out, scratch" [PP., p. 63]. The text concludes with amongst other terms, 
another brief reference to kalaphos. In this final context, Derrida is keen to stress 
how Plato (and by implication "Platonism") are grounded in an exclusion of this 
kalaphos which refuses to be excluded. Plato can only helplessly contrive to avoid 
this reality ["Plato gags his ears" (Platon se bouche les oreilles)]. Derrida sums up 
the futility of this Platonic gesture as follows - 
Il ya 1ýi cendre [ There is there, flame] 
This Derridean apocalypticism bears striking resemblances to the sense of 
"intellectual death" as described by De Cusa in "De Docta Ignorantia" as it does 
similarly to Plato's description of the states of perplexity (aporia), benumbment 
(narkosa) and laziness (argous) in the Meno. But as with Plato's attempt to bring 
Socrates out of the Menoian paralysis, so too with De Cusa's conception of 
"intellectual death". This stage or phase of thinking represents for De Cusa the 
consequence of a fundamentally misguided methodology. The issue of "what is 
philosophy? " again becomes crucial here. Prior to his description of the state of 
"intellectual death", De Cusa has clearly delineated that such a phase does not signify 
a proper or inevitable state of affairs. Quite the contrary; intelligence in its most 
proper sense, far from being interminably confused in a labyrinth without exit, 
actually "embraces within itself incorruptible forms" - 
An intelligence is above time and unsubjected to temporal corruption, for by 
its nature it embraces within itself incorruptible forms..... ["OLI", p. 85]. 
This transition from "intellectual death" to a supra-temporal "intelligence" appears 
highly problematic from a philosophical point of view. How is this leap across the 
chasm ["the very gulf itself', "OLI" p. 85] effected and with what justification? It is 
this very problematicity which appears insurmountable. For Derrida, there can be no 
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possible move from intellectual death to supratemporality. And how, one might ask, 
can De Cusa believe himself to have so succeeded? 
Before offering an appraisal of the success or otherwise of De Cusa's method, it is 
crucial to note that, contrary to first impressions, De Cusa and Derrida are not facing 
the same problem. For Derrida, the issue is one of a lack of knowledge - one can 
never "know" a supra-temporal intelligence and thus one is limited to an 
interminable circle of dlffcrance. For De Cusa, however, it is the very emphasis on a 
lack of knowledge (or rather the emphasis on "knowledge" as a philosophical 
paradigm) which constitutes the problem. It is for De Cusa not so much a matter of 
too little knowledge as too much. This agnosticism (or anepistemologism) is of 
course readily apparent in the very title of De Cusa's most famous text, "De Docta 
Ignorantia". One has an "ignorance" or lack of knowledge but this ignorance is not 
negative - it is rather positive; a "learned ignorance". 
This sense of a positive learnedness cannot derive from epistemology in the measure 
to which Dc Cusa's emphasis on ignorance is precisely a critique of knowledge as a 
value. Its source is most clearly and eloquently explicated by De Cusa in his 
dialogical text, "De Sapientia" or "Concerning Wisdom" [8]. This pivotal text 
comprises two books and has been acclaimed as "the most important discussion of 
wisdom in the late Middle Ages" [cf. Dolan, Introduction to De Cusa, Unity and 
Reform p. 99]. The text involves two interlocutors, a "Citizen" and an "Orator", the 
first representing lay wisdom and the second a professional expertise. The crucial 
aspect from the perspective of the difference between De Cusa and Derrida is that 
while professional expertise is deconstructed, the reader is presented with a positive 
alternative. To this extent, the Cusian text follows an analogous trajectory to that of 
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Plato's method in the Meno - an initial positing of sophistic knowledge, a consequent 
deconstruction of this sophism, leading to aporia and finally an affirmation of 
wisdom beyond the limits of epistemology. 
Significantly, Cusa's text exemplifies the compatibility between Platonic and 
Christian ideals of wisdom. In Chapter 6,1 introduced the problem of the relation 
between Platonism and Christian Platonism - as the former remains irrevocably a 
pagan philosophy, can it be seen as reconcilable with a Christianity founded on 
dogmatics (the Incarnation, Redemption etc)? There I came to the conclusion that 
Platonism and Christianity represented irreducibly singular but nonetheless 
compatible thought-systems. Here in the case of Cusian wisdom, this compatibility is 
so pronounced as to become almost an identification. I will clarify this point through 
an analysis of "De Sapientia" with reference to "De Docta Ignorantia" where 
necessary. 
Perhaps the most explicit invocation of Platonism in "De Sapientia" concerns what De 
Cusa refers to as the "foretaste" ["CW", p. 107] of wisdom. This concept is 
introduced as a resolution to a philosophical situation uncannily similar to the 
problematic described by Plato in the Meno. There, having deconstructed the value 
of knowledge, Socrates faces a paradox as outlined by Meno. How, Meno asks, if 
there can be no knowledge of truth, is one to recognise truth when one finds it? In 
response, Socrates puts forward the path of pistis (faith) as an answer - one believes 
that there is a truth. While this solves the difficulty of starting upon the search for 
truth, it still leaves unresolved the issue of recognisability. One can believe that one 
will find something but unless one has some sense what that something is, one may 
well find it without realising this fact. In answer to this more difficult objection, 
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Socrates introduces the crucial Platonic theme of anamnesis or remembrance, the 
idea that all learning is a process of recollecting truths. Here one can see a clear 
Pythagorean influence on Plato - the soul exists prior to its embodiment in a state of 
wisdom and while this wisdom is more or less forgotten upon entrance of the soul into 
the body, nonetheless a trace of "truth" remains. 
De Cusa develops this point through his concept of a "foretaste" of wisdom - 
life itself is an intellectual spirit having in itself a certain innate foretaste 
through which it searches with great desire the very font of its own life. 
Without that foretaste it could neither seek after it nor know when it had 
acquired it. It is due to this that it is moved toward it as its proper life. Every 
spirit finds it sweet to ascend continually to the very principle of life even 
though this be inaccessible [p. 107, "CW"]. 
Like Plato (and unlike Derrida), De Cusa here offers a projected solution to the 
problem outlined by Meno's paradox. If epistemology is unable to find truth through 
its criterion of knowledge, are we not destined to an interminable wandering of 
philosophy, a discipline apparently going nowhere? This sense of misdirection or 
what Derrida terms (inventing a neologism) destinerrancy, is provisionally reinforced 
in the Meno by Socrates' description of philosophers as lacking any expertise, as 
being but "poor creatures" (phauloi) [Meno, 96d, p. 357]. The term Socrates 
employs in this context ("phauloi") is very strong, having the sense of triviality, 
pettiness, meaness, worthlessness. When one combines this passage with the prior 
section in the Meno where Meno speaks of perplexity (aporia) and benumbment 
(narhosa) and Socrates admits to feeling the same, the overarching mood of the Meno 
seems strongly Derridean. I reiterate this aspect of Plato's thinking (what one might 
term a nihilistic phase) because it is crucial to an understanding of De Cusa's own 
solution. 
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Prior to even Plato, this mode of thinking can be referred back to our analysis in 
Chapter 2 of the Presocratic philosophers, Heraclitus and Parmenides. In particular, 
Heraclitus' concept of orexis or striving is revealing. For Heraclitus, truth can never 
be accessible as such to the human - philosophy is always a love of an unachieved 
wisdom rather than a wisdom possessed. This conception of lack or absence is also of 
course central to Plato's work - in the Meno it is perhaps best emblematised by the 
two contrary uses of the term tharros. In the first case, Plato uses it negatively to 
refer to a sophistic possession of knowledge or wisdom; literally an "over- 
confidence". In the second case, however, Plato employs "tharros" positively to 
refer to a philosophising "confidently". Faced with aporia and perplexity, the 
philosopher (as exemplified by Socrates) must "confidently" carry on striving after 
wisdom. Unlike the negative sense of tharros which has an air of finality attached to 
it (the sophist would know the truth), the positive sense of "confidently" carries with 
it an air of nonfinality, of endless openness or vulnerability amidst the striving. 
It is this second sense of tharros which implicitly guides De Cusa's thinking in both 
"De Sapientia" and "De Docta Ignorantia". Through his concept of a "foretaste of 
wisdom", De Cusa avoids the infinite regress of Meno's paradox while at the same 
time avoiding the negative over-confidence (tltarros) of sophism. De Cusa speaks of 
the intellectual spirit "ascending continually" to the principle of life, giving the 
sense that the destination is never properly reached - it is the continuous ascent which 
is emphasised. This idea of nonfinality is also clarified by De Cusa's description of 
the principle of life as "inaccessible" [p. 107, "OLP']. A little later, De Cusa 
eloquently clarifies this movement of the intellectual spirit - 
Since this vital motion cannot find rest except in that infinite life which is the 
eternal wisdom, the motion which will not cease in the attainment of the finite 
which never touches the infinite. It is moved with a continual desire to reach it 
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and the delightfulness of the attraction is never lessened. For wisdom is such a 
pleasant food that it satisfies without diminishing the appetite and thus 
provides a delight that never ceases [p. 111, "CW"]. 
One therefore avoids "intellectual death" through a specific satisfaction of the 
intellectual spirit but this satisfaction is never final or exhaustive. As De Cusa 
observes in "De Docta Ignorantia", "you shall be satisfied, and with no disgust of 
satiety, for this immortal food is life itself' ["OLI", p. 95]. This sense of an 
insurmountable disjunction between desire and ultimate satiety is grounded in De 
Cusa's theological conviction that the intellectual spirit (which is infinite) cannot be 
satisfied with the temporal while nonetheless such intellectual spirit can never fully 
attain divinity but only participate in it inadequately. In the first case, De Cusa 
makes clear in "De Docta Ignorantia" the sense of the infinite striving of intellectual 
spirit - 
Praised be God who has given us a mind that cannot be satisfied with the 
temporal. Its desire having no limits, it recognises itself as above all time 
immortal, from its insatiable desire within time ["OLI", p. 95]. 
In "De Sapientia" however it is also made clear that the human can only partially 
transcend the temporal. Intellectual desire may take us beyond the limits of 
temporality but it can never fully attain to union with the divine - 
even though it [God / infinite wisdom] literally communicates itself to all 
things as something infinitely good, yet it cannot be received by any as it 
is.. .. intellectual sweetness. This 
is the image of the sweetness of eternal 
wisdom which is the quiddity of quiddities and an improportionable 
comparison of one sweetness to another [p. 114, "CW"]. 
Human "wisdom" [strictly speaking; "human love of wisdom"] is inproportionable to 
divine wisdom, the latter "communicating" itself to its "image". One should note the 
similarity to the Platonic concept of "participation", and also to Heraclitus' statement 
that "the human is to the divine as a child is to an adult". In each of these cases one of 
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the most significant philosophical implications is the strong critique of 
anthropomorphism; the human is irrevocably limited - to quote De Cusa's famous 
principle, there is no proportion between the finite and the infinite. Applying this to 
the ancient-modern quarrel one can speak of a critique of subjectivity. This critique is 
implicit in several of the passages from both "De Sapientia" and "De Docta 
Ignorantia". In the former, the first negative reference to subjectivity occurs in the 
context of Dc Cusa's stress on the "incomprehensibility" of the infinite "object" - 
it comes to pass that the very inaccessibility or incomprehensibility of its 
infinite life becomes that which is most desired and longed for. It is as if a 
man discovers that the treasure of his life is innumerable, unweighable and 
immeasurable. And this very awareness of the incomprehensibility is most 
desirable not because it refers to the one comprehending but to 
the...... incomprehensible loveliness of the thing loved ["CW", p. 107] (my 
emphasis). 
The negative reference to subjectivity is crucial here - "not because it refers to the one 
comprehending". The focus is shifted from the locus of comprehension, the subject, 
to the object being comprehended, the objective or extra-subjective. A little later in 
"De Sapientia", De Cusa explicitly states that the eternal wisdom will not be obtained 
if the criterion of subjectivity is maintained - 
the eternal wisdom will not be obtained unless the possessor keeps nothing of 
his own. That which we have of our own are our vices and that which we have 
of the eternal wisdom are nothing but good things [p. 112, "CW"]. 
This could not be more unequivocal - subjectivity is "vice", a phrase which reminds 
one of Meister Eckhart's call to an "annihilation of self' in his text "On 
Detachment"[9]. Both Eckhart and De Cusa are here strictly within the medieval 
tradition of the anti-subjective, the "objective" (however mystical or elusive the 
object may be). In "De Docta Ignorantia", this theme is reiterated by De Cusa. He 
first speaks of charity by which he appears to mean a movement outside the concerns 
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of the self towards the object; charity would be the relinquishing of subjectivity by the 
subject in a move outside itself towards God - 
Charity is the form of faith....... when body and soul themselves are reckoned as 
nothing by comparison with Him, then have you certificate of a most powerful 
faith ..... [p. 91, 
"OLI"]. 
Again, several sections later, De Cusa states that no man could so love Christ that he 
could not possibly be loved more by Christ ["OLI", p. 93]. Subjectivity is once more 
a site of that which is less. It is at this point that De Cusa clarifies perhaps the most 
crucial implication of this philosophy (particularly as it relates to the ancient-modern 
quarrel). He distinguishes between the "vegetative" ["OLI", p. 84] and "intellectual" 
["OLI", p. 94] aspects of subjectivity as they relate to their respective objects. In this 
context, "vegetative" seems to have a broader than usual sense, including all kinds of 
rationalism which claim to exhaustively understand their objects. The nature of 
vegetative power, De Cusa states, is that it "transmutes nourishment into its own 
system" ["OLI", p. 84], the food becomes "the nature of the feeder" ["OLI"., p. 95] - 
in other words, the "object" is reduced to "subjective" terms. In contrast, in genuine 
philosophy, where the subject is as it were deconstructed - 
the food of life is eaten ever, but never to become the nature of the 
partaker.... the intellect becomes the thing it understands ["OLI", p. 96]. 
The focus is therefore shifted - from rationalism where the object becomes subjective 
to the life of "intellectual spirit" where the subject, as it were, becomes its object. It 
is clear in applying this De Cusian logic to Derrida's work that one cannot simply 
locate deconstruction at the level of "vegetative" subjectivity. Indeed Derrida has 
continuously repeated the very need to deconstruct "subjectivity". Rather the kernel 
of the issue lies at the level of the "objective". It is here that De Cusa and Platonism 
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on the one side and deconstruction on the other radically diverge. While both agree 
that subjectivism and rationalism reduce the "object" to anthropocentric parameters, 
for Derrida there can be no objective "outside" of rationalism. As he observes in 
"Cogito and the History of Madness" - 
Hegel again, always ["Cogito", p. 49]. 
For De Cusa however, (as for Plato), this is an excessively fatalistic perspective. 
Following a strong Platonic heritage, De Cusa invokes the notion of Form to posit a 
resolution to the crisis of rationalism - 
Wisdom, which is itself the equality of being, is the word or reason of things. 
It is, as it were, an infinite intellectual form and the form that gives the 
formed existence to a thing. Therefore, an infinite form is the actuality of all 
formable forms and the most precise equality of them all ["CW", p. 113]. 
De Cusa goes on to give this concept of Form a theological specificity - 
The art or wisdom of God the Father is the most simple form and yet it is the 
only and most equal example of infinite formable forms, regardless of how 
variable they may be ["CW", p. 1141. 
On first inspection, this may give the impression that what is at issue here is a simple 
matter of philosophy vs. theology. In so far as De Cusa invokes God as an Infinite 
Form, is he not irreducibly a theologian? Derrida on this interpretation would be the 
philosopher seeking (but not finding) reasons for truth and existence. However, this 
kind of interpretation is very misleading. Returning to our original discussion of the 
origins of "philosophy" in Presocratism, we there defined philosophy as "love of 
wisdom". In this sense, De Cusa is precisely nothing more than a philosopher - he is 
the philosopher par excellence. This also reintroduces the question of the relation 
between Platonism and Christianity. While the concept of God is fundamental to De 
Cusa, nonetheless Plato's nonChristian concept of Form performs a closely analogous 
function. This complicates the idea of the issue being simply one of philosophy vs. 
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theology. It is not so much a matter of trying to subtract theological elements from De 
Cusa as of saying that the strict distinction between philosophy and theology is highly 
problematic. 
For a thinker so outspoken on the need for interdisciplinary contamination and the 
deconstruction of academic boundaries (cf. for example "The Law of Genre"[10]) 
Derrida seems surprisingly determined to maintain the hegemony of philosophy. As 
we saw in Chapter 5, Derrida understands the possibility of dialectic in exclusively 
epistemological terms. But this is to exclude a whole range of alternative 
possibilities. Beyond rationalism, there is for example always the possibility of a 
dialectic based on faith rather than knowledge. It is this particular path of 
transcending Derrida's aporetic crisis on which I have concentrated in this thesis, in 
this chapter through an analysis of the respective systems of Augustine and De Cusa. 
In my Conclusion, I will give a brief overview of some of the most crucial claims of 
this thesis and attempt to make suggestions as to how some of the problems which 
have been foregrounded might be resolved or at least more clearly addressed. 
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CONCLUSION 
I-A General Overview 
Ernst Cassirer in one of his important texts on Platonism (The Platonic Renaissance 
in England) [1] describes the philosophy of Nicholas De Cusa as "a form of 
scepticism, a conception of `i norantia", which in its consequences nullifies the 
form of the great medieval systems" [Cassirer, p. 14]. This thesis has been concerned 
to focus on the mode of scepticism exemplified, often conceived as nihilism, as a 
generalizable trait of Platonism as a whole. I have successively traced this movement 
through the works of Plato, Plotinus, Boethius, Augustine and De Cusa himself. 
But one should not be misled by this sceptical bent to see Platonism as a philosophy 
of negativity. Cassirer's conclusion concerning De Cusa is also generalizable to the 
wider movement of Platonism - 
But this very nullification carries with it the germ and the requirement of a 
new positive basis of faith [p. 14, Cassirer]. 
It is this philosophical positivity which, I have claimed, gives Platonism its 
contemporary relevance. When one analyses Derrida's philosophy, one has a very 
close analogue of the first two stages of Platonic dialectic, but the third positive stage 
is absent. The first stage of a misguided epistemologism and the second stage of a 
rigorous deconstruction are indeed present. This makes the confrontation between 
Platonism and deconstruction all the more powerful - the crux of the issue becomes 
located in the attempted transition from the second to the third stage. For Derrida, 
this transition cannot take place, it is philosophically impossible. For Platonism on 
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the other hand this transition must take place if philosophy is to have any genuine 
future. 
Starting from Chapter 1, my claim has been that Derrida's resistance to the transition 
from the second to the third stages actually has its roots in a philosophically 
determined position - that of a development of Cartesianism, in effect a neo- 
Cartcsianisni. Concentrating there on Derrida's early work on Husserl and, in 
particular, on the 1963 essay "Cogito and the History of Madness", I attempted to 
demonstrate a clear foregrounding by Derrida of the idea of infinity. In the "Cogito" 
essay, Derrida attempts to extricate this "idea" from the more repressive "deductive 
system" of Descartes. In so doing he both agrees and disagrees with Foucault's 
famous assessment of Descartes in Madness and Civilisation. Derrida agrees with 
Foucault concerning the repressive nature of the Cartesian philosophical system as 
such. He disagrees however on two counts - 
1) In the first case, lie disagrees with Foucault that Cartesianism represents a 
fundamental rupture in the history of philosophy. Rather Derrida posits a continuity 
linking the ancients to the moderns which he describes as "a history of Reason", an 
interpretation which is perhaps most succinctly summated in his phrase "Hegel again, 
always". 
2) Secondly, he demarcates an isolated moment in Cartesianism which does succeed 
in transgressing the repression of the overarching "deductive system". Foucault had 
claimed that Descartes' "radical doubt" was not genuinely radical in so far as it 
excluded the possibility of madness. Derrida counters that the radicality of the 
"madness" example (while itself excluded for strategic reasons) is nonetheless 
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transmuted to the example of "dreams" and thus a genuine radicality is maintained by 
Cartesianism. 
This defence of Descartes has specific relevance to the problem of Cartesianism but 
also has broader implications with regard to Derrida's reading of philosophy per se. 
This is where points 1 and 2 interconnect. In the first case, Derrida introduces what 
he elsewhere terms a "quasi-transcendental" reading of philosophy. Philosophy is 
double, as it were. It is both repressive and liberating. This is a theme which recurs 
in "Plato's Pharmacy" - the Platonic text is both repressed and liberated. The sense 
in which Derrida seems to understand these terms is revealing. From the perspective 
of repression, it is dialectic which is the prime example. In the "Cogito" essay 
Derrida seeks to undo the dialectics of Descartes's "deductive system". Similarly in 
"Plato's Pharmacy", any attempt by Plato to draw a strict dialectical line between 
metaphysics and sophism is "unravelled". This finally leads to Derrida's polemical 
contention that Socrates actually deserved the hemlock (cf. "A Poison Deserved"), 
i. e. he really was a sophist. 
In contrast, it is the nondialectical or even anti-dialectical moments of both Plato and 
Descartes's texts which are seen by Derrida as constituting a genuine movement of 
deconstruction. In the "Cogito" essay Derrida declares "I philosophise only in terror" 
and invokes the Kierkegaardian dictum, "the instant of decision is a madness". This 
stress on "terror" and "madness" is directly linked by Derrida to the nondialectical 
status of the "idea" in the "Cogito" essay. Here it is contrasted with the attempted 
"reassurance" of the project of "philosophy" - 
philosophy is perhaps the reassurance given against the anguish of being mad 
at the point of greatest proximity to madness. This silent and specific moment 
could be called pathetic ["Cogito", p. 59] 
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In the context of his reading of Descartes, Derrida would seem to have a strong case 
here. The very validity of the Cartesian project (its historical raison d'etre) is 
premised on its introduction of the criterion of a clear and distinct idea as a 
philosophical paradigm. In instituting the "Cogito, ergo sum" principle Descartes 
explicitly expresses his disdain for the previous systems of the ancients which he 
describes pejoratively as having been built on "nothing but sand and mud". Whereas 
the premoderns tended to move from the objective reality to the subjective idea, 
Descartes turns this system on its head. The individual becomes as it were the locus 
of the cosmos; it is reality which proceeds from the subject - 
never to accept anything for true which I did not clearly know to be such; that 
is to say, carefully to avoid precipitancy and prejudice, and to comprise 
nothing more in my judgement than what was presented to my mind so clearly 
and distinctly as to exclude all ground of doubt (p. 15, Discourse on Method). 
To this point, Descartes would seem to have avoided Derrida's suspicions concerning 
the "pathetic" and "reassuring" aspect of philosophy. Descartes is here explicitly 
declaring the need for an avoidance of deception or doubt. However, by the end of 
the Meditations, Derrida's point would seem to have been irrevocably confirmed. 
Having set out from the principle of autonomous subjectivity, Descartes now seems 
to condition this principle through recourse to the existence of a transubjective God - 
even the rule which I stated above that I held, namely, that the things we 
grasp very clearly and very distinctly are all true, is assured only because God 
is or exists and because he is a perfect Being, and because everything that is in 
us comes from him....... if we did not know that all that is in us which is real 
and true comes from a perfect and infinite Being, we would have no reason 
which would assure us that, however clear and distinct our ideas might be, 
they had the perfection of being true [ Meditations, p. 58 / 59]. 
The ultimate Cartesian standard therefore is not a clear and distinct idea of God, but 
rather a God who verifies that clear and distinct ideas are, by definition, true. On 
Descartes's own terms, this philosophical manoeuvre constitutes a failure of method. 
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He has not succeeded in refounding philosophy as he had originally declared. Crucial 
to our question is Derrida's very specific response to this failure of Cartesianism - 
if philosophy has taken place....... it is only in the extent to which it has 
formulated the aim of thinking beyond the finite shelter ("Cogito", p. 56). 
Here Derrida is reiterating what he has previously interpreted (contra Foucault) as the 
radical moment of Descartes's project - the idea of infinity. The final invocation of 
the objective existence and Being of God as a philosophical standard by Descartes is 
judged by Derrida to be inadmissible. This refers back to his description of the 
"reassurance" of philosophy as being "pathetic". Nonetheless Derrida still wishes to 
salvage a possibility for philosophy, a partial escape route. In the above quotation, 
he allows for a certain "taking place" of philosophy as being a possibility - "if 
philosophy has taken place... ". By "taking place" he would seem to be implying that 
the philosophical project may be viable or successful if it manages to avoid the . 
"pathetic" reassurance previously described. 
Derrida's sense of the nature of this viability is revealing - 
...... only 
in the extent to which it has formulated the aim of thinking beyond 
the finite shelter ["Cogito", p. 56]. 
This stress on "thinking" is crucial. Descartes's original project had been founded on 
a new clarity of subjective thinking. But in the Meditations Descartes ultimately 
reinvokes the premodern standard of the objective i. e. God as ultimate Object. In 
recognising this failure, Derrida nonetheless wishes to focus on "the intentional 
meaning of this project itself' ("Cogito", p. 310) - 
One cannot allege that the philosophical project of the "infinitivist" 
rationalisms served as an instrument or as an alibi for a finite historico- 
political-social violence (which is doubtless the case) without first having to 
acknowledge and respect the intentional meaning of this project itself. Now 
within its own intentional meaning, this project presents itself as the 
conceptualisation of the infinite, that is, of that which cannot be exhausted by 
any finite totality ("Cogito", p. 310). 
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What is at issue here is the reason for and significance of the Cartesian failure for 
philosophy in general. According to Derrida, Descartes failed because his 
philosophy invoked a transubjective God which was not admissible in terms of the 
criterion of subjective clarity and distinctness. This much is clearly defensible. 
However Derrida then proceeds to delineate the only possibility for philosophy ("only 
in the extent.... " ["Cogito", p. 56]) as a reemphasis on a subjective thinking separated 
from its objective context ("beyond the finite shelter"). In other words, Derrida is 
suggesting that any attempt to dialecticize an "idea" of infinity into some kind of 
objective existence is invalid in the measure to which one cannot "know" infinity as 
an object. This aspect of the "Cogito" essay reiterates several themes which appeared 
in Derrida's first text (from 1962), his Edmund Husserl's "Origin of Geometry": An 
Introduction, most notably his stress there on the "Idea in the Kantian sense". In the 
Introduction Derrida focuses on Husserl's attempt to dialecticize the Kantian Idea into 
a metaphysical truth which is intrinsic to the lebenswelt or world as such. In the 
particular context of geometry, Husserl puts forward strong criticisms of naive 
objectivism such as the system of Galileo, which posits geometrical truth as supra- 
temporal. According to Husserl, Galileo pays no attention to the "origin" of 
geometry; he acts as if geometrical truth had simply fallen from the sky. In 
opposition to this vulgar objectivism, Husserl invokes the transcendentalism of Kant. 
In the first case, geometrical truth must have a subjective aspect, what he terms the 
Idea in the Kantian sense. Secondly, this aspect points to a specific kind of historical 
contingency - truth is not simply discovered as an extrasubjective object. It is also 
"created" by the subjective geometer. 
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This is clearly a move away from Galilean objectivism and indeed from vulgar 
objectivism in general. It is also however a move away from a simple Kantianism. 
With Husserl, the Kantian phenomenal / noumenal distinction becomes dialecticized 
into an attempted symbiosis between subjectivity and objectivity. Derrida's point in 
the Introduction however is that this project is an ultimate failure. And analogously to 
the situation of Descartes, Derrida believes that it is the dialectical moment in 
Husserl that must be avoided. What Derrida derives from Cartesianism is an "idea" of 
infinity, an ideality which nonetheless refuses to be dialecticized into a truth of 
metaphysics. 
We are now in a position to reapply this Derridean philosophy to the deconstructive 
readings of Plato and Platonism. In the case of the reading of Plato in "Plato's 
Pharmacy", Derrida's primary focus is on the Phaedrus. Derrida emphasises the 
"unravelling" of dialectic in this dialogue particularly through the case of "writing" - 
If we extend ourselves by force of play. If we then write a bit: on Plato, who 
already said in the Phaedrus that writing can only repeat (itself), that it 
"always signifies (semainei) the same" and that it is a "game" [PP., p. 65]. 
"Plato's Pharmacy" is a meditation on how Plato cannot so easily control "writing" - 
and "ecriture" here comes to signify what Derrida in Limited Inc refers to as "the real 
history of the world". What is at stake is thus the very possibility of metaphysics - 
if the network of opposing predicates that link one type of writing to the other 
contains in its meshes all the conceptual oppositions of "Platonism" - here 
considered the dominant structure of the history of metaphysics - then it can be 
said that philosophy is played out in the play between two kinds of writing. 
Whereas all it wanted to do was distinguish between writing and speech [PP., 
p. 149]. 
The philosophical distinction between speech and writing, it is therefore claimed by 
Derrida, is inadmissible, and this inadmissibility is then generalized to the "history of 
metaphysics" which is described as being "played out" i. e. "unravelled" or 
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interminably deconstructed. The inadmissibility of the speech / writing distinction is 
therefore a paradigm case of the failure of philosophical distinction or normativity per 
se. In Chapter 4,1 considered the specifics of the speech / writing issue in the 
Phaedrus and more generally with regard to Derrida's concept of phonocentrism. 
However, here I will rather concentrate on the question of philosophical normativity. 
The issue once again revolves around the precise meaning Derrida gives to 
philosophical normativity and what he considers to be threatening to its very basis. 
He has already described Platonism as "the dominant structure of the history of 
metaphysics" (PP., p. 149). It is perhaps a reference to the Meno in "Plato's 
Pharmacy" which is most revealing in this context. The reference concerns Meno 
80a-b, where Meno accuses Socrates of "exercising magic and witchcraft" [PP., 
p. 118] and of reducing others to "perplexity" [PP., p. 118]. There is also in this 
passage a warning from Meno to Socrates concerning the danger of being "arrested as 
a wizard" [PP., p. 119] which considering the Meno was apparently written directly 
after Socrates' execution, adds a sense of gravitas to the problem. Derrida's point is 
that the Socratic method precisely as a kind of "magic and witchcraft" is 
indistinguishable from sophism. But it is the very possibility of such normative 
distinctions (e. g. Platonism / sophism, speech / writing etc) which constitutes the 
basis of what Derrida terms the "history of metaphysics". If such distinctions are 
untenable, then Plato's philosophy and more generally metaphysics as such are 
subject to an interminable deconstruction. 
The difficulty with this Derridean interpretation lies again in his tendency to reduce 
Platonism and philosophy per se to an exclusively epistemological enterprise. 
Returning to the Phaedrus which is the primary concern of "Plato's Pharmacy", one 
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can trace several possible Platonic responses to Derrida's attempted deconstruction. 
In the first case, the Phaedrus is centrally concerned with the question of 
philosophical methodology. In contrast to the Cartesian paradigm of a clear and 
distinct subjective idea, the Phaedreus very much exemplifies the paradigm of the 
Object or Form in Platonism. For example at 277d-e, Socrates describes- the 
philosophical object as being a study of the just, the fine and the good and crucially 
outlines how any subjective interpretation of this Object cannot be final. Even those 
who succeed in speaking accurately of such Forms cannot be ascribed the title of 
"being wise" - 
Socrates: To call him wise seems to me to be too much, and to be fitting only 
in the case of a god; to call him either a lover of wisdom -a philosopher - or 
something like that would both fit him more and be in better taste [PP., p. 131; 
Meno 278d] 
This is a reinvoking of the Heraclitean / Parmenidean standard of thinking as 
described in Chapter 2. Philosophy is not a matter of wisdom, even less knowledge, 
but rather a love of or striving for (orexis) wisdom. This is a crucial point with regard 
to the Phaedrus to the extent that the latter dialogue when interpreted in 
epistemological terms appears bizarrely disorganised. Derrida in fact makes reference 
to the common interpretation of the Phaedrus as being an ununified text [PP., p. 67]. 
Diogenes Laertius for example describes the Phaedrus as perhaps being Plato's first 
attempt at a dialogue, which consequently manifests "a juvenile quality" (nzeirakiodes 
ti) [PP., p. 66]. H. Raeder, in 1905, took the alternate view that the "badly 
composed" Phaedrus was rather a proof of "old age", or as Derrida describes it 
"senile impotence" [p. 67, PP. ]. 
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Now Derrida wishes to distance himself from these interpretations, preferring to see 
the Phaedrus as "a rigorous, sure and subtle form" [PP., p. 67]. However, Derrida's 
point is that Plato's subtlety in subverting epistemological certainty in the Phaedrus 
has the consequence of an interminable doubling. In other words, on this 
interpretation, Plato would be the first self-deconstructor, a worthy precursor of 
Derrida. 
This is where I wish to question Derrida's reading. Because Derrida interprets 
philosophy in exclusively epistemological terms, it would seem that one is either an 
epistemologist or a deconstructionist; one is either possessed of knowledge or one is 
destined to a journey without origin or destination, a "destinerrancy". On my 
interpretation, however, what makes the Phaedrus significant is exactly its 
construction of an alternative philosophical paradigm to epistemology. The Phaedrus 
manifests the same epistemological insecurity as Derrida's essay "Cogito and the 
History of Madness", but whereas Derrida is driven to emphasise an "idea of infinity" 
abstracted from dialectic, Plato rather seeks to reconstruct dialectical thinking. At 
276c-d for example Socrates outlines the nature of dialectical thinking as having to 
focus inevitably on "pieces" of knowledge; dialectic is therefore not absolute but 
fragmented. Similarly, Socrates states that philosophical arguments can only point us 
in the right direction, they cannot be said to be full expositions of the truth (on this 
point cf. Rowe p. 8). 
These qualifications of dialectical certainty are perhaps best understood in the context 
of Plato's declaration in the Seventh Letter of the increasing "perplexity" (325e) 
which accompanied his philosophical development - 
The result was that I, who had at first been full of eagerness for a political 
career, as I gazed upon the whirlpool of public life and saw the incessant 
movement of shifting currents, at last felt dizzy, and, while I did not cease to 
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consider means of improving this particular situation and indeed of reforming 
the whole constitution, yet, in regard to action, I kept waiting for favourable 
moments, and finally saw clearly in regard to all states now existing that 
without exception their system of government is bad. Their constitutions are 
almost beyond redemption except through some miraculous plan accompanied 
by good luck (326, a-b, p. 1575 / 1576) [2]. 
The situation described in the first part of the passage is almost Derridean -a dizzying 
whirlpool of shifting currents. And the final solution posited is far from Cartesian 
clarity and distinctness - "some miraculous plan accompanied by good luck". What 
makes the Phrredrus significant is that this sense of the miraculous and of chance are 
not allowed to spiral ad infinitum (ä ]a Derrida) but are rather grafted onto a 
constructive dialectical method. This method is explicitly described as "nonfinal" 
(278d) but nonetheless the "pieces" (276c-d) of knowledge one has access to as a 
philosopher arc regarded as directing us towards the whole. This is again reminiscent 
of the Meno where Socrates disavows both the tharraleon of epistemology and the 
aporiu of Meno, surpassing both these options with the more vulnerable tharros of 
the true philosopher -a striving grounded in pistis. 
This central aspect of Plato's work is of course developed through the tradition of 
Neo- and Christian- Platonism, and I have attempted in this thesis to clarify the nature 
of this development. Again one can highlight Derrida's neo-Cartesianism as a major 
stumbling block to his efforts to offer representative interpretations of Platonism. In 
the three essays "Passions", "Sauf le Nom" and "Khora" [cf. Chapter 5] Derrida is 
driven to apophasrs as the only solution to the crisis attendant upon the deconstruction 
of Platonic metaphysics. However, in Chapters 6 and 7,1 have tried to outline an 
alternative philosophical perspective to apophasis, through the analysis of the varied 
systems of Plotinus, Boethius, Augustine and De Cusa. It is perhaps De Cusa's 
concept of "learned ignorance" (docta ignorantia) which is most emblematic of the 
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dual movement in Platonism of "nullification" and positivity. Whereas Derrida tends 
to see such nullification or ignorance as the motor of deconstruction, Platonism rather 
sees it as the condition of possibility for a new model of metaphysics. 
Derrida's most recent text on this question The Gift of Death (Donner la mort) 
[analysed in Chapter 5] follows Jan Patocka in its analysis of Platonism as a 
philosophy fixated on the epistemological "object". Significantly, Derrida here 
distinguishes this epistemologism from a more deconstructive thinking which he 
(again following Patocka) now links to Christianity. The Christian philosopher 
Derrida looks to in this context is Sören Kierkegaard, particularly to his motifs of fear 
and trembling, pure exteriority and subjectivity. The Gift of Death, in its primary 
thematics, bears an uncanny resemblance to the themes outlined almost thirty years 
before in the essay "Cogito and the History of Madness". 
It is this continuous subtcxt in Derrida's work which I have attempted to make explicit 
in this thesis. I have argued that Derrida's emphasis on an interminable differance is 
not historically neutral but is rather conditioned by a development of the Cartesian 
paradigm. In the "Cogito" essay, Derrida identifies a failure in the philosophical 
project - Descartes's "idea of infinity" cannot be epistemologically proven to be a 
"thing-in-itself" i. e. God. Dcrrida derives the conclusion that such an ideality cannot 
be dialecticized dc jure and as such it is the specificity of the idea as idea which 
constitutes the future of philosophy. But by extending this problem outside the 
parameters of Derrida's work onto the issue of an ancient / modern quarrel, I have 
attempted to put forward a critique of deconstruction. 
The failure of the Cartesian system to achieve "objectivity", I have claimed, does not 
prove the inadmissibility of "objectivity" as such. Even less does it necessitate an 
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increased recourse to the paradigm of subjectivity (Derrida's movement in The Gift of 
Death). Instead, to the contrary, it is the claim of this thesis that Cartesian 
"objectivity" is the epiphenomenon of Cartesian "subjectivity", the latter rather than 
the former being the locus of the Cartesian failure. To this extent, the attempt to 
resolve the failure of Cartesian "objectivity" should start with a redefinition of 
objectivity, outside the parameters of subjectivism. It is premodern (i. e. 
preCartesian) metaphysics which provides us with an exemplary model in this regard. 
It is evidence of Derrida's residual Cartesianism that he fails to invoke the positive 
aspects of the premodern heritage, preferring instead to dwell on the negative 
dimensions of apophasis. The Cartesian failure becomes a generalized failure, and 
Derrida does not recognize that this failure itself depends upon an acceptance of the 
Cartesian terms of reference. 
I have forcgrounded Plato and Platonism as cases of resistance to these limitations of 
philosophical thought. Chronologically there is the difficulty that the latter 
(obviously) precede Descartes and modernity and therefore cannot precisely be said to 
resist modern rationalism. Two brief rejoinders might be articulated. Firstly sophism, 
in its stress on the importance of the individual (e. g. Protagoras' "man is the measure" 
principle) and its conception of philosophy as techne is a close analogue of modern 
rationalism. To this extent, Plato's continued resistance to sophism represents very 
much a prelude to the larger, more contemporary debate. Secondly, in this thesis I 
have chosen to concentrate on the Platonic tradition from a premodern perspective. 
But there are of course many examples of Platonic thought within the modern epoch 
and this thinking has unsurprisingly always been recognised for its unequivocal 
resistance to rationalism and positivism. The Cambridge Platonists [3] stand as 
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perhaps the most eloquent examples of this thinking but up to our own day such 
philosophers as Simone Weil and Iris Murdoch have retained an explicitly Platonic 
allegiance. This is not to mention the vast array of thinkers who exemplify an obvious 
Platonic influence, most notably for example Hans-Georg Gadamer or Leo Strauss 
[4]. 
In speaking of an ancient / modern quarrel, therefore, I have not been intending to 
raise a question of merely antiquarian interest. True to the sense of Platonism as a 
continuously renewed, striving (rather than possessing) metaphysics, this thesis 
foregrounds a problem which I believe to be of significant contemporary importance. 
In effect I have been attempting to do a Derrida on Derrida. In outlining a residual 
Cartesianism in Derrida's thought, I have been employing Platonism to deconstruct 
deconstruction. Perhaps d jffdrance is not the infinite deferral and differing Derrida 
would have us believe but rather a perspectival stifling of constructive philosophical 
resources. Here there is a potential stifling, not simply of the historical resources of 
Plato and (Nco / Christian) Platonism, but also of more contemporary sources of 
resistance to modernism which, on my interpretation, constitute more promising 
exemplars of "post-modem" thinking. The second and final part of this Conclusion 
will briefly look at two such examples, those of Iris Murdoch and Simone Weil. 
II - Murdoch, Weiland a Postmodern Platonism 
A collection of Iris Murdoch's most important essays has recently been published 
under the title Existentialists and Mystics. In the Foreword, George Steiner refers to 
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the fundamental affinities between Murdoch's project and that of (the historical 
movement of) Platonism - 
The programme is precisely that mapped in Neo-Platonism, in Augustine and 
in Dante's Paradiso. But with a formidable difference. It does not postulate 
"God". There is no need for any formal creed, let alone any generalised 
diffuse deism [Steiner, EM. p. xv]. 
In earlier chapters (particularly Chapter 6, with reference to Boethius) I spoke of the 
"compatibility" between paganism and Christianity. One example in this context is 
the way the Platonic doctrine of "participation" might be seen as analogous to the 
Christian doctrine of the Incarnation. It is with this broader sense of "Platonism" in 
mind (as not being restricted to one particular creed, whether Neo-Platonic or 
Christian) that one can best come to interpret Murdoch's eschewal of the postulate of 
"God". In saying that Murdoch's thought follows "precisely the programme" set out 
in, for example, Augustine but then abstracting "God" from the equation, Steiner 
seems to be stating a contradiction. But if we reintroduce the problematic of the 
ancient-modern quarrel here as an explanatory tool, the contradiction disappears. 
Steiner's point is precisely that there is something philosophically fundamental which 
Murdoch shares with Nco-Platonism, the Christian Platonism of Augustine and 
Dante's Aristotelianism, and that this fundamental agreement makes their obvious 
differences (with regard to creed) of derivative importance. Secondly, this common 
agreement is at its most philosophically powerful when it is posited as a unified 
opposition to the thinking of what Murdoch calls "existentialism", a term which is 
here used specifically with regard to Sartre but which is more generally extendable to 
modern philosophy beginning with Descartes and leading to Derrida. 
Murdoch focuses particularly on how the Platonic "Idea of Perfection" (this is the title 
of one of her most famous essays) became "a function of the will" [p. 3011. Her point 
241 
in this context directly relates to the earlier discussion of how the Platonic Ideon 
should not be confused with what Derrida calls "the Idea in the Kantian sense" or 
Descartes' "idea of infinity" - 
Goodness [becomes] not an object of insight or knowledge, it [becomes] a 
function of the will...... The idea that "good" is a function of the will stunned 
philosophy with its attractiveness....... metaphysical entities were removed 
[EM, p. 301]. 
Previously, that is strictly speaking prior to Descartes, "Goodness" was an object. 
In other words, prior to Descartes, "goodness" was a "reality" (a term Murdoch uses 
advisedly; EM, cf. p. 332) independent of subjectivity. Murdoch's "Idea of 
Perfection" therefore, like Plato's Idea (of which it is a direct descendant), is perhaps 
less confusingly rendered the "Form of Perfection / Goodness". From Descartes on, 
however, the Idea becomes subjectivized (i. e. it becomes dependent upon the 
subject's "idea"). In effect the Idea becomes an idea. This process is increasingly 
radicalized through the historical period of modernity and Murdoch traces its 
development up to a pivotal intensification with the work of Stuart Hampshire whom 
she describes as getting rid even of the proper "subject" ("the substantial self"; EM., 
p. 305) while replacing it with a "solitary omnipotent will" [EM., p. 305]. Although 
Hampshire's thinking falls more within the bounds of so-called "analytic" philosophy, 
Murdoch believes a strictly compatible movement to characterize so-called 
"Continental" philosophy. Here one can cite Murdoch's thought as a useful antidote 
to those who would have us believe in a strict divide between "analytic" and 
"continental" philosophy, opening up the possibility of a renewed debate between 
them. 
From the perspective of "continental" thinking, her particular focus is on Jean-Paul 
Sartre whom she describes as a "romantic rationalist" [cf. EM., Foreword p. xxii]. 
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The latter description for Murdoch is a pejorative one. On the one side, the charge of 
romanticism signifies a failure of existentialism to achieve its stated goal of returning 
us to "real" existence. On the other side, the rationalism charge symbolises the over- 
reliance of existentialism on the paradigm of subjective reason. The Murdochian 
solution to these twin perils is the introduction of what she terms mysticism (see 
especially Steiner, EM. p. xxii). Here Murdoch draws particularly on the work of 
Simone Weil as well as more traditional Platonic sources. In "The Idea of 
Perfection", Murdoch quotes Weil's famous declaration: "will is obedience not 
resolution" [EM., p. 331]. This is, as it were, the condensing of the essence of 
Murdochian mysticism into one phrase. 
The conception that "will" is "resolution" refers directly to the kind of view espoused 
by Hampshire (and Sartre) and for Murdoch is a direct development of Cartesian 
rationalism. The subjective will can be said to resolve philosophical and existential 
problems in the measure to which with Hampshire and Sartre the paradigm of 
subjectivity has been placed at the centre of philosophy. The criterion of value has 
been switched from the object to the subject. This point has been clarified above but 
it is important to reiterate it here in the specific context of Weil's declaration to the 
extent that Weil turns this modernist revolution on its head. By stating that "will is 
obedience not resolution", Weil (and following her, Murdoch) is taking the power 
away from º subjectivity and returning it to objectivity and she is doing this within the 
very language of modernism. By couching this transformation in terms of a self- 
definition of "will", `'Veil seems to be adhering to the very emphasis on subjectivity 
characteristic of modernity. But while the linguistic form of the statement might 
appear modernist, the philosophical content could not be more subversive of the 
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Cartesian project. The subject must be "obedient" to its object; the locus of power 
no longer resides with the Cogito but with the very other than self, a transformed 
emphasis which the title of Gordon's text on Murdoch captures powerfully; Iris 
Murdoch's Fables of Unsclfrng. 
But how is such "unsclfing", such "obedience" to the objective to be achieved? - 
Where virtue is concerned we often apprehend more than we clearly 
understand and grow by looking........ I have used the word "attention", which 
I borrow from Simone 'Veil, to express the idea of a just and loving gaze 
directed upon an individual reality [EM., p. 324 / 327]. 
The process of modern philosophical thinking has thus been turned upside down - 
instead of the subjective mind instituting its "resolution", the philosophical mind 
must rather attend to that which is independent of it. It is the object which is now 
determining of philosophical truth. And it is this which constitutes the inherent 
mysticism of Murdochian and Wcilian Platonism. If truth resides in the object it 
remains "other" to the subject. In contrast to the clarity and distinctness of the 
Cartesian object, the Platonic object is unclear, indistinct, mystical. Indeed for Weil 
(and perhaps less radically for Murdoch) this renewed attention to the object should 
eventually lead to an "annihilation" of subjectivity, another "mystical" tenet which 
can be traced most notably to Meister Eckhart's thinking. Weil moves from the 
evocative principle of "To see a landscape as it is when I am not there... " [Gravity 
and Grace, p. 37] (6) to the more radical "destruction" of the "I" outlined in the 
following passage - 
We possess nothing in the world -a mere chance can strip us of everything - 
except the power to say "I". That is what we have to give to God - in other 
words, to destroy. There is absolutely no other free act which is given us to 
accomplish - only the destruction of the "I" [GG., p. 23]. 
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The tone of this passage is unmistakeably Weilian and perhaps a little too extreme for 
the more sober thinking of Murdoch. There is also the difference that Weil is a more 
avowedly Christian Platonist than Murdoch, notably in the former's employment of 
the term "God" (which Murdoch tends to omit; see Steiner quotation above). These 
(important) differences are emblematic of something not often accredited to 
premodern metaphysics (at least by Dcrrida) - its inherently pluralistic nature. The 
similarities bctwcen the thought of Weil and Murdoch matter more than the 
differences, but there are significant disagreements and this disaffinity is an 
inevitable (if ironic) consequence of a thinking focused exclusively on the "object". 
Or rather it is an inevitable consequence if one's focus is exclusively on a mystical 
object as it is with both Weil and Murdoch. 
Existentialism had claimed to return philosophy to ordinary experience and thus to 
reopen the rigid structures of metaphysics. But in claiming that truth resided in 
subjectivity, each existentialist thinker (as him / herself a subject) became according 
to Murdoch the locus of truth per se and thus laid claim to a definitive and final, 
closed philosophical system. As Steiner observes - 
Murdoch came to feel that the existentialist commitment to the actual world 
was in some deep sense, spurious. Existentialist ontology and models of 
consciousness were abstractions, dogmatic mythologies of closure [No Exit] 
(Steiner, EM. p. xiii). 
Subjectivism therefore appeared to give much room for philosophical freedom, but 
ended in dogmatic univocity. Objectivism (or "realism") in contrast appeared to give 
no room for freedom or disagreement to the extent that there was only one objective 
reality to be apprehended. Ironically, however, because in such realism the power is 
taken away from subjects to offer definitive interpretations of the "object" (to the 
extent that the locus of emphasis is on the object and not on the subject) a new space 
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of philosophical openness develops within which provisional interpretations can be 
offered but no final solutions or "resolutions". This kind of "mysticism" (the term 
here signifying for Murdoch the :n noºt'able nature of the object) has been described 
throughout the thesis as it grounds the various movements of Platonism, the most 
obvious case being Dc Cusa's concept of docta ignorantia. 
Here we see its return in a contemporary setting with the work of Simone Weil and 
Iris Murdoch. As Murdoch observes in Existentialists and Mystics - 
I offer frankly a sketch of a metaphysical theory, a kind of inconclusive 
nondogmatic naturalism [EM., p. 335]. 
This disavowal of conclusiveness and dogmatism by Murdoch creates its own 
problems. Steiner wonders whether the ensuing vulnerability of this contemporary 
brand of Platonism might falter beneath the strength of Dostoevsky's "If there is no 
God, all is allowed" [Forc; t'ord, EM. p. xvi]. Do we not require conclusiveness and 
dogmatism if we are to avoid, for example, Derrida's dissemination? If the answer 
to this question is "yes", the philosophical movement of Platonism will not cure our 
woes. Weil in particular is unrelenting on this point - 
Affliction in itself is not enough for the attainment of total detachment. 
Unconsoled affliction is necessary. There must be no consolation - no 
apparent consolation. Ineffable consolation then comes down [GG., p. 12]. 
To reduotc another Weilian principle: "the will is obedience not resolution". But 
although there is no subjective resolution ("no consolation") there is, it could be said, 
an objective resolution. Even Weil acknowledges this with her reference to an 
"ineffable consolation". What differentiates Platonism from deconstruction is that the 
former combines subjective confusion with a continuous acknowledgement and 
reverence for an Object beyond this confusion (however inaccessible). Murdoch 
makes an analogous point when she considers the term "reality" - 
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Philosophical difficulties may arise if we try to give any single organised 
background sense to the normative word "reality". But this word may be used 
as a philosophical term provided its limitations are understood [EM., p. 332]. 
On this interpretation, there is a "reality", there is an "Object", there is a "God", 
however much we may be reticent in employing these enigmatic terms. It is this faith 
(pistis) which makes Platonism such a specific and important part of the discussion 
concerning the future of philosophy, with particular reference to the so-called epoch 
of postmodernity. 
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